

CHAPTER FOUR

RATIONALISING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
THE CASE OF GREEK SECURITY
PROFESSIONALS

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Introduction

The links between migration and security in Greece started to form in the early 1990s, once the country became an immigration host.¹ Indeed, “[t]he result [of migration to Greece was] [...] the creation of a ubiquitous ‘moral panic’ [...] among the public, the media, and very importantly the police.”² These flows were comprised of people from former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for whom Greece was a final destination. In the early part of the 21st century, Greece also became a transit country for undocumented migrants coming mainly from Asia and Africa. Their final destination is usually in Central, Western and Northern Europe. However, due to the Dublin II regulation³ and the intensification of

¹ Karyotis, G. “Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives, and Implications,” *International Political Sociology* 6, no. 4 (2012): 390-408; Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. “Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 1 (2010): 43-57; Swarts, J. and Karakatsanis, N. M. “The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no. 1 (2012): 33-51; Swarts, J. and Karakatsanis, N. M. “Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15, no. 1 (2013): 97-120.

² Antonopoulos, G. A. “The Limitations of Official Statistics in Relation to the Criminality of Migrants in Greece,” *Police Practice and Research* 6, no. 3 (2005), 251.

³ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for

internal EU border controls they became trapped in Greece, a country which faces an important challenge regarding irregular migration, as its borders are almost all external borders of the EU, except for the Greek-Bulgarian one.⁴ These relatively new flows from Turkey to Greece have significantly increased since 2007.⁵ Thus, because of its geographic location and international obligations, Greece plays an important role in the EU's Internal Security Strategy⁶ and in the external dimension of EU's migration policy.⁷

In this respect, Greece undertook various measures to enhance its external border control, such as establishing the border guard force in 1998, signing bilateral readmission and police cooperation agreements with a number of countries⁸ and cooperating closely with Frontex, among others. Yet, in general terms, the state's reaction to the influx of migrants has been characterised by unpreparedness, inconsistencies and short-termism.⁹ It is within this context that human rights violations in immigration enforcement

examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ 2003 L50/1, now replaced by Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 2013 L180/31.

⁴ Triandafyllidou, A., Maroufouf, M. and Nikolova, M. "Greece: Immigration Towards Greece at the Eve of the 21st Century. A Critical Assessment," *Athens: ELIAMEP IDEAS Working Paper 4* (2009), 46.

⁵ IOM, *Migration in Greece: a country profile 2008* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2009), 40.

⁶ Council Document, *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model*, 5842/2/2010.

⁷ Geddes, A. and Lazarou, E. *Europeanization of Migration Policy and Narratives of Migration Management: The case of Greece*, Sussex: Paper presented at EPRC Workshop Narratives of Migration Management and Cooperation Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex (2008).

⁸ Bosnia and Herzegovina (3547/2007), Bulgaria (2406/1996), Croatia (2350/1995), France (2917/2001), Hungary (3321/2005), Italy (2857/2000), Latvia (2861/2000), Lithuania (2911/2001), Poland (2384/1996), Romania (2301/1995), Slovenia (2353/1995), Switzerland (3726/2008), and Turkey (3030/2002).

⁹ Karyotis, *Securitization*; Triandafyllidou, A. "Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?" *European Journal of Migration and Law* 11, no. 2 (2009): 159-178; Triandafyllidou, A., Dimitriadi, A., Maroufouf, M., Hatziprokopiou, P., Gemi, E., Nikolova, M., and Yousef, K. *Migration in Greece: People, Policies and Practices* (Athens: ELIAMEP and EUI, 2013).

in Greece emerge. The detrimental impact of the “migration-security nexus” for migrants in Greece is not in question.¹⁰ In this respect, Greece has lost a number of European Court of Human Rights cases with regard to its treatment of migrants.¹¹ A broad non-academic literature produced by human rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) has examined the effects of this “nexus” on migrants, refugees and asylum seekers by extensively documenting the unfair deterrence, apprehension and detention practices of the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard.¹²

¹⁰ Karyotis, G. and Skleparis, D. “Qui Bono? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration,” *Griffith Law Review* 22, no. 3 (2013); Karyotis, G. and Skleparis, D. “Migrant Mobilisation during the Economic Crisis: Identity Formation and Dilemmas,” in *Remapping “Crisis”: A Guide to Athens*, eds. M. Tsilimpounidi, and A. Walsh, (London: Zero Books, 2013); Lazaridis, G. and Skleparis, D. “Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek security professionals,” *International Migration* 54, no. 2 (2016); Skleparis, D. “(In)securitization and illiberal practices on the fringe of the EU,” *European Security* 25, no. 1 (2016).

