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In Defence of the Vegan Project

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Abstract The vegan project is defined as the project that strives for radical legal reform to pass laws that would reserve the consumption of animal products to a very narrow range of situations, resulting in vegan diets being the default diets for the majority of human beings. Two objections that have been raised against such a project are described. The first is that such a project would jeopardise the nutritional adequacy of human diets. The second is that it would alienate human beings from nature. It is argued that neither undermines the vegan project.

Keywords Animal ethics; Animal law; Global health; Veganism

Introduction

In earlier work I argued that minimal moral veganism is the theory that people should adopt if they agree with the view that killing animals for food is, in most situations, more problematic than killing plants and fungi (Deckers 2009, 2011a, 2011b). It is “minimal” as it does not require that human beings abstain from eating the products derived from animals in all situations. It is a moral theory that can be adopted by all people, even by those who ought not to adopt vegan diets for personal, social, or ecological reasons. It is a theory that defends that vegan diets should be the default diets for the majority of the human population.

Clearly, not everyone could adopt a vegan diet, even if he or she wanted to. Some Inuit who live in Northern Canada, for example, may not be able to enjoy a diet that is nutritionally adequate unless they eat some animal products. Whereas the argument could be made that they should therefore either relocate or rely more on the importation of fruits and vegetables, both options are not without their moral problems: The former raises the issue whether it would be justified to demand that people relocate when they might have deep feelings of connectedness to the land on which they live; the latter raises the issue whether it would be justified to increase a population’s nutritional dependency as well as its food miles.

I shall not entertain myself here with the question of whether or not it would be ethical for Inuit to adopt vegan diets. The main concern that underpins my choice for minimal moral veganism does not pertain to the activities of the Inuit living in Northern Canada; rather, it pertains to the systematic, planned control that human beings exert over farmed animals, often from before they are conceived until they are killed. In this paper, I focus on the question of whether or not it is morally required for the majority of the human population to adopt vegan diets. In the first part of this article, I answer this question by introducing the vegan project. In the second part, I reply to two objections that have been raised against such a project.

What Is the Vegan Project and Why Should It Be Adopted?

Elsewhere I have argued that policy-makers ought to create laws that demand a qualified ban on the consumption of farmed animal products (Deckers 2010a). Having argued that, in many situations, killing wild and feral animals ought also to be avoided, this resulted in a commitment to minimal moral veganism (Deckers 2009, 2011a, 2011b). This theory defends the view that the consumption of animal products should be allowed only in situations when not doing so

would produce unacceptably large negative personal, social, or ecological impacts and in some situations where such consumption is not associated in any way with the intentional killing of animals for food. My support for minimal moral veganism stems at least in part from a concern with killing animals when doing so is not motivated by the desire to liberate the animal from a protracted and painful death. This concern relates partly to the assumption that many animals are made to suffer pain when human beings use and kill them, whilst there seems to be less evidence for the view that plants and fungi might suffer under similar circumstances. Many methods that are used to kill animals are known to inflict pain (Shields et al. 2010; Atkinson et al. 2012; Bergqvist and Gunnarson 2013). However, even if it might be theoretically possible to look after and to kill animals without inflicting pain on them, I still take issue with the painless killing of animals where doing so is not motivated by compassion for animals who would otherwise suffer drawn-out, distressing deaths. Compared to plants and fungi, animals appear to possess greater degrees of conscious control over their lives. When we kill them, as well as more generally when we use them to produce food for us, we often seize a significant amount of control over their lives. Though we also take control over the lives of plants and fungi when we kill them for food, I adopt the view that this is less troublesome in light of the plausibility that their lives may matter less to them. Animals, by contrast, appear to value the ability to live independently a great deal. Even if their capacities to do so vary, I think we should attach great moral significance to their capacities for autonomous living. Accordingly, I disagree with the claim made in personal communication (in a meeting on December 14, 2011) by Sandra Edwards—a scholar who researches animal welfare at Newcastle University—that we do animals a favour by removing them from nature’s brutality through domestication and thus saving them from more painful natural deaths, even if doing so might provide them with a higher standard of welfare than the welfare that they would have enjoyed if they had lived in nature.

