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**NATO’S adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the agenda a reality**

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**Abstract**

International security institutions play a pivotal role in the realisation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda through their adoption and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. This article examines NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325, drawing upon Cynthia Enloe’s conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ disseminating lessons on gender. In doing so, it finds UNSCR 1325 has been understood to be of ‘added-value’ to the Alliance in two respects: first, to support NATO’s long-established agenda to increase the representation of women in NATO forces; second, as a tool to increase operational effectiveness. I find that NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 emerged as part of a counter discourse. The fact that this counter discourse was put forward by partner states challenges dominant understandings of the direction of policy dissemination within NATO. This case provides salient lessons on the opportunities for – and hindrances to – change through the pursuit of a feminist agenda within an international security institution.

**Key words**

NATO, UNSCR 1325, Women, Peace and Security, Femocrats, Gender, International Organisations, Afghanistan

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the preeminent international security institution spanning Europe and North America. This means that understanding the nature of NATO’s engagement with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) is of considerable importance and requires examination of the unique set of organisational politics arising from NATO’s dual military and political/civilian structure. The article draws upon a feminist security studies framework to interrogate NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2007; the development of the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy on UNSCR 1325; and the resulting military concept, which extended these provisions to NATO-led operations. In order to do so, Cynthia Enloe’s understanding of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ (1983: 131) – sharing lessons on best practice in relation to gender – is used to analyse not only NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 but also how NATO came to view UNSCR 1325 instrumentally as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance. Building on Enloe’s conception, the article outlines the nature of NATO’s particular gender regime as an institution of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012), and conceives of NATO as much more than a collective defence organisation, but rather as a ‘political community in the realm of defence’ (Kitchen, 2010).

In order to do so, the article interrogates NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 in three parts. First, the article contextualises NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 against the backdrop of decades of feminist organising within NATO. This has culminated in the creation of gender machinery in both NATO’s military and political/civilian structures, which now serves to support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. The most significant development has been the creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security in the political/civilian structure. The role of femocrats within NATO structures has
proved crucial; however, as the article shows, these individuals have faced significant challenges. One of these challenges has been the side-lining of WPS as a result of a perception that it is a ‘personal agenda’, even when it is part of an institutional mandate; another is the association of gender with women.

The second part of the article examines the role of NATO members and NATO partners in supporting the emergence of UNSCR 1325 as part of a counter-discourse. This analysis finds that states have come to value UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool with the utility to further their own agendas and increase their influence - incommensurate with their status - within the Alliance. The central role of partner states challenges assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) outward facing and that NATO sets the parameters of the relationship (Webber, Hallams and Smith, 2014: 776). Further, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in conjunction with EAPC serves to symbolise a separation of the WPS agenda from the core business of the Alliance.

Finally, the third part of the article examines the impact that framing UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to NATO has had on the transformative potential of the Resolution. In part, this has resulted from situating UNSCR 1325 as an extension of NATO’s existing agenda to increase the representation of women in the NATO forces but also as a tool to increase operational effectiveness. This analysis situates NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, where the Resolution facilitated a shared starting point from which to foster a community with NATO partners and contributors to the ISAF mission, including Sweden.

This article makes three significant contributions. First, through examining the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the pre-eminent European security actor, NATO, this article makes an important contribution to the understanding of UNSCR 1325 at the regional level. This is
important because NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has created a regional action plan and framework through which the meaning of WPS can and is contested by NATO members (and partner states). Second, it contributes to understandings of how NATO functions as an organisation; the role of critical actors or femocrats in supporting transformative agendas and in particular the value of NATO partnerships for both NATO and partner states. Finally, in developing Cynthia Enloe’s conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’, the article underscores the importance of feminist security studies scholars engaging in the study of international security institutions in order to understand how global gender norms – such as UNSCR 1325 – are shaped by them.

This article draws upon both primary and secondary sources to examine NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. Although much of the information can be found in open sources, including scholarly work and NATO documentation, closed sources offer additional insights. Therefore, confidential semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 officials working for, or at, NATO and based in Belgium or the USA in order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as fully as possible. The interviews took place over a six-month period between February 2014 and August 2014. All of the interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity. For this reason, no distinction is made between individuals employed directly by NATO, NATO members or partner states.