¹¹ Recent cases include *SD v Greece* (53541/2007, 11.6.2009), *Tabesh v Greece* (8256/2007, 26.11.2009), *AA v Greece* (12186/2008, 22.7.2010), *RU v Greece* (2237/2008, 7.6.2011), *Rahimi v Greece* (8687/2008, 4.7.2011), *Grand Chamber MSS v Belgium and Greece* (30696/2009, 21.1.2011).

¹² E.g. CPT, *Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 20 to 27 February 2007* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2008); CPT, *Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 23 to 29 September 2008* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009); CPT, *Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 29 September 2009* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010); CPT, *Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 19 to 27 January 2011* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2012); FRA, *Coping with a Fundamental Rights Emergency: The Situation of Persons Crossing the Greek Land Border in an Irregular Manner* (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2011); HRW, *Stuck in a revolving door: Iraqis and other asylum seekers and migrants at the Greece/Turkey entrance to the European Union* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008); HRW, *No refuge: migrants in Greece* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009); HRW, *Unwelcome Guests: Greek Police abuses of migrants in Athens* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013); Pro Asyl, *The truth may be bitter, but it must be told* (Frankfurt: Friends of Pro Asyl, 2007); Pro Asyl,

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has described the situation for asylum seekers and migrants in Greece as a “humanitarian crisis.”¹³ A recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) criticises specific practices implemented under the “Xenios Zeus” operation, which in August 2012 became the main internal migration control measure, enforced by the Hellenic Police.¹⁴ The report states that the “lengthy and intrusive procedure” of “stop and search” identity checks “amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of liberty”¹⁵ and is unlawful, as it discriminates against people based on their physical characteristics, ethnic and racial profile.¹⁶ Body pat-downs, bag searches, disrespectful treatment, rude, insulting and threatening behaviour, even physical violence are described as routine.¹⁷ In the same manner, external border control practices, such as interceptions and systematic push-backs by the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard have been widely criticised for violating the principle of *non-refoulement*.¹⁸ Moreover, the detention facilities of migrants, particularly in Evros, near Greece’s northern land borders, are characterised as “grim” and equated with “medieval dungeons.”¹⁹ Overcrowding, poor hygiene, sporadic violence and lack of access to legal aid, information and translators, make the facilities “synonymous with brutality, despair and dehumanisation.”²⁰

The situation is out of control (Frankfurt: Friends of Pro Asyl, 2008); Pro Asyl, *Walls of Shame: Accounts from the inside* (Frankfurt: Friends of Pro Asyl, 2012); Pro Asyl, *Pushed back: systematic human rights violations against refugees in the Aegean Sea and at the Greek-Turkish land border* (Frankfurt: Friends of Pro Asyl, 2013).

¹³ “UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece is ‘a humanitarian crisis’”, *UNHCR Briefing Notes*, 21 September 2010, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4c98a0ac9.html> (last visited 28 January 2014).

¹⁴ HRW, *Unwelcome*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3, 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸ See UNHCR, *Observations on Greece as a country of asylum* (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2009); Amnesty International, *Frontier Europe: Human Rights Abuses on Greece’s Border with Turkey* (London: Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom, 2013); Pro Asyl, *Pushed*.

¹⁹ Hellenic League for Human Rights, *Report about the detention facilities of undocumented migrants in Rodopi and Evros* (Athens: Hellenic League for Human Rights, 2009), 10.

²⁰ Pro Asyl, *Pushed*, 3.

However, these unfair internal/external control and detention practices have been largely treated by NGOs and IGOs as isolated cases despite their frequent occurrence, which has been mainly blamed on the lack of resources, infrastructure and education in human rights, and on bureaucratic deficiencies.²¹ In contrast, this chapter argues that the repetition of illicit practices by Greek security professionals derives to a great extent from deeply embedded negative attitudes towards various key issues related to migration in their field.