In earlier work I developed a moral theory that measures what is good and bad in terms of the negative and positive Global Health Impacts (GHIs) that are produced by moral agents, and I argued that all human beings have a duty to limit their negative GHIs to their fair share (Deckers 2011c). I also provided evidence to suggest that the negative GHIs produced by the farmed animal sector are excessive compared to its positive GHIs (Deckers 2011d). This is so for a number of reasons. Many diets that include animal products not only impact negatively on

other (nonhuman) animals and other parts of nature but also on human health (Deckers 2009). Many nutritionists have questioned the human consumption of animal products. For example, Marsh, Zeuschner, and Saunders argue that “there is now a significant amount of research that demonstrates the health benefits of vegetarian and plant-based diets” (2012, 250), which they associate with reduced risks of some types of cancer, cardiovascular disease, obesity, and diabetes, as well as increased longevity. Likewise, Lanou concludes her “15-year quest to understand the effect of cow milk and other dairy product consumption on human health” by stating that “vegetarians will most likely have healthier outcomes for a host of chronic diseases by limiting or avoiding milk and other dairy products” and that “all nutrients found in milk are readily available in healthier foods from plant sources” (2009, 1640S). Accordingly, vegan diets have been associated with a reduction in health care and other costs (Barnard, Nicholson, and Howard 1995). Vegans also contribute less to the creation of a range of diseases that are produced by the farmed animal sector, for example different strains of pandemic flu and the development of resistance to antibacterial agents among microbes (Akhtar 2012; Deckers 2011e). Many vegan diets use fewer resources, including land, water, and fossil fuels, thus reducing the human hunger that results from our competition over these resources (Deckers 2011f). Most vegan diets also contribute less to climate change and other environmental hazards, such as local air pollution around pig farms (Akhtar 2012; Deckers 2010b).

Whereas minimal moral veganism is not necessarily incompatible with supporting the farming of animals for food, I argue that—in many situations—it requires the adoption of a vegan agricultural system. This is a system of food production that does not include any domesticated animals, other than insects and animals who are used to provide labour and who are not killed in order to provide food. Were citizens of the United Kingdom, for example, to embrace minimal moral veganism, U.K. agriculture would need to change from a mixed to a vegan agricultural system. This is based on the views that the negative GHIs associated with forgoing the products from farmed animals in a country that enjoys a temperate climate and is surrounded by the sea—which allows for relatively energy-efficient transport—would be smaller compared to the negative GHIs produced by a mixed agricultural system, and that using the latter system would imply that U.K. citizens exceed their fair share of negative GHIs. At present, the U.K. agricultural system produces large negative GHIs. This is due to a number of reasons. One reason is that it uses and kills large numbers of farmed animals whose body parts are eaten by

people who do not need to do so to enjoy adequate nutrition. Another reason is that more than half of all the cereal crops that are grown in the United Kingdom is fed to farmed animals, a waste of precious resources. Additionally, a lot of arable land overseas is used to provide feed for farmed animals in the United Kingdom, itself one of the least forested countries in Europe (Keyzer et al. 2005). For example, U.K. farmed animals consume an area the size of Yorkshire in soya, a large part of which is produced on Brazilian land that used to be very rich in biodiversity (WWF 2011). Whereas a radically reformed mixed U.K. system might significantly reduce its negative impacts, it has also been argued that a vegan U.K. agricultural system could produce a similar amount of benefit whilst reducing its negative human health impacts to a similar level (Fairlie 2010). If we include the negative GHIs produced by the systematic control that human beings exert over the lives of farmed animals, it is clear that those who support minimal moral veganism must also endorse the implementation of a vegan agricultural system in the United Kingdom, as well as in many other countries with excessive negative GHIs where a larger amount of net positive GHIs can be produced by such a system compared to the net positive GHIs that might be produced by a mixed agricultural system.

If governments agree either with the specific view that relinquishing our control over the lives of other animals trumps killing animals merely because the products that are rendered from them taste good or with the general theory that vegan diets should be promoted to curtail the negative GHIs from those who would otherwise exceed their fair share, they should create laws that would prohibit the consumption of nearly all animal products. The vegan project is the project that strives for this legal reform. The consumption of animal products would be reserved exclusively for citizens who have morally convincing personal, social, or ecological reasons and for some situations where such consumption is not associated in any way with the killing of animals for food—for example, eating the body parts from animals who had died naturally or accidentally or who had been killed to prevent them from suffering an imminent, painful death from serious injury or disease. Of course, this, too, could be questionable, for example because it might increase the temptation to use other animals—a point that I have developed elsewhere (Deckers 2009). However, it would be justifiable to eat these animals in situations where not doing so might jeopardise one's ability to enjoy adequate nutrition. A second example is products from animals who fulfil important ecological functions and whose lives are not controlled significantly by human beings, including the honey taken from bees who are well