**NATO as a ‘teaching machine’**

In order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 it is necessary to understand how NATO functions as a gender regime. This can be done through examining NATO’s organisational structure and the reproduction of gendered inequalities within it. Gender regimes refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all organisational structures and at the same time are unique to each organisational context
(Walby, 1997: 6). The gender regimes underpinning international security institutions are premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). The concept of hegemonic masculinity refers to the particular set of masculine norms and practices that come to subordinate other masculinities, enabling the continued dominance of men over women (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). Hegemonic masculinity is the norm and is normative, but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be supported by force, it has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the military (in Europe and the US) occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity. This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values.

Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are characterised by the dominance of male bodies and masculine practices (Kronsell, 2011: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990: 146–147). NATO is an organisation dominated by men, who occupy 77.5% of senior management positions and 69% of A-grade staff (NATO, 2012). This inequality is most visible at the top level, with no woman having served as Secretary General and only one woman having served as an Assistant Secretary General.¹ Instead, women are located in administrative and civilian roles where they do reach a gender balance with men (defined by NATO as a 40-60 ratio) (NATO, 2012). This is evidence of the role international organisations play in reproducing and reinforcing power constructed through gender hierarchies (Enloe, 2004: 281), with organisational structure forming a core component of this gendering process (Acker, 1990).

NATO’s gender regime forms the basis of the institution’s role as, what Cynthia Enloe has described, a ‘teaching machine’ and ‘structure for experimentation in gender’ among member states (1983: 131). At the political strategic level, as Enloe (1983) identifies, this extends to
learning lessons on what works, and what does not work in respect of the integration of women into the military (and by extension the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325). This occurs through both formal and informal channels in NATO’s military and political/civilian structures. Enloe’s (1983) understanding of NATO is supported by Kitchen’s (2010:7) contention that NATO is far more than just an alliance brought together against a common threat, but has remained a community bound together by shared values. NATO members, therefore, ‘share a common identity, view their security as intertwined, and see a common destiny’ (Kitchen, 2010: 11). This is important because it allows space for the introduction of a counter-discourse based on values, rather than just a security rationale.

NATO’s political community is underpinned by a commitment to reflexivity and it is through ongoing talk and debate that members demonstrate not only their commitment to this community but create the community (Kitchen, 2010). Building upon this premise, NATO’s unique structure, which relies upon an extensive committee system, supports the organisation’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ enabling member states to focus on specific issues and practicalities, such as UNSCR 1325. NATO is not, in contrast to other international institutions, a ‘cumbersome forum for discussing big issues’ (Wallander, 2000: 724). This allows space for smaller member states to put certain items onto NATO’s agenda and challenges understandings of NATO as an institution whose agenda is primarily dictated by the US acting as the ‘internal socialization agent’ (Flockhart, 2011: 266). It is this conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ that provides the basis for analysing NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. As this article goes on to identify, at NATO ‘learning’ about UNSCR 1325 occurs through both informal (socialisation) and formal (NATO’s gender machinery) structures.

Feminists and femocrats: Advancing feminist agendas at NATO
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 took many feminists by surprise. Cynthia Cockburn (2011), for example, took exception to the adoption of this ‘feminist achievement’ by an organisation perceived as the bastion of militarised masculinity. Indeed, as Nadine Puechguirbal (2010: 179) asks, why would such institutions ‘open the doors to change and share the power and privileges they have accumulated over the years?’. It is here that building upon Enloe’s (1983) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ provides a framework for interrogating NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 from a feminist perspective and understanding how the Resolution came to be on NATO’s agenda.

Feminist agendas are not new to NATO and there is evidence that femocrats have been operating within NATO for over 50 years. For the purpose of this article, femocrats are understood as individuals who act on their own, even in spite of the system, to initiate policy initiatives which benefit women (they do not necessarily have to be women) (Prugl, 2004: 69). It is femocrats who were instrumental in bringing the status of women in the military to the attention of NATO allies and whose actions supported the creation of NATO’s gender machinery, first in the military and then the political/civilian structure. This gender machinery has provided the locus for advancing women’s interests within the Alliance, and now for the integration of UNSCR 1325.