In this respect, twenty interviews with Greek security professionals in Athens, Lesbos, Orestiada and Alexandroupoli in 2012 and the discourse of eleven master's dissertations²² produced by high-ranking officers during their study at the School of National Security and the Hellenic National Defence College - which train elite security professionals - was analysed. The views expressed in this sample definitely do not reflect the opinions of all Greek security professionals. Yet, they do manifest a particular and quite widespread ethos among them, which was also reflected in the recent polls, where “[m]ore than half of all police officers in Greece voted for the far-right ultra-nationalist party Golden Dawn.”²³ Thus, the aim of this chapter is to map out the rationalities that inform the unlawful practices of the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard. In this respect, it provides an overview of the security professionals' understanding of the Greek “migration-security nexus,” the migrant “other”, the “self”, globalisation and multiculturalism. Additionally, it puts forward an outline of their perceptions of Islam, Turkey, and the role of Greek NGOs. Finally, it presents their reflections on EU and national migration policies, the role of Frontex migration controls, and their own practices.

Framing Theory and Migration

The framing literature offers a useful angle for studying the rationalities, perceptions and opinions that inform the unlawful practices of the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard. Framing involves highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality in discourse “in such a way as to promote a particular

²¹ See FRA, *Coping*.

²² Access to these unclassified dissertations was granted to the researcher after a formal request was submitted to both the School of National Security and the Hellenic National Defence College.

²³ “Half of Greek cops go ultra-nationalist at elections”, *Russia Today*, 16 May 2012, available at <http://rt.com/news/greek-police-vote-nazis-350/> (last visited 28 January 2014).

problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”²⁴ In other words, frames call attention to some elements of reality, while obscuring other aspects.²⁵ They establish the parameters and points of reference for audiences to interpret, categorise and evaluate complex or ambiguous events,²⁶ such as irregular migration. This may be achieved through subtly altering the presentation of an issue or through more direct attempts to draw attention to certain elements of an issue, while ignoring others.²⁷ Thus, frames function like lenses, which are capable of shaping the opinions of individuals regarding a specific issue.²⁸

Broadly speaking then, frames are “schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals to “locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within the world, rendering them meaningful,²⁹ and thereby functioning as experienced organisers and action guides.³⁰ In this respect, frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities” of those who construct and adhere to them by simplifying and condensing elements of the world,³¹ while they “are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning.”³²

In the political and social realms, actors with vested interests are constantly debating with each other the correct or standard way to define/present an issue, each putting forward a specific set of values, actions and policy recommendations.³³ This means that frames do not exist

²⁴ Entman, R. M. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993), 52.

²⁵ Ibid, 55.

²⁶ Benford, R, and Snow, D. “Framing process and social movements: An overview and assessment” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 611-639.

²⁷ Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A. and Oxley, Z. M. “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.” *American Political Science Review* (1997): 567-583.

²⁸ Iyengar, S. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

²⁹ Goffman, E. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 21.

³⁰ Benford and Snow, “Framing,” 614.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Gamson, W. A. *Talking Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 111.

³³ Lavenex, S. “Migration and the EU’s New Eastern Border: Between Realism and Liberalism,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 1 (2001): 24-42; Scheufele,

within a vacuum, but they typically compete directly with each other, while also constrained by “pre-existing meaning, structures or schemas.”³⁴ Those frames that can relate more closely to the specific socio-political and historical context and which can be easily retrieved from memory are more likely to dominate.³⁵

Two main frames compete for dominance with regard to migration.³⁶ On the one hand, the “realist policy frame” predominantly presents migration as a security problem. Following a state-centric approach, the realist frame emphasises “the need to secure borders, restrict migration and homogenise all categories of migrants into a single policing-repression scheme.”³⁷ More particularly, irregular migration is perceived as a direct threat to the state’s legitimacy, as it damages the myth of control of its borders and many of its key institutions, such as the government, the army and the police.³⁸ Moreover, it is perceived as a threat to “our” jobs, personal and social security, moral values, collective identities, and cultural homogeneity.³⁹ When it comes to the control and management of irregular migration then, the only appropriate response from this perspective is to employ a hard stance to suppress it, with the emphasis placed on the strengthening of internal and external border controls as deterrent measures.