cared for and who pollinate a variety of plants. A third example is products eaten by people who live in areas with relatively great food insecurity where the farming of animals could provide a means to use grass that is grown on land that would otherwise not be able to provide human nutrition. In spite of these examples, I believe that supporting the vegan project requires, in the majority of situations, the adoption of a vegan diet. Without implying that eating products provided by insects can always be justified, I define a vegan diet as a diet that does not include any animal products apart from those that have been produced by insects (e.g., honey), with exclusion of their body parts. Put more simply, a vegan diet is a diet that does not include any products that human beings remove from the bodies of other animals.

Does the Vegan Project Compromise the Nutritional Adequacy of Human Diets?

Whereas I have not come across any convincing objections to the vegan project, I believe nevertheless that two particular objections demand serious consideration. The first objection is that a predominantly vegan global agricultural system would compromise the nutritional adequacy of human diets unjustifiably, either by not providing sufficient animal products for all people who need to consume animal products in order to be healthy or by jeopardising long-term food security. In reply to the first concern, many nutritionists have questioned whether the consumption of animal products is necessary to enjoy good health (Marsh, Zeuschner, and Saunders 2012; Lanou and Castleman 2009). The American Dietetic Association, for example, has argued that “appropriately planned ... vegan diets ... are appropriate for individuals during all stages of the life cycle” (2009, 1266). Whereas I believe that this is correct, I cannot claim to know this with certainty. A friend of mine claims to have been very anaemic and to have passed out regularly whilst she was a vegetarian. The problem disappeared as soon as she followed her doctor’s advice to start eating the body parts of some animals again. I agree with an anonymous reviewer of this article in doubting the dietary advice provided by this doctor. It may well be possible that her anaemia resulted from an increase in the consumption of dairy products whilst she adopted vegetarianism, as such products are known to inhibit the absorption of iron (Hallberg 1998), and it might well have been possible to tackle the problem without resorting to eating animals even if the deficiency was not caused by a greater intake of dairy products. However, I do not wish to contribute to legal reform that might jeopardise either my friend’s

health or the health of any other human being. This is an important reason why the vegan project does not demand the elimination of animal products from all human diets.

In spite of the fact that I have concerns with the consumption of body parts from wild animals, there is at least one crucial moral difference between the consumption of products derived from most farmed animals and the consumption of products derived from wild animals: The lives of the former tend to be controlled to a much larger extent by human beings. Those who are keen supporters of hunting might start warming toward my project, but they might get hot too quickly. I am not arguing for an increase in hunting per se, but I suspect that the number of wild (including feral) animals would increase as the farmed animal sector contracts. I would support the killing of some of these animals for food only to the extent that doing so would be required to ensure that all human beings can be provided with adequate nutrition and in situations where this aim cannot be achieved by other means without producing unacceptably large negative GHIs. I hypothesise that there would be enough animal products to go around to feed those human beings who must consume animal products out of dire health needs, even if many relatively affluent countries in temperate climates prohibited the farming of animals. Should the quantity of body parts provided by wild animals not be sufficient, it may then be necessary to allow the farming of some animals for food. Thus, the vegan project does not turn its back on those who must eat animal products out of necessity to maintain good health. If all human beings have rights to adequate food and health care that I have defended elsewhere (Deckers 2011c, 2011f), then all who agree and who are able to adopt corresponding duties must act appropriately. This includes the provision of support for the implementation of appropriate policy mechanisms to safeguard the rights of all human beings to adequate nutrition, particularly those who may be more vulnerable, as their nutritional requirements may be compromised. In this light, hunting would not be justifiable as a leisurely pursuit of the well-off and well-fed but as an activity that may be required to feed some human beings in some situations.

