Looking at the World Bank’s safeguard reform through the lens of deliberative democracy

Abstract

The sheer amount of non-state participation in the creation of the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) is surely noteworthy. The aim of the Bank’s consultation was to get ‘global’ input and feedback, and with over 8,000 stakeholders from over 63 countries taking part, it is laudable. The extent of the participation challenges the positivist approach to international law-making, which views only states as having the power to make law and raises questions about how to legitimise such international soft-law making. Legitimacy is entangled with democracy, as scholars debate whether democracy is the required benchmark for decision-making processes at international organisations. This article uses deliberative democracy to analyse the ESF consultation process. Whilst, democratic legitimacy has been interpreted to mean inclusivity and participation, deliberative democracy raises a series of hard questions about equality and power that scholarship on global governance needs to grapple with. Although this participatory process at the World Bank challenges traditional narratives in international law, analysing it through a lens of deliberative democracy exposes the work that still needs to be done to discuss democracy in international decision-making.

Keywords: Consultation processes, Deliberative Democracy, The World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework, International Organisations.
1. Introduction

The adoption of the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) on 4th August 2016 was the result of the 'most extensive consultation ever conducted by the World Bank'.\(^1\) Across a four-year period, the World Bank engaged with governments, experts, indigenous peoples, and civil society groups (CSOs). The breadth of participation in the consultation process was coupled with live-streaming of events and online discussions on social media platforms.\(^2\) The aim of the Bank’s consultation was to get ‘global’ input and feedback,\(^3\) and with over 8,000 stakeholders from over 63 countries taking part, the consultation is laudable. The attempts to engage non-state actors, and the attitude of transparency that facilitated world-wide engagement, are symptomatic of the legitimatisation of decision-making at international organisations, which is advocated for by scholars.\(^4\) Ideas of participation, inclusion and transparency have

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\(^4\) See for example, T. Kleinlein, ‘Non-state actors from an international constitutionalism perspective: Participation matters!’ in J. d’Aspremont (ed.),
been offered as markers of legitimacy, but have an elusive relationship with democracy.\textsuperscript{5} This article considers the ESF through the lens of deliberative democracy to expose the types of debates and questions that should underpin a discussion on democracy in international decision-making.

The ESF is the new framework that applies to World Bank investment projects, and it seeks to protect environmental and human rights interests as well as strive for sustainable development. The ESF includes instructions for Bank Staff, as well as other national or international funding agencies,\textsuperscript{6} and it includes ‘standards’ or norms, which are mandatory requirements for borrowing countries and projects.\textsuperscript{7} The Bank argues that the ESF promotes sustainable borrower institutions,\textsuperscript{8} but the Framework has been criticised for giving too much decision-making power to the borrowing countries, rather than generating rules for the borrowing countries to comply with.\textsuperscript{9}

The normative nature and the implications of the ESF demand that the framework is considered legitimate by those affected by it,\textsuperscript{10} but the literature is divided on whether

\textsuperscript{6} The World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing
\textsuperscript{7} The Environmental and Social Standards
\textsuperscript{8} World Bank, The Environmental and Social Framework (2017), at ix
\textsuperscript{9} For example, Human Rights Watch, supra note 2; Khatri, \textit{supra} note 2
\textsuperscript{10} For a discussion on whether it is just law, soft law or other norms that require legitimacy see, S. Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), \textit{The Philosophy of International Law} (2010), 163 at 173; M. Goldmann, ‘We need to cut off the head of the king: past, present and future
democracy is the requisite standard of legitimacy in international decision-making. On the one hand, decision-making within international legal governance is increasingly being held against a so-called ‘democratic’ standard by academics and civil society.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, scholars make deliberate choices to separate ideas of participation, inclusion, accountability and transparency from the transfer of democracy from the nation-state to international governance.\textsuperscript{12} Keenly aware of the opposition to transferring state-based models of democracy to international institutions, scholars, such as Dryzek, argue that deliberative democracy is a more appropriate model for global governance.\textsuperscript{13} Multi-stakeholder consultation processes in international decision-making have been explained as exercises of deliberative democracy.\textsuperscript{14} Building on these debates on the legitimisation of global governance, this article unpacks deliberative democracy and uses it to analyse the World Bank ESF consultation process.

Deliberative democracy can be said to include four components, which are: a *demos* constituted according to social relations rather than territory; an informal public sphere; deliberation; and, an act of decision-making. There is much overlap between the public sphere, deliberation and decision-making, given that the importance of the public sphere lies in its communication of interests, views and concerns to formal decision-making processes.\(^{15}\) For the purposes of this article, three components will be extrapolated: the *demos*, deliberation and the act of making a decision. Deliberative democracy is critiqued for ignoring power-dynamics and homogenising the *demos*.\(^{16}\) Thus, to discuss deliberative democracy requires an understanding of its component parts and the critiques. The ‘global’ scope of the consultation, to the extent that it is suggestive of world-wide participation, can be praised for its inclusion and participation. But, as will be explored in this article, breadth of participation is not sufficient to amount to an exercise in deliberative democracy, which requires genuine connections between the *demos*, deliberation, and the act of decision-making.