On the other hand, the “liberal policy frame” focuses more on the individual, rather than the state. The preoccupation with human rights constitutes the core of this approach, which criticises the consequences of restrictive policies on migrants’ living conditions and human rights.⁴⁰ Moving away from the realist frame that sees migrants as inferior and/or threatening, the liberal frame perceives them as beneficial to the economy and deserving of respect, regardless of their legal status, favouring

D. A. “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” *Journal of Communication* 49, no. 1 (1999): 103-122.

³⁴ Scheufele, “Framing,” 105.

³⁵ Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, “Media.”

³⁶ Lavenex, “Migration”.

³⁷ Karyotis, G. “The Fallacy of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences,” in *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, ed. Lazaridis, G. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 13-14.

³⁸ Anderson, B. R. O.G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (Brooklyn: Verso, 1991).

³⁹ Faist, T. “The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and Security before and after 9/11.” *Migration, citizenship, ethnos* (2006): 103-20.

⁴⁰ Lavenex, “Migration.”

ethnically diverse and multicultural societies. In turn, migration is understood as a natural right, as a symptom of global poverty and war, rather than as a problem in itself that needs to be tackled by any means. In this respect, when it comes to the control and management of irregular migration, the most suitable response from this perspective is to adopt a much more lenient stance, with the emphasis placed on regularisation schemes, integration, and the provision of international protection to those who need it.

The remainder of this chapter aims to map the rationalities, attitudes, perceptions and opinions that constitute the Greek security professionals' frame with regard to various key issues related to migration. It is argued that this frame heavily draws on the "realist policy frame" described above, which, in turn, informs restrictive policies and practices. However, it also deviates from it, towards a more extreme and radical version. Those very departures from the classic "realist policy frame" inform and guide Greek security professionals' unlawful practices in the control and management of irregular migration.

In what follows, this chapter applies Entman's definition of the frame to Greek security professionals' opinions, beliefs, rationalities, reflections and evaluations regarding various issues related to migration. First it presents the definition of migration as a problem according to Greek security professionals, which is followed by their interpretation of the causes of the problem. The security professionals' moral evaluations of migrants in Greece and the attitudes of Greeks towards them, as well as the role of NGOs and Frontex in managing and controlling migration are put forward next. The chapter continues with the treatment recommendation according to Greek security professionals, which is accompanied by their reflections on their own security practices. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings and assesses the challenges that occur for the EU's Internal Security Strategy.

Defining the Problem: Migration as a Security Threat

This section presents the way in which Greek security professionals frame migration. Instead of portraying it as a social issue, they choose to interpret it as a social problem and security threat by drawing attention to particular negative elements of it, while ignoring the positive ones that exist in the "liberal policy frame" discourse. Thus, Greek security professionals frame migration as a public health, political, social and

societal, asymmetric, and economic threat to the country. In this respect, they promote a specific definition of the phenomenon of migration as a multi-level security threat, which constitutes a core element of their frame.

According to one of the interviewed police officers, “[...] migrants are a public health bomb.”⁴¹ New/unknown contagious diseases are brought into the country by illegal migrants,⁴² or their emergence is fostered by migrants’ grave living conditions.⁴³ Additionally, the unregulated inclusion of illegal migrants in the labour market, without any sanitary controls, is another potential factor for the spread of diseases,⁴⁴ as well as prostitution networks that operate without any healthcare monitoring and control.⁴⁵

Moreover, migration creates implications for the diplomatic relations between Greece and other Schengen countries. Drymouisis argues that Greece has been repeatedly accused in the past that it doesn’t contribute efficiently to the deterrence of international migration flows that use the country as a gateway to Europe,⁴⁶ which has resulted in the dispersing of these migrants to other EU and Schengen member states.⁴⁷ Migration also exacerbates the diplomatic relations between Greece and third countries. Koukouras⁴⁸ refers specifically to the issue of Kurdish migrants and refugees in Greece, which has occasionally undermined the Greek-Turkish diplomatic relations. Finally, migration can potentially lead to the creation of large and solid religious/ethnic/national minorities with leverage in the Greek state with the ability to influence its foreign policy. In this regard,

⁴¹ Hellenic Police Officer, Hellenic Police Directorate, Orestiada, 6 April 2012.