The first NATO Conference on Women took place in Copenhagen in 1961 and was the result of an initiative by senior military women to draw attention to the status, employment conditions and career opportunities for women within NATO forces. The delegates, including those from Denmark, Holland, Norway, UK and USA agreed to organise future conferences, expressing hope that other NATO allies would consider increasing the representation of women in their armed forces (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). Five years later, the Directors’ Conference of Senior Women Officers was hosted by NATO’s Information Service. These two conferences led to the creation of the ad hoc Committee on Women in NATO Forces in 1973, which was officially recognised
by the Military Committee in 1976 (North Atlantic Military Committee, 2014). The goal of Committee on Women in NATO Forces was to share ‘knowledge and information’ with NATO members (and later EAPC partners) on the integration of women into the military in order to create ‘harmony in the workplace’ (Harris, 1997). This Committee and its subsequent iterations would become the focal point of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of women and gender, and later UNSCR 1325.

Over the following decades the Committee on Women in NATO Forces has held an annual conference attended by national delegations from NATO member states and (since 2007) NATO partners (Harris, 1997). Despite this, it was not until the late 1990s that further development occurred at NATO in respect of the status of women in the armed forces, and again this impetus came from femocrats engaged with the issue. In 1997 NATO’s Military Committee approved the creation of an office to support the work of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces on a three-year trial basis. This was the result of lobbying by the then Chairperson of Committee on Women in NATO Forces and the Director of the International Military Staff (IMS) to provide continuity in pursuit of the Committee’s goals (NATO, 2007a) and provided the Alliance with its first formal gender machinery. The office, however, was far from a permanent part of NATO’s structure and it was the efforts of the two femocrats which headed up the Office on Women in NATO Forces (Major Sarah Garcia, supported by Master Sergeant Michele Tyler) which led to the Military Committee granting the office permanent status (NATO, 2007a). This was a significant development which would help facilitate the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NATO’s military structure.

The Office on Women in NATO Forces played a crucial role in supporting the work of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces through the collection of annual reports from member states to monitor the status of women in NATO forces (Obradovic, 2014:52). In 2009 the terms of reference of Committee on Women in NATO Forces were extended to include the
integration of a gender perspective and to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The committee was also renamed as the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and the office as the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 2012). Against this history, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 appears not so much as a surprising development but as a logical progression in the development of NATO’s gender machinery. It also demonstrates that femocrats can work to advance their agendas within resistant institutions. Moreover, NATO’s gender machinery has provided a crucial focal point for the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325, in particular through the extension of the annual reports from member states to include monitoring on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 2012).

The development of gender machinery in NATO’s military structure has only recently been replicated in NATO’s political/civilian structure. The creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in 2012 – approved at NATO’s Chicago Summit – is a significant development in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO. However, this post would have remained vacant had Norway not volunteered to fund the role for two years, appointing Norwegian diplomat Mari Skåre to the post (NATO Official, 2014). At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 the role became a permanent part of NATO’s structure (NATO, 2012). The role of the Special Representative, as a high-level focal point for NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, represents a significant symbolic commitment to the WPS agenda by NATO and was highlighted as best practice for regional organisations in the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Coomaraswamy, 2015).

At the organisational level, the pursuit of a feminist agenda at NATO has drawn attention to the role of femocrats operating within NATO in both the military and political/civilian structures over many decades. These individuals are crucial for supporting transformative
change within organisations, which occurs at the site of ‘everyday routines and practices’ (Kronsell, 2011: 286). Their agenda is both ‘emotional and personal’ (Rao, 2013: location 248), forcing individuals to re-examine their own beliefs and behaviours against the largely hostile backdrop of the organisation they are working to change (Rao, 2013: location 248). This backdrop makes it difficult for femocrats to seek support from colleagues within the organisation. They are also isolated from outside support because they operate in a separate sphere from feminist activists who are, moreover, often resistant to engaging with them (Manuh, Anyidoho, and Pobee-Hayford, 2013: location 1322-1355). The adoption and implementation of the WPS agenda by NATO has exemplified this issue, with a number of NATO Officials interviewed commenting on the personal nature of the WPS agenda. For example, one stated that ‘UNSCR 1325 tends to stoke strange feelings… [and it] becomes emotional’ (NATO Official, 2014). For this individual, it seemed that almost everyone they encountered had a pre-formed opinion on the WPS agenda or a personal experience they could relate in relation to gender, regardless of whether they were supportive of or resistant to the WPS agenda. UNSCR 1325 was not perceived as a ‘neutral’ issue, even if it was – as a different NATO Official put it – a difficult issue to openly oppose (NATO Official, 2014). Tacit resistance was another matter. Another NATO Official highlighted how easy it was to write off the agenda because it was perceived as a personal agenda affecting women, even though it remains, officially, an institutional imperative. This perception serves to place UNSCR 1325 outside of NATO’s core remit and draws attention to the difficulty of mainstreaming a transformative agenda within a resistant institution.