Despite these considerations, the vegan project has nevertheless been criticised for its failure to buffer human beings sufficiently against the constant threat of food scarcity. Simon Fairlie (2010) devotes several pages of his book *Meat: A Benign Extravagance* to this claim, arguing that a predominantly vegan system would lack the benefits that, within a mixed system, are brought about by the existence of a greater number and range of farmed animals and of the

arable crops that are fed to them. These would act as a “buffer,” protecting human beings from undernutrition and hunger (Fairlie 2010, 114–118). Whilst I have argued elsewhere that the consumption of animal products contributes to human hunger in many situations (Deckers 2011f), Fairlie claims that the adoption of a predominantly vegan global agricultural system would, paradoxically, pose a greater threat to food security compared to a reformed mixed system. Food shortages would be caused either by a rising human population or by crop failures, or by their combination. If this claim is valid, vegan societies might also be free-riding on a general duty to refrain from promoting production systems that might jeopardise human food security.

With regard to the population issue, Fairlie claims that, unlike societies that slaughter a proportion of their domesticated animals once they reach carrying capacity (as the Maring of New Guinea do with their pigs)—before they start intruding on land occupied by neighbouring societies—a predominantly vegan global society would grow larger than a population that adopted a mixed system. This is because it would populate the additional ecological space with human beings, but it would lack the option of slaughtering a significant number of animals to free up space to grow crops to feed the human population more efficiently upon reaching global carrying capacity (Fairlie 2010). Whereas this possibility must be taken seriously, especially since the global human population is already at an all-time high, I do not think that a predominantly vegan global society would necessarily carry on increasing its population until it teetered on the brink of exceeding its carrying capacity. Rather, it is plausible to believe that those who advocate the creation of a society that attends to the care and well-being of animals would also strive to reduce the size of the human population. I have argued elsewhere that those who advocate the creation of such a society must also take and support measures to control the human population, so that many organisms with whom we share this planet can thrive (Deckers 2011c). Not only the extent to which we control the lives of animals but also the extent to which we control the lives of all other organisms must be questioned.

Even if we assume that a largely vegan population would not possess the tendency to become any larger than a population depending on a mixed system, Fairlie maintains that the former would still be less buffered because they would be more vulnerable to crop failures, lacking the existence of a sizeable number and range of farmed animals to protect humans from the associated negative impacts. Whereas some arable crops are grown to feed farmed animals in a

mixed system, Fairlie rightly points out that, in times of crop failures, human populations could not only resort to eating those animals but also to eating the crops that had been destined to feed them. In a predominantly vegan system, this option would be almost absent, so that the risk of human starvation through crop failure would be much greater. I share Fairlie's concern with human food security and would therefore not be willing to advocate the vegan project if it increased our vulnerability to human hunger resulting from crop failures (Deckers 2011f). The challenge that remains is to argue that it is possible to establish both local and global vegan projects that do not increase human vulnerability to crop failures compared to mixed systems. I would like to address this issue by pointing out that there are a number of reasons to believe that, in many locations, the adoption of a predominantly vegan system may be able to provide as much human food security as a mixed system.

First, as mentioned before, it is highly likely that the adoption of the vegan project would be accompanied by a significant rise in feral and wild populations of animals. Whereas it may be more difficult to catch and kill these animals and to provide the products derived from them to those who might not be able to enjoy ethical and adequate nutrition otherwise, their nutritional quality may be better than the products derived from farmed animals (Crawford et al. 2010). Second, farmed animals would not be absent in all vegan systems. Whilst no animals would be killed in such systems in order to produce human food, farmed animals could in some situations justifiably be kept for other purposes, such as traction or transportation. Some human food products could be derived from them, even if the animals were not killed in order to produce food; for example, some of their body parts could be eaten after they had died accidentally or naturally or after they had been killed justifiably on compassionate grounds. This is not to say that their consumption would be free from ethical concerns. Third, whereas the vegan project would limit the number of mixed systems, it would not seek to eliminate them where doing so would produce unacceptably large negative GHIs. Some people in India, for example, lack access to private land where they could grow crops as well as access to cash to purchase food (Devendra 2007). For these people, owning a cow who can graze on public land may be vitally important. It would seem to be highly unethical to deny them a cow if the factors that contribute to their precarious situations cannot be removed. Fourth, some edible arable crops that are grown are not used for food but for other purposes, for example to produce alcohol. As recognised by Fairlie, these crops could be used for food in times of scarcity (Fairlie 2010). In