This article will discuss the deliberative qualities of the World Bank consultation process using publicly available World Bank reports of the proceedings and the uploaded consultation submissions.\(^{17}\) These reports give a sense of who participated

and through what channels, and the Bank provides commentary on what they took into account and how they responded to comments from participants. However, relying on these summaries of the consultation meetings has its weaknesses: Chatham House rules are used, which makes it difficult to recapture how stakeholders were participating and to ascertain if certain participants had greater leverage or dominance in meetings; some of the documentation is incomplete, with lists of participants not uploaded or in some cases no documentation is provided;\(^{18}\) and although there are sporadic transcriptions of ‘Feedback’ sessions that give insight into the format of meetings, these findings cannot be generalised across the consultation process. Using only the available summaries does limit what inferences can be made about the deliberative quality of the consultation, but a picture of the proceedings emerges.

Reading international decision-making exercises, such as the World Bank’s consultation process, through the lens of deliberative democracy can uncover the difficult questions that international scholarship still needs to grapple with when discussing democracy in international decision-making.\(^{19}\) This article considers the consultation process leading up to the adoption of the ESF from the perspective of deliberative democracy. The first part of the article provides an overview of the reform process. The second part of the article briefly explores the requirements for deliberative democracy and critiques of this model of democracy, which are then used to analyse the consultation process in the third part of the article. In this third part, the

\(^{18}\) For example, there is often no documentation for meetings with development partners in Phase 1, and sometimes documentation for government meetings in Phase 1 are missing. Some participant lists are missing from consultations with civil society and multi-stakeholder meetings in Phase 2.

\(^{19}\) For example, the instrumental and functional approach adopted by Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 5
article will discuss both the types of participants and the quality of the deliberations. It draws on examples from indigenous peoples and human rights issues to demonstrate potential gaps in the consultation process.

2. The World Bank ESF and the Consultation Process

The ESF, approved in 2016, and implemented in October 2018, includes a series of standards to protect people and the environment from the effects of development projects that are financed by the World Bank. The ESF is comprised of a Vision for Sustainable Development, the World Bank Environment and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing (which outlines mandatory requirements for the Bank) and the Environmental and Social Standards (which set out mandatory requirements for Borrowers and projects, and in particular they outline the requirements for Borrowers when identifying and assessing environmental and social risks and impacts arising from investment projects). The ESF guides the deliberations on financing agreements between the World Bank and other entities, as well as governs the oversight and implementation of projects. There are ten Environmental and Social standards (ESS): assessment and management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; Labour and Working Conditions; Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management; Community Health and Safety; Land, Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement; Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities; Cultural Heritage; Financial
Intermediaries; and, Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure. Compliance with the ESF is ensured by the Inspection Panel and the Independent Evaluation Group.

The ESF is criticised for weakening protections in certain aspects.\textsuperscript{20} Rather than a rules-based approach, the ESF favours the national laws of borrowing countries, with academic and civil society actors criticising the relaxed approach adopted by the Bank.\textsuperscript{21} Whether this was a result of deferring too heavily to the interests of Borrowing states or the outcome of balancing poverty reduction and profits,\textsuperscript{22} it highlights how potentially the interests of community groups and civil society actors were less influential in discussions. This section will elaborate on the specific features of the World Bank consultation process.

Reform of the Environmental and Social safeguards was a long process,\textsuperscript{23} with years of consultation and stakeholder participation. In the Bank’s discussions on the reform process, the scale of participation and depth of consultation are key.\textsuperscript{24} Across the four year period the Bank consulted with: Member Countries, known as shareholders;

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{20}See E. Hey, ‘International and the Anthropocene’, (2016) 5(10) ESIL 1, at 4
\bibitem{22}Sovacool, \textit{supra} note 21, at 6
\bibitem{24}World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies’, \textit{supra} note 17
\end{thebibliography}
development partners, such as the EU, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as a meeting with the Japan International Cooperation Agency;\textsuperscript{25} international organisations, including the International Labour Organization, the United Nations, and the United Nations Development Programme; selected experts; and, various stakeholders, which includes indigenous peoples, academics, CSOs, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Bank held consultation meetings with and read submissions from states, indigenous peoples, stakeholders, and ‘project-affected communities’.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, the reform process sparked an online discourse as academics and specialists provided commentary on the process and substance of the ESF.\textsuperscript{27}

In the run up to the consultation process, various stakeholders were incorporated into the review of the Environmental and Social safeguards and possible reforms. The Independent Evaluation Group carried out an assessment of the safeguards and sort feedback from a variety of stakeholders.\textsuperscript{28} In the World Bank’s Approach Paper, which

\textsuperscript{25} World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 3 Feedback Summary (Tokyo, Japan)’, 2 February 2016
\textsuperscript{28} Independent Evaluation Group, \textit{supra} note 23
was a starting point for the consultation process, there are indications that stakeholders had input into its content. Paragraph 35 of the Approach Paper states ‘[s]ome stakeholders have requested the Bank to consider in the review and update process a number of areas that are not addressed under the current set of safeguard policies’. These areas include: ‘human rights, labor and occupational health and safety, gender, disability, the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples, land tenure and natural resources, and climate change’. Whilst, it is unclear which stakeholders had input, and how this input was collected, it is laudable that stakeholders had input into the agenda, which would shape the consultation process. Moreover, the Approach Paper was opened to consultation. In Annex A of the Approach Paper, the Bank lists Consultation Questions that are open-ended and facilitate stakeholder-led reforms. In these questions, the Bank asks for additional factors and examples that should be considered in the reform. The Bank therefore appreciates that stakeholders had different perspectives on the shape of reform, perspectives that might have been excluded in the initial drafting of the Bank’s approach to reform.