The perception of UNSCR 1325 as an issue which is additional, rather than integral to NATO’s core identity as a defensive institution, has been exacerbated through the overrepresentation of women in posts responsible for delivering on UNSCR 1325, particularly given that a number of these women have no previous experience of, or expertise on the issue (NATO Official,
The implication of women being perceived by extension of their gender as a natural fit for a role working on gender results in the framing of gender as synonymous with women. This performative reproduction of gender (Zalewski, 2010:24) serves to reinforce, rather than challenge existing gender relations (an essential strategy for transformative change within organisations) (Cockburn, 2010: 143). In part, this is a reflection of a weakness within UNSCR 1325 itself, which has framed gender as synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2008: 171). That NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not sought to challenge the logic within the Resolution is to be expected and demonstrates a hindrance to realising transformative agendas in international security institutions.

The emergence of a counter-discourse: The ‘friends of 1325’

NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship (Wallander, 2000: 729). It also challenges understandings of NATO as an institution whose agenda is dictated by the USA acting as the ‘internal socialization agent’ (Flockhart, 2011: 266). This is because of the central role of partner states in supporting the Women, Peace and Security agenda at NATO from the outset. Most significant, is that in a departure from the usual NATO protocol, the proposal for the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 was first heard by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) before being raised at the North Atlantic Council (NATO [Wikileaks] 2007c). The EAPC is a composed of both NATO member and partner states and is merely intended as a forum for dialogue and consultation. This challenge to convention led the Turkish Permanent Representative to raise an objection at the North Atlantic Council that NATO partners had been involved in discussions on an issue requiring action by the senior military authority in NATO. In response, the US Ambassador Nuland suggested the North Atlantic Council approve the measure there and then, which they did (NATO [Wikileaks] 2007c). This discussion suggests
that the Military Committee (as the primary source of military advice to North Atlantic Council) had not put forward a proposal to NAC for a NATO policy on UNSCR 1325. It also demonstrates that norm sharing can be a multi-directional process, with NATO partners having had a significant role in introducing UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda. This is significant given that the widening and broadening of NATO partnerships, including into Asia and the Middle East, necessitates a reassessment of the value of partnerships (for NATO and partners), even if NATO has yet to fully resolve the purpose of such partnerships (Moore, 2012: 57).

The continued role of partner states has proven crucial to the advancement of the WPS agenda at NATO, in particular through an informal ad hoc working group of states (NATO, 2010) known as the ‘friends of 1325’ (NATO Official 2014). The ‘friends of 1325’ brought together a diverse range of 20 states which sought to champion UNSCR 1325 at NATO (NATO 2010), including; Austria, Croatia, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.3 Their reasons for participating varied but in the majority of cases related to WPS being a key foreign policy deliverable and/or the role of femocrats within delegations. The ‘friends of 1325’ understood the importance of consultation with like-minded allies prior to the official negotiations. This was a strategy they employed when they met informally to coordinate strategies for the pursuit of their agenda in meetings (NATO, 2010). This approach has proved pivotal to advancing the WPS agenda at NATO (NATO Official, 2014). However, it should also be noted that membership of the ‘friends of 1325’ group does not equate to a commitment to implementing UNSCR 1325; rather, states have learned the cost of not providing tacit support for the WPS agenda. As one NATO Official put it ‘gender is an issue you can’t be seen not to support’ (NATO Official, 2014). This suggests an understanding of gender at NATO as a non-contentious issue, or even a side-issue and one which does not pose a threat to national agendas. Nevertheless, the ‘friends of 1325’ have provided an important forum through which NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 could be advanced.
The roles of two partner states and members of the ‘friends of 1325’ – Austria and Sweden – are a case in point of how a foreign policy deliverable can be realised at the regional level. For example, Austria played an instrumental role in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 and built upon its track record of championing UNSCR 1325 as part of a foreign policy deliverable at the EU (Holzner in Eyben and Turquet, 2013). Austria proved itself as an effective supporter by acting as a ‘tiger team’ to bring in others to support the agenda (NATO Official, 2014). The centrality of Sweden to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 is unsurprising. Sweden has actively sought to position itself at the centre of global efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and as part of this supported the adoption of NATO’s military concept for implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014: 63). The support of NATO partner states has been pivotal but has also served to symbolically separate the WPS agenda from NATO and position it as somewhat external to the Alliance.