addition, a growing amount of arable land is used to produce alternatives to fossil fuels. Whereas it would be prudent to grow energy crops that could, when necessary, be used for food purposes as well, the GHIs of any proposals to grow and use potential food crops for biofuels must be very carefully considered. Fairlie rightly points out two major concerns in relation to this: The energy that is provided by many crops that are currently used for biofuels is rather small and the distillation processes involved rely frequently on large central facilities. Therefore, a challenge that must be addressed is whether any (parts of) crops grown for other purposes could be used for food in times of scarcity, without producing worse negative GHIs than if the land on which they are grown were used to feed farmed animals. In spite of this concern, I do not think that a predominantly vegan society would necessarily rely more on the production of inefficient biofuels to maintain the same level of food security as an alternative society. Other strategies could be pursued. Fairlie mentions the option of “banking food in state-controlled granaries which maintain sufficient surpluses” (2010, 117). More generally, as a result of past technological advances, our ability to store crops for a long time and to transport them to those who need them has grown considerably. Advocates of the global vegan project should make sure that further research is carried out in these domains and that all available technologies are used in the interests of maintaining or promoting food security, without increasing negative GHIs. Finally, it is highly likely that the wider adoption of vegan diets would stimulate interest in growing a wider range of vegetables and fruits. This might make the food system more resilient, thus reducing the risks posed by crop failures and any increases in malnutrition and starvation that might result from them.

To sum up: I have argued that the vegan project does not compromise the ability of human beings who need animal products out of dire necessity to enjoy adequate nutrition and that it does not jeopardise long-term human food security, either.

Does the Vegan Project Alienate Human Beings From Nature?

Fairlie also contends that those who advocate the vegan project are, like Peter Singer, “blissfully ignorant about the perils of growing vegetables” (2010, 217). Fairlie’s argument could be labelled as “the fence” argument, as he claims that a vegan agricultural system would require the building of very substantial fences resembling “the fence around Glastonbury festival”—a large popular music festival held annually in England—to keep out pests (2010,

219–220). This relates to the likely increase in feral and wild animal population numbers, resulting in a greater need to keep them away from the arable crops grown for human consumption. Fairlie contends that “the fence represents a logical conclusion of the vegan project [and] the most graphic symbol of the rift between humanity and nature” (2010, 220). Thus, the vegan project would also result in “millions of people living on the wild side of the fence” losing their livelihoods (Fairlie 2010, 225). Fairlie’s fence argument raises a number of concerns that should be addressed. Nevertheless, I think the argument is not without its problems.

The fence that Fairlie is dreading should the vegan project be successful is already there. Domesticated animals must also be fenced in to avoid their encroachment upon arable crops. Admittedly, fences would need to be more robust to withstand the greater ability of some wild animals to transcend boundaries, and we would need to have more of them to be able to cope with burgeoning numbers of such animals in a world where more space would be occupied by land that was managed to a lesser extent by humans. Fairlie conjures up the image of a relatively small number of large fences surrounding huge nature reserves, suggested by his use of the word “the fence” in the singular. In reality, it is likely that the vegan project would consist of a significantly larger patchwork of fences erected both within wildlife areas that are relatively free from human activity as well as outside those areas.

Whereas the ways in which the land would be carved up in a predominantly vegan system might therefore not be as dissimilar from the present situation as he portrays, Fairlie nevertheless asks profound questions about the place that human beings should occupy within the natural world. In Fairlie’s opinion, the fences that would be required to support the vegan project would alienate us from the natural world. However, it must be asked whether it is the vegan project or the agricultural project that marks our separation from nature. In fact, we may need to travel back in time even further. Before the advent of agriculture, gatherer-hunter societies already separated themselves from nature by building shelters. Though some gatherer-hunter societies still exist, most human beings now depend on agriculture. With the start of agriculture—which is, interestingly, represented as a negative event in the book of Genesis—humans started building more permanent shelters as well as fences, thus separating themselves further from the rest of nature, or what is frequently referred to simply as “nature” or “the natural world.” Regardless of one’s view about the attraction of the Garden of Eden—which

was not much of a “garden,” anyway, but more akin to a gatherer-hunter society—a large-scale return to the land of Eden is, at least in the short-term, not desirable in light of the size of the expanding human population, particularly if we adopt the view that all human beings have a right to adequate nutrition. It is not desirable for all human beings to become gatherer-hunters again as the collapse of agriculture would, at least in the short-term, result in an inability to feed all human beings.