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30 ibid
33 ibid, para 35
The World Bank consultation on the ESF was divided into three phases. Phase 1 saw consultations with stakeholders on the approach of the new safeguards. An approach paper was prepared by the World Bank and opened for public consultation. Phase 1 focused on ten thematic areas: areas for improvement, implementation, sustainable development and disabilities, labour and occupational health and safety, human rights, land tenure and natural resources, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples, gender, and climate change. These Phase 1 consultations reached more than 2,000 stakeholders from over 40 countries. The Bank state that it received 81 position papers. In this Phase there were 73 consultation events. As part of this phase, the Bank also held expert focus groups on Gender, Human Rights, Climate Change, Disability, Labour and Occupational Health and Safety, FPIC of Indigenous Peoples, and Land Tenure and Natural Resources, as well as sixteen dedicated dialogues with indigenous peoples.

Phase 2 included the release by the World Bank Board’s Executive Committee on Development and Effectiveness (CODE) of a ‘Proposal Document’ that was open for consultation for three months. During this phase, the Bank held 88 events with

39 Where an “event” might include more than one meeting.
government representations and different stakeholders, which included video conferences, as well as two online consultations. There was an online forum where stakeholders could submit feedback, and the Bank documents 136 received submissions during Phase 2. There were expert focus groups on, Managing Social Risk, Non-discrimination, Labour, two groups on Cultural Heritage, and two on Biodiversity, as well as eight consultation meetings with indigenous peoples. In Phase 2, countries were selected by the Bank to participate to ensure the balanced representation of middle- and low-income economies.

Phase 3 was more concerned with the implementation of the proposed ESF. This Phase included a three-month consultation on a revised draft of the proposed ESF, and on the ‘indicative list of outstanding issues’ drawn up by the Bank. The Executive Directors requested that the focus of the consultation was on ‘implementability from a borrower perspective’, which meant that consultations focused on ‘government officials and project implementation units in borrowing countries’. The Bank convened 72 meetings, 3 online consultations, and received 92 submissions. There were focus groups on Religious concerns, Financial intermediaries, Indigenous people, Non-discrimination, Ensuring Environmental and Social Integrity, and Labour.

42 Ibid, at 3
At each phase of the consultation, the Bank writes a reply to demonstrate how comments are taken into account. ⁴⁶

Throughout the consultation process, there were divergences in relation to certain issues between the borrowing countries and civil society participants and donor countries. On issues such as: land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; FPIC of Indigenous Peoples; Labour issues including those with brokers, agents and other intermediaries; non-discrimination; and, biodiversity conservation, the borrowing countries were concerned with respecting national laws. ⁴⁷ Whilst donor countries and civil society called for strong FPIC for Indigenous Peoples, ‘Borrowers in Africa and in Latin America were also concerned that FPIC could be interpreted as having a veto function’. ⁴⁸ In relation to human rights, it was predominantly the donor countries and civil society participants that called for the incorporation of human rights into the ESF, with borrowing countries ‘noting conflicts with the World Bank’s mandate’ and the identity of the Bank as a reason not to incorporate international human rights. ⁴⁹

The tensions between the various actors and the fundamental differences of opinion on crucial issues highlight some of the challenges when talking about deliberative democracy within international decision-making. The next section outlines the types of debates that a lens of deliberative democracy necessitates.

⁴⁸ Ibid, at 37
⁴⁹ Ibid, at 19
3. Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy is a process of decision-making where relevant actors join to debate common issues. Within deliberative democracy, the needs and interests of each participant are taken into account and treated equally, provided such interests are communicated through reasoned arguments. Within the deliberative model there are two spheres; the informal and the formal. The informal is characterised by debates amongst the people. The formal sphere refers to state-based, public institutions of decision-making, such as assemblies. The informal discussions between civil society actors should be fed into the formal decision-making processes. Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy can be deconstructed into four overlapping component parts: the demarcation of the people, the public sphere, deliberation, and decision-making. Theorists of deliberative democracy stress the efficacy of the public sphere, emphasising that debates within the public sphere must influence decision-making. Given this, this article focuses on three aspects: the demos, deliberation, and the act of making a decision. These aspects of deliberative democracy can be used and critiqued to analyse the World Bank consultation process.

52 Habermas, supra note 15, at 352; N. Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, (1990) 25/26 Social Text 56, at 75
53 Habermas, supra note 15, at 375; Fraser, supra note 52, at 75
3.1 Constructing a Demos

Debates abound within deliberative democratic theory about the appropriate criterion for demarcating demoi. The all-affected principle is criticised for being too broad, and the all-subjected principle is considered too narrow. As the all-subjected principle refers to ‘those who are subject to a given governance structure’, it is not appropriate in this case where there is a soft-law mechanism that regulates negotiations of finance agreements and the distinction between governed and governor is missing. At its broadest, the all-affected principle refers to ‘all and only those who are affected by a decision’. The utility of the ‘all-affected’ approach for global governance is that the demos is fluid and constructed as and when there are decisions to be made.