**The ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO**

NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 built upon the decades of feminist organising within NATO and the creation of gender machinery within the organisation; it also relied upon the support of NATO partner states. Nevertheless, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by NATO would not have come about at the time it did without NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan (NATO Official, 2014); as such, Afghanistan has shaped the value NATO places on UNSCR 1325. The challenges of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission required NATO to improve strategic dialogue among contributors (Mattelaer 2011) and UNSCR 1325 offered one shared starting point from which NATO could foster a ‘community of practice’ with partners, including Sweden (Wagnsson, 2011:598). Moreover, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was intended to support NATO’s Comprehensive Approach – an acknowledgement that military means on their own were not enough to achieve operational goals (NATO, 2007b).
This led, in part, to UNSCR 1325 being viewed instrumentally as a tool to increase operational effectiveness when it was adopted by NATO’s military structure.

The focus on UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational effectiveness has been reinforced through Sweden’s role in supporting the adoption of the military concept for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014: 63) and in hosting the ‘Department Head’ for NATO’s gender training at the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) (Rasmussen, 2013). The Swedish Military Representative to the EU and NATO, Major General Karl Engelbrektson, has stressed the importance of including a gender perspective because of the ‘strategic’ and ‘operational effect’ of incorporating diverse perspectives (Engelbrektson, 2011). Again, the central role of Sweden – a NATO partner – can be seen to symbolise the separation of the WPS agenda from NATO and the Alliance’s core purpose as a defence organisation, it has also helped shaped a very particular understanding of the value of UNSCR 1325.

The adoption of the military concept – Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 – in 2009 (subsequently revised in 2012) extended the provisions of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 to NATO’s military structure. The concept built upon the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325, which had stressed the added value of women’s participation in NATO operations ‘due to cultural factors’ but also for ‘successful force generation by mobilizing additional resources’ (NATO/EAPC, 2007). It drew attention to ‘the importance of women in the military forces of the Alliance’ because of ‘the influence they can have in all stages of conflict or crisis… to enhance the effectiveness of NATO-led operations and missions in order to ensure Alliance success’ (NATO, 2009). This framed an essential part of achieving the aims of UNSCR 1325 as the ‘pursuit of [the] real operational use of female soldiers’ (Masdea, 2012: 15). In this respect NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has framed the Resolution as a means to advance NATO’s pre-existing concern with the status of women in NATO forces. An agenda which has
arguably stalled because despite some nominal progress, the representation of women in NATO militaries remains low. For example, Turkey (1%) and Poland (2.9%) have the lowest rates of gender inclusiveness and Hungary (20%) and Latvia (17.2%) have the highest (Obradovic, 2014: 52). However, this framing also links to the Nordic states’ approach to UNSCR 1325, which has focused on increasing the representation of women in the military (Bergman Rosamond, 2014: 18). This is unsurprising given the role Sweden and other Nordic states have had in supporting UNSCR 1325 at NATO, in particular through the ‘friends of 1325’.