The question remains, however, whether the vegan project alienates us further from nature than we are already. One response to this charge would be to simply concede that this is the case, but that we should pay this price for the positive value associated with relinquishing greater control over the lives of animals. I doubt whether this response is convincing. Whereas Fairlie rightly questions the attitudes of those vegans who know very little about what is involved with the production of their food, epitomised perhaps by those who belong to what he calls “soybean civilization” (2010, 225), the vegan project might actually connect humans more with “nature” by a renewed emphasis on growing fruits and vegetables and by questioning the alienation from “nature” that humans have imposed upon other animals. The farmed animal sector has taken a great deal of control away from domesticated animals, who are alienated from the natural environments wherein their wild ancestors used to live. Some domesticated animals would not even be able to live anymore without human assistance. Some breeds of turkeys, for example, have lost the ability to reproduce without human intervention. Fairlie is right to suggest that a predominantly vegan agricultural system would not be able to avoid controlling the lives of animals, whose movements must be inhibited to some extent to protect arable crops. However, the difference between a mixed and a predominantly vegan agricultural system is that, in the former, humans set out to control the lives of farmed animals by planning when they come into existence, where and how they spend their lives, and when they are killed, whereas in the latter most animals would be either wild or feral. Their lives would not be controlled by human beings unless they presented a serious threat to significant human interests, for example when managing them would be required to protect arable crops. Most animals would be allowed to roam freely unless they presented a serious threat to important human interests, in which case a predominantly vegan system would have to use measures to control their movements. Whilst this could be done by fencing them out in many situations, in some situations it may be necessary to kill some animals; for example, when pigeons pose a significant threat to arable

crops, they cannot be deterred and their numbers cannot be controlled in other ways. In many situations, I believe that it is better to fence out wild and feral animals than to fence in domesticated animals.

Fairlie envisages that the vegan project would present someone living in an area that had been designated to become a new wildlife area with the stark choice of “becoming a tourist guide or vegan gamekeeper” or of emigrating to a place where he or she could become an arable farmer (2010, 225). However, these need not be the only options if relatively wild areas could be created and used for a wider range of other human purposes that would be compatible with other animals living there. Whereas Fairlie is correct that more land would be set aside for other animals to roam freely within a predominantly vegan system, a large amount of land freed up by the demise of domesticated animals could still be managed for human purposes; for example, to produce energy alternatives to fossil fuels. In this way, the fact that employment within the farmed animal sector would diminish could be accompanied by the creation of new labour opportunities. To give some examples: A larger number of people would be involved in the erection of fences and in forestry management, and a number of plants that grow either without or with little cultivation and that may be unattractive to other animals could be harvested for medicinal or nutritional purposes.

To sum up: I am not convinced that the vegan project would alienate human beings further from nature, in spite of the fact that Fairlie is right that more efforts would be required to protect arable land from roaming wild and feral animals.

Conclusion

It has been argued that radical legal reform is required to introduce a qualified ban on the consumption of animal products. The vegan project is the project to strive for this reform. I have also argued that the realisation of the vegan project would not alienate us further from nature than we are already and that it is very unlikely that either local or global vegan projects would jeopardise human food adequacy and security more compared to other agricultural projects. I appreciate that there have been times when human beings could not afford to be as fussy about what they ate as we can today. Thanks largely to the mechanisation of agriculture and advances in biotechnology, these times are now over for many of us. Indeed, in a world marked by excessive control over other animals, economic instability, rising food prices and

human hunger, increasing levels of obesity, dwindling resources, accelerating climate change and biodiversity loss, and a rapidly growing human population, I have argued that the continued consumption of animal products by those who have appropriate alternatives is wrong as it increases negative GHIs unjustifiably.

I end by providing some examples of the many important questions that remain to be addressed: How many negative GHIs should we allow to be associated with the consumption of plant foods imported by those who live in areas where insufficient plant foods can be grown to provide adequate human nutrition, before we deem it unacceptable for them to refrain from consuming locally produced farmed animal products? How should we decide on the different moral significance that might be possessed by different animals, e.g., whether or not farming invertebrates may be more acceptable than farming vertebrates in situations where the farming of animals for food could be justified? When might it be acceptable to kill animals in order to protect the plants that are grown for human consumption? It is my hope that more bioethical work will focus on these questions in the future.

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