The meaning of ‘all-affected’ is contested, with scholars debating the threshold requirements. Some have argued for ‘fundamental interests’ as a limit, others consider the extent to which interests are affected. Important interests within global

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54 N. Fraser, *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World* (2010), at 64
56 Fraser, *supra* note 54, at 65. See also L. Valentini, ‘No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? A Systematization and Critique’, (2014) 12(4) *Perspectives on Politics* 789, at 792
57 Näström, *supra* note 55, at 117 and 123
58 Valentini, *supra* note 56, at 793
59 S. Wheatley, *The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law* (2010), at 325
governance might range from human rights\textsuperscript{61} to financial stakes. Financial decision-making at an international level can affect ‘creditor institutions, debtor governments, investors in global financial markets, and residents’.\textsuperscript{62} Constructing an ‘all-affected’ demos within international decision-making is ‘complicated’ because of the range of actors with competing interests.\textsuperscript{63} Scholarship on deliberative global governance has included NGOs, activists, journalists, corporations, members of governments and international organisations within the public sphere.\textsuperscript{64}

Theories of deliberative democracy are predicated on consensus and have traditionally assumed a homogenous polity.\textsuperscript{65} Feminist scholars critique the lack of equality within demoi that are presented as homogenous groups. Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere is predicated on the idea that the participants were social equals, but this is an assumption that effectively works to bracket the participants’ differences in gender, race and class.\textsuperscript{66} Fraser critiques Habermas’ conceptualisation of the public sphere for being built on communication between particulars ‘as if’ they were equal.\textsuperscript{67} The ‘as if’ assumption ignores the barriers groups might face, such as language, resources and information, and can potentially exclude voices and opinions of certain groups of society.\textsuperscript{68} Asking about the demos within deliberative democracy

\textsuperscript{63} ibid, at 22.
\textsuperscript{64} Dryzek, supra note 15, at 24
\textsuperscript{65} Wheatley, supra note 59, at 106
\textsuperscript{66} See Fraser, supra note 52, at 62
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, at 63
\textsuperscript{68} Young, supra note 16, at 54-55
can raise difficult questions about who should participate within the consultation and the equality between members within that *demos*.

### 3.2 Deliberation and Decision-Making

Deliberation, at its broadest, is suggestive of debate and discussion. Within the models of deliberative democracy there are particular rules that guide deliberation, which include; discussions predicated on reasoned arguments, the idea that no relevant actor is excluded from the discourse, everyone has the opportunity to speak, individuals should listen to one another and respond to one another, individuals should justify their positions to each other, and no one can be coerced.⁶⁹

Participation and inclusion are common markers of legitimacy within the literature on international law and international organisations.⁷⁰ Though, what participation and inclusion mean can vary. For Kuper inclusion refers to the range of actors from different social backgrounds,⁷¹ and for Teubner the utility of participation and inclusion is the plurality.⁷² In essence, these ideas of participation and inclusion speak to the scope of participation, or the number and variation of participants. It is this form of participation-based legitimacy that the Bank appeals to in its promotional and

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⁷⁰ Kleinlein, *supra* note 4, at 41 and 44
informative literature on the ESF. The standard of deliberative democracy is more complicated.

For Habermas, deliberation means ‘[a]ll interested parties should have an equal opportunity to exercise influence in the process of bargaining, “so that all the affected interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing”’. This can be broken down into two potentialities: firstly, equal opportunity to participate and secondly, equal chance of their views prevailing. Crucially, within deliberative democracy, the deliberations must feed into the act of decision-making; it is through reasoned arguments that participants convince one another to form a consensus.

Although deliberative democracy has been championed in scholarship on global governance, these potentialities within Habermas’ the theory weaken the utility of deliberative democracy for consultation processes such as the World Bank’s reform of the ESF. The potential of equal opportunity and of prevailing can be undermined by power-dynamics. Equal opportunity to participate and to prevail at their weakest mean that in principle deliberations must be open to those affected. Young would go further and argue for genuine participation, exposing the obstacles that participants might face when participating. For example, Young highlights how location, language and resources can act as barriers to participation and how voices can be patronised for not

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73 Habermas, supra note 15, at 167; Wheatley, supra note 59, at 104
74 Habermas, supra note 15, at 166
75 Fraser, supra note 54, at 93
76 Young, supra note 15, at 54-55
meeting a prerequisite standard of rationality.\textsuperscript{77} Habermas argues that participants have an equal chance of their opinion prevailing.\textsuperscript{78} Arguably, this means that within deliberative democracy no one actor should be able to claim an advantage.\textsuperscript{79} However, this ignores power dynamics within the demos, where some actors can exert leverage over the decision-making.\textsuperscript{80} For example, Levy has demonstrated how ‘elite’ actors, which could include civil servants and policy-makers, have power to shape deliberative processes.\textsuperscript{81} The potential of equality of opportunity and of prevailing raise a limitation of deliberative democracy; this model of democracy cannot provide guarantees that people’s views will be taken into account. Given this weakness, it is questionable whether deliberative democracy is an appropriate standard for the World Bank consultation process.

Combining the component parts of deliberative democracy with these critiques, offers a rich set of challenges for international decision-making. When outlined, deliberative democracy sets a high threshold; it includes the efficacy of the public-sphere and a genuine connection between the demos, the process of deliberation and the act of decision-making. The critiques, often from feminist theorists, expose how deliberative democracy brackets differences between actors and overlooks potential power-dynamics, which are critical challenges within international decision-making. The next

\textsuperscript{77} ibid; Phillips, \textit{supra} note 15, at 143
\textsuperscript{78} Habermas, \textit{supra} note 15, at 167
\textsuperscript{79} Wheatley, \textit{supra} note 59, at 103
\textsuperscript{80} Phillips, \textit{supra} note 15, at 147
section will use both the components of deliberative democracy and these critiques to analyse the World Bank consultation on the ESF.