The pursuit of the increased representation of women in NATO armed forces, under the auspices of UNSCR 1325, can undermine the transformative potential of integrating a gender perspective when pursued for instrumental reasons (including to increase operational effectiveness). NATO’s concern with the status of women in the military is multifaceted, and while it can be attributed to concern over the ‘manpower’ capacity of member states (Enloe, 1983: 131), it can also serve an ideological purpose (Mathers, 2013: 133) or become ‘a marker of civilizational difference and superiority’ in NATO-led interventions (McBride and Wibben, 2012: 207). For example, McBride and Wibben (2012: 200) find that the gendering of counterinsurgency and the use of Female Engagement Teams as part of the NATO-led ISAF mission was part of an attempt to frame intervention in Afghanistan as a ‘humanitarian, even progressive, mission’. The integration of women in the military in support of broader operational or ideological goals further undermines the transformative potential of integrating a gender perspective, by creating an expectation that women will bring diversity with them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing the existing majority is normalised and constructed ‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012:67). Moreover, this expectation of diversity is in contradiction to the foundation of military training, whereby
a recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part an obedient part of the military whole, able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158).

The integration of women into NATO forces for instrumental purposes therefore supports, rather than challenges, the existing gender regime and reinforces existing gender binaries. Again, it indicates the possibility that UNSCR 1325 can be co-opted to support existing agendas, rather than (solely) to support transformative change.

**Conclusion**

This analysis has drawn attention to the opportunities for – and hindrances to – institutional change in line with feminist goals within international security institutions. It has contextualised NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as a culmination of the decades of incremental progress to put women’s issues and gender onto NATO’s agenda. In doing so, the article has drawn attention to the role of femocrats operating within NATO structures and the challenges they face in pursuing a feminist agenda within a resistant institution. In particular, the emotions invoked by such an agenda increase the possibility that the agenda will be written off as a personal, rather than a professional one, even when it is a defined part of a foreign policy deliverable or institutional mandate. The role of femocrats in supporting the establishment of NATO’s gender machinery has been crucial to the establishment of the institutional knowledge and gender expertise necessary to support NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. NATO’s gender machinery, particularly NATO’s concern with the status of women in NATO armed forces, provided a foundation for UNSCR 1325 to be introduced as part of NATO’s remit.

The critical role of NATO partners and member states in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has demonstrated that in a post-Cold War world it is no longer possible to assume that the aim
of all NATO member states and partners is to influence (just) the USA. Rather, they can use a particular initiative – in this case on UNSCR 1325 – as a tool for public diplomacy on an issue larger states have not taken ownership of, but which can be framed as salient for the Alliance. NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 also challenges dominant understandings of NATO partnerships as solely a means through which NATO can influence partner states.

NATO’s institutional composition and extensive gender machinery have provided opportunities for supporting the adoption of UNSCR 1325. In understanding NATO as a political community it has been possible to understand the effectiveness of the strategies employed by the ‘friends of 1325’ to successfully champion UNSCR 1325. They did so through ongoing discussions within both informal and formal structures and learnt strategies from each other to advance their agenda. This has epitomised one way in which NATO functions as a ‘teaching machine’. NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ also meant that NATO members and partners learnt the value of UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool to further their own interests, incommensurate of status. In one sense, NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged the transformative potential of the Resolution; turning it into an instrumental tool has both limited its transformative potential and made it into an issue states feel they must be seen to support.

In understanding NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ it is possible to comprehend how NATO came to value UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to the alliance and as a tool to increase operational effectiveness both through organisational structures and through the NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan. Yet this has also served to limit how far the adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged NATO’s existing gender regime. UNSCR 1325 can be seen to support the status quo in terms of the prevailing gendered norms which characterise NATO’s organisational structure and NATO-led operations, because the implication of ‘adding value’ is that UNSCR 1325 remains of instrumental importance to NATO, rather than a core part of the organisation’s remit as a collective defence alliance.
Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank all those interviewed for the invaluable knowledge and insight they provided. In addition to the convenors of this special issue, Nicole George and Laura J. Shepherd, the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their detailed and helpful feedback, which has helped to produce a stronger article.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović served as Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy from 2011 to 2014. It is noteworthy that the first woman to hold such a position did so for a something some in NATO would perceive of as a ‘soft issue’.
2 This is not to say that these women did not go onto become experts on the issue and femocrats in their own right.
3 Austria and Sweden are not NATO members but are members of EAPC, Croatia became a NATO member in 2009.
4 The award of Department Head status is a recognition of where NATO’s expertise in a particular area is situated.
5 Manpower is a military term used to describe the number of individuals available for active service. It is a gendered term but (usually) refers to the availability of both men and women to serve.

References


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