4. Deliberative Democracy and the World Bank Safeguard Reform

4.1 The World Bank ESF demos

Using the ‘all-affected’ principle to demarcate a demos, raises questions about the types of actors participating in the ESF consultation. The ESF impacts on a number of different categories of persons, and therefore potentially “affects” a range of actors. The World Bank ESF, the ESS and the Policy for Investment Project Financing is directed at borrowing states, the Bank, and donor states. Within the ESF, there are obligations on borrowing states, due diligence obligation for the Bank, and instructions on relations with donor states and multilateral or bilateral funding agencies.82 Thus, ‘affected’ could include borrowing countries, the Bank, and donor countries. These actors could be considered to be ‘affected’ because the ESF places obligations on them.

82 World Bank, The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (2017), at 4-5 and 55
The ESF also has implications for the countries where the Bank finances projects. This means that the ESF affects states in receipt of funding, as well as the communities that are both positively and/or adversely affected by the financing of projects.\textsuperscript{83} Indigenous peoples are “affected” by the ESF both because Bank-financed projects can encroach on their rights, but also because they have participatory rights that are protected by the ESF. Within the consultation process, indigenous people had a stake in what the ESF would say about the scope of their participatory rights. Other funding agencies have to reach ‘materially consistent’ standards with the ESF,\textsuperscript{84} and it is therefore arguable that they have a stake in the content of the ESF.

Attempts to narrow the ‘all-affected’ principle refer to fundamental interests or take into account interests that are significantly affected.\textsuperscript{85} This might exclude other funding agencies that were interested in the outcome of ESF reform, but did not have a fundamental interest at stake. Yet, these limits on the all-affected principle are subjectively defined and could lead to problems in the case of ESF where fundamental interests such as human rights, environmental concerns and financial assets are at stake.\textsuperscript{86} Within the ESF, the human rights of project-affected communities are being balanced against the financial assets of the Bank and its donor countries, and the potential financial interests of borrowing countries.\textsuperscript{87}

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\textsuperscript{83} Human rights violations via Bank financed projects are documented. See for example, M. Heupel, ‘Human Rights Protection in World Bank Lending: Following the lead of the US Congress’, in M. Heupel and M. Zürn (ed.), \textit{Protecting the Individual from International Authority} (2017), 241 at 241
\textsuperscript{84} World Bank, \textit{The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework} (2017), at 5
\textsuperscript{85} Valentini, \textit{supra} note 56, at 793
\textsuperscript{86} Wheatley, \textit{supra} note 59, at 325
\textsuperscript{87} For a discussion on possibility in the \textit{demos}, see Goodin, \textit{supra} note 60
Discussing the ‘all-affected’ principle as the criterion for demarcating a group of relevant actors in the ESF consultation process highlights that increased plurality of actors does not necessarily ensure that the interests of the people, represented through civil society actors, are protected. In this instance, the Bank’s choice of actors balances the interests of communities with the interests of the Bank, borrowing countries and donor countries.

When reading the ESF through a democratic lens, a pertinent question is how the World Bank constructed the *demos*. In this World Bank consultation, there is a mixture of selection and self-selection. The Bank made decisions on the experts to consult and the Participants questioned the Bank’s process for selecting these experts, highlighting that experts on gender were not included in aspects of Phase 1. The Bank selects which actors consult on which questions. For example, in paragraph 35 of the Approach Paper it states, ‘[t]he Bank will undertake an internal dialogue on these areas, followed by consultations with *shareholders* and *external experts*’. This means that there is a range of issues, which includes human rights, gender, disability, natural resources and climate change, where the Bank proposed to open consultation only to shareholders (i.e. Member States), external experts, and Bank staff. Thus, potentially ignoring the views of communities. Moreover, as noted above, in Phase

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88 World Bank ‘Preliminary Report Out on Phase 1 of the Safeguards Review Consultations (Washington, DC)’, 20 April 2013, at 67
90 della Porta criticises deliberative processes that focus on experts, rather than citizens. D. della Porta, *Can Democracy be Saved?* (2013), at 174
2, the Bank selected countries to ensure a balance of middle- and low-income economies, and in Phase 3 the Bank concentrated on consulting with government officials and implementations units within borrowing countries.

The World Bank set out to be global in scope; the consultation process was supposed to engage people, groups, and governments from around the world. Whilst stakeholders were invited by the Bank, there was a process for other stakeholders to register to attend.91 This online registration process is arguably available to all. Importantly, the Bank followed its Consultation Guidelines and examples of international good practice on consultations. This meant that consultation meetings were advertised in advance. Importantly, the Bank stressed its effort to ensure that its processes were accessible to those persons that faced obstacles to participation; '[t]he World Bank made a special effort to reach out to stakeholders in rural and hard to reach areas, such as indigenous groups and people living in rural areas'92 and '[c]onsultation venues were accessible for persons with disabilities', sign language interpreters were available, and copies of the materials were printed in Braille.93

However, summaries and transcripts of the consultation meetings with multiple-stakeholders highlight the limits of the Bank’s efforts to be inclusionary. There are repeated complaints about the short-notice given for consultations,94 and the lack of

92 Ibid
93 Ibid
94 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Feedback Summary (Dakar, Senegal)’, 18 November
time to read circulated documentation. Participants note the choice of locations for some of the consultation meetings were difficult for more rural populations or isolated people to attend. Comments are made about the lack of translations for local languages, creating barriers to participation. With respect to disability access, in Phase 1 of the consultation, a speaker complained of the lack of facilities for disabled persons:

There were no arrangements made to facilitate the participation of disabled persons in this consultation meeting. For example, there were no documents in Braille provided for the visually impaired, neither could they have access to the Power Point or complete the registration forms. There was no sign language interpreter for the hearing impaired. It should not be claimed that these

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96 World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Consultations – Feedback Summary (Beirut, Lebanon)’, 3 November 2014, at 1


In contrast, in Egypt participants praised the Bank for holding the consultation in Arabic and for translating documentation: World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Consultations – Feedback Summary (Beirut, Lebanon)’, 3 November 2014, at 1.
consultation meetings are open and accessible to all if this is in theory only; they should be open in real terms.\textsuperscript{98}

Similarly, in Phase 2, there were continued calls for documentation to be made available in Braille or enlarged print.\textsuperscript{99}

Moreover, comments from the consultation process highlight that there were peoples that did not or could not participate in the consultation process. One participant stated: ‘I think one of my main concerns throughout this process is that it happened so quickly and that the communities are actually not here […]’,\textsuperscript{100} and another gave the example of a community organisation that represents persons impacted by the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, an organisation that was not told about the consultation and were told it was ‘too late to attend the multi-stakeholder consultation’ when they tried to register.\textsuperscript{101} In Latin America, ‘major indigenous peoples’ organizations were not aware of the consultations happening in their countries’.\textsuperscript{102} Requests for consultations by CSOs were left unaddressed by the Bank; for example, one participant argued that the Bank had not responded to requests for consultation in Montreal.\textsuperscript{103} One participant highlighted that diaspora communities were not consulted during Phase 1, despite the

\textsuperscript{98} World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Consultation Meeting with Civil Society Organizations, (Buenos Aires, Argentina)’, 12 March 2013, at 3
\textsuperscript{99} World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Consultations – Feedback Summary (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)’, 4 November 2014, at 1
\textsuperscript{100} World Bank, ‘Safeguard Policies Review – Consultation Meeting (Washington, DC)’, 15 November 2012
\textsuperscript{101} World Bank, ‘Preliminary Report Out on Phase 1 of the Safeguards Review Consultations (Washington, DC)’, 20 April 2013, at 30
\textsuperscript{102} ibid, at 30
\textsuperscript{103} World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Feedback Summary (Ottawa, Canada), 7 January 2015, at 1
impact climate change has on those communities, and another argued that ‘peasant organizations, as well as relevant sub-groups, including small family farmers’ were not present in discussions in Paraguay. These sorts of comments highlight that voices were left out of the consultation process. Feminist scholars have highlighted how a commitment to equality can work to bracket structural inequalities of power between these different actors. These comments from the consultation highlight the obstacles to genuine participation for certain communities.

To meet the standard of deliberative democracy, the participants in the ESF consultation process would need to be ‘all interested parties’, but reliance on this criterion alone to demarcate the demos is problematic. Focus on demarcating the demos using ‘all-affected’ allows for the participation of powerful economic actors and communities of people. Deliberative democracy, as a form of procedural legitimisation, focused on treating participants ‘as equals’, cannot ensure the protection of substantive rights nor a ‘just’ outcome. Merely focusing on demarcating a demos using mechanisms such as the ‘all-affected’ criterion, does not expose the unequal power dynamics between the Bank, the donors, the borrowing countries, and communities and activists, nor the potential barriers to participation for certain groups.

106 See also, World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies. Phase 2 Feedback Summary (Brasilia, Brazil’ 16 December 2014, at 1-2 (suggests that there were several civil society movements missing from consultations); World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Phase 3 Feedback Summary (New Delhi India’), 5 November 2015, at 1 (suggests people were not invited to the consultation)
107 Young, supra note 16, at 81 and 108
108 Habermas, supra note 15, at 167
This discussion on *demos* highlights that *how* the bank chooses its participants for consultation needs further research and there needs to be a clearer, normative approach to the demarcation of the participants. Going for ‘global’ participation might satisfy a plurality participation-focused idea of legitimacy, but the fusion of actors in this consultation process raises challenges. Feminist critiques of deliberative democracy ask hard questions about who should be included in decision-making processes and how much weight should be accorded to their views. Reading the process using the feminist critiques of an all-affected principle, exposes the inequalities of power that are not necessarily highlighted when discussing deliberative democracy. Asking the democracy question necessitates a debate on who should have a stake in decisions. Whilst, it might be legitimate for both the Bank and the affected communities to have a say in decision-making, it is not necessarily a just outcome that more powerful actors have an ‘equal’ say to the persons that the ESF was designed to project.

4.2 Deliberation and Decision-Making in the ESF consultation process

The Bank in its consultation exercise did construct processes that provide opportunities for a range of actors to participate. As noted above, consideration was given to access requirements for persons and the Bank made efforts to reach rural communities.\(^{109}\) There were a wealth of town-hall meetings that provided space for

\(^{109}\) See text at note 92
participation, and video links were used as a means of extending the participation. The sheer scale of participation, as well as the plurality of actors from a range of social and economic backgrounds that were involved, is praiseworthy.

However, mere inclusion and participation are not sufficient for deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy calls for an understanding of how these groups of people participated.\textsuperscript{110} For deliberative democracy, there must be a genuine connection between the deliberative exercises and the act of decision-making; it is not sufficient for mere deliberation to take place. Deliberative democracy calls for discussions and debates between actors, as the idea is that actors can convince each other to form a consensus. An equal opportunity to participate and an equal opportunity to prevail in deliberations, underpins deliberative democracy.

If those are the ideal standards necessitated by deliberative democracy, then the summarised or transcribed comments from the consultation process expose problems with the deliberations in the ESF consultation. Consultations were often short and did not facilitate deliberation as understood within deliberative democracy. The quality of the consultation was criticised by participants, as the length of meetings was too short and there was not sufficient time to discuss all the issues.\textsuperscript{111} Another concern that was


repeated throughout the process, was that the consultation process did not allow deliberation between stakeholders; meetings with government representations were held separately from the consultation meetings with ‘multi-stakeholders’, often members of CSOs.\(^{112}\) Holding separate meetings obscures reasoned debates between participants, where actors learn from each other and can adapt to reach a consensus.

Civil society actors and Indigenous Peoples were concerned that their comments were not given weight by the Bank.\(^{113}\) One participant argues that the Bank ignored calls from certain community groups, offering ‘insensitive responses’ to the ‘pleas’ from people affected by Bank-supported projects in Guatemala, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Indonesia.\(^{114}\) As the meetings were held with Chatham House rules, and often

2 Consultations – Feedback Summary (Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt’), 28 October 2014, at 1
summarised, it is difficult to assess whether some participants dominated proceedings over others, but it is pointed out that meetings with CSO consultation were shorter than the meetings with governments. Commentary on the meeting in Jakarta states that the meeting was ‘dominated by nongovernmental and CSO organisations’, at the expense of other parties that had been invited. These critiques demonstrate that the consultation was not predicated on an equal opportunity to participate.

The decisions on the ESF were ultimately taken by the Bank management, namely the Development Committee, and approval of the final draft of the ESF was sought from the Board of Executive Directors at the Bank. The Bank acknowledged that consensus between the varying shareholders and stakeholders was difficult to find. There were two prominent methods the Bank used to reconcile differences between stakeholders: one method was to ‘prioritized implementability’, whilst seeking to improve the coverage of environmental and social issues, and another was to argue that negotiation was guided by the Bank’s mandate.

With respect to ‘implementability’, as a principle of reconciliation, there are clear examples where the Bank has weakened provisions so as to accommodate the

concerns of those Borrowing countries implementing the ESSs. For example, in relation to the freedom of association and collective bargaining of workers, borrowing countries argued that there was inconsistency with national laws, and so the Bank ‘clarifies that the objective of supporting the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining of workers would be required in a manner consistent with national law’. Borrowing countries argued that the costs of estimating greenhouse gases is too onerous, and the Bank placed limits on what was expected of borrowing countries. Similarly, in relation to Indigenous Peoples’ FPIC, borrowing countries feared this would amount to a veto, so the Bank ‘clarified that, for the purpose of ESS [on Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Undeserved Traditional Local Communities], consent refers to the collective support of affected Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities for the project activities that affect them, reached through a culturally appropriate process’. This means that projects can go ahead even if some groups or individuals disagree. The Bank states that it was responding to ‘Indigenous Peoples’ interest in FPIC’, but this is disingenuous to the support of and call for strong FPIC during the consultation process. Although it is arguable that within deliberative democracy

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120 ibid, at 21
121 ibid, at 33
122 ibid, at 19
123 ibid
124 ibid
participants cannot claim a privileged position,\textsuperscript{126} within the ESF reform process the borrowing countries had decision-making power, rather than the communities.

The Bank’s Mandate is used as another tool for reconciliation, specifically in the debate on the incorporation of international human rights standards. The Bank states:

\begin{quote}
The multiple and sometimes conflicting voices that claim to represent stakeholders’ interests can lead to a polarized debate, and make it difficult to find consensus. The Bank will seek to strike the right balance, guided by its mandate, its overall development objectives, and implementation considerations.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

In the Management’s Response to the third consultation phase, it states:

\begin{quote}
Consistency with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement was also raised as a major concern. Given the divergent views on human rights coverage in the ESF among shareholders and stakeholders, Management suggests that the current approach, addressing human rights in the Vision statement, be maintained.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} Wheatley, \textit{supra} note 59, at 103


\textsuperscript{128} World Bank, \textit{Summary of Phase 3 Consultations and Bank Management Responses}, August 2015, at 8
Alston (and Human Rights Watch in their submission),¹²⁹ highlight the extent of stakeholders and interested parties petitioning for the inclusion of human rights.¹³⁰ There is a debate on whether the Bank should have incorporated human rights, which will not be expanded upon here as this article is concerned with the process. Despite the calls by civil society actors, the Banks’ mandate prevailed. Any deliberation that could be said to ‘take into account’ the interests and concerns of participating stakeholders is weighed against the Bank’s mandate. In other words, the decision reached is not necessarily led by the concerns of participants, but rather potentially trammelled by the Bank’s mandate. Human rights provisions within the ESF are an example of how in this World Bank consultation process, the negotiation and agreement is not reached through discussions between people and/or their representatives so as to reach consensus through rational debate,¹³¹ but instead agreement is reached by the Bank management.

The Bank’s mandate evolves. It can be currently understood as:

> the World Bank promotes long-term economic development and poverty reduction by providing technical and financial support to help countries reform certain sectors or implement specific projects—such as building schools and health centers, providing water and electricity, fighting disease, and protecting the environment.¹³²

¹³¹ Habermas, supra note 15, at 166
Zweifel points out that in 2006 the Bank’s mandate is interpreted as to ‘fight poverty and improve living standards for people living in the developing world’.\textsuperscript{133} Scholars have highlighted the shifting politicisation of the World Bank as it strives to accommodate global challenges, not least the 2008 economic crisis;\textsuperscript{134} some scholars argue that the reduction of poverty is a rouse to introduce liberal economics;\textsuperscript{135} and others emphasise the Bank’s competitiveness within a market of lenders, which results in the balancing of poverty reduction with profits.\textsuperscript{136} Note also the shift from improving people’s living to helping countries, which could be suggestive of a move to prioritise the developing countries over the interests of the people living there. In theory, if decisions are being made to ensure the reduction of poverty or the improvement of living-conditions, this is in favour of the communities within developing countries. However, the mandate is currently interpreted to refer to helping developing countries, rather than specifically the lives of their people. Another instance of the borrowing counties potentially having more leverage in the decisions on ESF reform and of elites, such as Bank staff, shaping the deliberations.

\textsuperscript{133} Zweifel, supra note 110, at 87. See International Development Association, Articles of Agreement (effective 24 September 1960), at preamble and Article 1
\textsuperscript{135} ibid, at 819; Hey, supra note 20, at 4
Reliance on the mandate and on implementability as tools for reconciliation does not allow the people themselves to decide. Deliberative democracy necessitates a genuine link between deliberations and the act of decision-making, and that link is broken in this consultation process. Under the deliberative democracy model, the decision reached should be one that all participants could agree. For Habermas, consensus means that the decision is based on arguments that ‘convince parties in the same way’. Although this is a highly idealistic threshold, it expresses the crucial role of the people in the act of decision-making. Using deliberative democracy as a lens exposes the gap between the deliberations and the act of decision-making, demonstrating that the weaker role for people within international decision-making.

The commitment to homogeneity within deliberative democracy would treat all participants as equal, and in the case of the ESF consultation process, it would treat donors, borrowers, Bank representatives, civil society representatives, and affected communities as equals. Yet, the demos constructed by the World Bank is far from homogenous and is rather constituted of a series of inequitable power struggles. For example, struggles between donor states and borrowing states, and also between borrowing countries, the Bank and the communities adversely affected by investment projects. This article exposes the Bank’s deference to borrowing countries despite donor countries and civil society actors calling for greater protection in areas such as

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137 della Porta has highlighted the ‘missing links between the consultation, deliberation, decision and monitoring phases […]’ in deliberative processes. della Porta, supra note 90, at 174
138 Habermas, supra note 15, at 166
140 della Porta, supra note 90, at 67
141 Heupel, supra note 83, at 261
human rights and discrimination. \textsuperscript{142} As these actors are considered to be ‘equal’ under deliberative democracy, \textsuperscript{143} there are no mechanisms to ensure that the views of the people are heard, taken into account and acted upon. Within deliberative democracy, people’s views cannot be explicitly prioritised above others, \textsuperscript{144} even though the borrowing states held more sway in this reform process, and rural or isolated groups were denied genuine access to consultation meetings.

The process leading up to the adoption of the Bank’s ESF is laudable in its attempt to engage internal and external stakeholders on a global scale. However, if a model of deliberative democracy is used, there are questions about the quality of discussions in the consultations, the role of the different actors in the consultation process and the respective weight they had in decision-making. Discussing deliberative democracy, and its critiques, exposes the problems within the reform process. It exposes the inequalities of power between participants and the prevailing gulf between communities of people and international decision-making.

5. Conclusion

The World Bank consultation process on the ESF is a genuine attempt to strive for global-wide participatory decision-making. The plethora of non-state actors involved, \textsuperscript{142} ibid, at 261. \textsuperscript{143} Fraser, \textit{supra} note 54, at 93 \textsuperscript{144} Wheatley, \textit{supra} note 59, at 103
the breadth of countries that participated, and the intensity of the three-phase consultation are admirable. Focusing on whether this World Bank consultation process could be explained as an exercise in deliberative democracy, this article highlighted the types of debates that scholars need to have to discuss deliberative democracy within global governance.

This article exposed a number of problems with the ESF consultation process. It highlighted the problems of trying to construct a demos for a consultation process with multiple potential stakeholders, with competing interests, and diverging amounts of leverage within decision-making. In striving for global participation, or even to incorporate those affected by the ESF, the World Bank draws together a demos that differs widely in terms of their respective powers; borrowers and donors, bank staff and communities, as well as activists and civil society are treated as if they were equal. Comments from civil society actors during the consultation process expose the weak nature of the deliberation: there were people who could be said to be affected by the ESF that were not there; civil society actors were kept separate from government actors; and, time constraints meant less opportunities for informed debates. Looking at how the Bank made attempts to reconcile the opinions of different actors, highlights the gaps between the deliberations and the act of decision-making. The World Bank consultation process falls short of the ideal of deliberative democracy, but there is still something to be learned from talking about these sorts of consultation processes through a lens of deliberative democracy.
By using deliberative democracy to analyse the World Bank consultation process, this article uncovers the uncomfortable questions around the types of actors invited to participate and their respective powers in the decision-making process. Critiques of deliberative democracy highlight the extent to which the model ignores power dynamics, brackets questions of difference, and seeks to homogenise the demos through an idea of equality. The weaknesses of the Bank’s consultation process on ESF highlight the challenges that are still faced in relation to power-struggles and injustices within international decision-making. There is still more that needs to be done to integrate people and communities into decision-making. Asking about deliberative democracy can uncover these power-dynamics. Moreover, scholarship that strives to find examples of democratic decision-making should be mindful of the difficult questions that need to be addressed about the people participating in deliberations and their respective powers.