⁴² Manos, D. “Muslim economic migrants in Greece and the relevant Greek policy: approach, weaknesses, problems, and national planning within the context of the European reality and the Middle Eastern instability”, *MA Dissertation*, Hellenic National Defence College, 2011, 35.

⁴³ Kokkinis, N. “National security and migration policy”, *MA Dissertation*, School of National Security, 2009, 151.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 152.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ Drymouisis, I. “The Muslim economic migrants in Greece and the relevant Greek political approach (weaknesses, problems and national planning within the context of the European reality and the Middle Eastern systemic instability)”, *MA Dissertation*, Hellenic National Defence College, 2012, 39.

⁴⁷ See “EU plans to exclude wayward Schengen nations”, *Financial Times*, 12 September 2011, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb2a9b0e-da0e-11e0-b199-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UiQfe7U> (last visited 28 January 2014).

⁴⁸ Koukouras, A. “The criminality of aliens in Greece. Myths and reality”, *MA Dissertation*, School of National Security, 2003, 47.

Drymouisis expresses his concerns about the size of the Albanian minority in Greece, which, in combination with Albanian nationalism, can potentially harm Greece.⁴⁹

Additionally, migration poses a social and societal threat to Greece by undermining the demographic, ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity of the country. Indeed, the regularisation of hundreds of thousands of migrants, in combination with their high fertility rates and the persistent Greek demographic problem will result in Greeks becoming a minority in their own country in the future.⁵⁰ Migration is also linked to the increase of criminality and organised crime and the resulting rise of fear, insecurity and racism that leads to social segregation and racist violence.⁵¹ In this respect, Kokkinis argues that racism and xenophobia appeared in Greece simultaneously with the increase of criminality, which was caused by mass migration.⁵² However, according to academic studies, the involvement of migrants in serious criminality was not significant enough to justify the widespread “Albanophobia” in Greece in the 1990s.⁵³

Furthermore, security professionals frame migration as an asymmetric threat to Greece, which is “a threat that does not aim to overpower the defences of its target, but rather to surpass them and attack its weak points.”⁵⁴ Dimitriadis suggests that the possibility of infiltration of terrorists in Greece through illegal migration channels should not be excluded,⁵⁵ as illegal migration always goes hand-in-hand with the terrorist threat.⁵⁶ Barla and

⁴⁹ Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 43.

⁵⁰ Manos, “Muslim,” 32.

⁵¹ Dimitriadis, V. “Migration, illegal migration and criminality in modern Greece”, *MA Dissertation*, School of National Security, 2005, 5; Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 40; Koukouras, “The Criminality,” 87; Tsironis, D., Stamatiadis, G., Daviotis, L., Tsitsimpikos, N., Liakos, G., Papathanasiou, V., Kamnis, I., Varzakis, A., Lerakis, K., Diamantaki, I., and Barkatsas, G. “Guarding land and sea borders and illegal migration in Greece and the European Union”, *MA Dissertation*, Hellenic National Defence College, 2009, 8.

⁵² Kokkinis, “National,” 142.

⁵³ Karydis, V. “Criminality or Criminalization of Migrants in Greece? An Attempt at Synthesis” in *The new European criminology: Crime and social order in Europe*, eds. V. Ruggiero, N. South, and I. Taylor. (Abington: Routledge, 1998).

⁵⁴ Kordalis, V. “New dimensions in Police work as a consequence of the recent policies for legal and illegal immigrants in the European Union and Greece”, *MA Dissertation*, School of National Security, 2006, 135.

⁵⁵ Dimitriadis, “Migration,” 82.

⁵⁶ Kokkinis, “National,” 144.

colleagues suggest that there is fertile ground for the eruption of terrorism in Greece due to the widespread poverty, the large migrant population, their grave living conditions, their illegal status, and their socialisation with outlaws.⁵⁷ Moreover, Greek security professionals believe that Turkey is using illegal migration as a weapon of asymmetric warfare against Greece. Tsironis and colleagues maintain that “Turkey can potentially recruit spies and saboteurs among illegal immigrants that are willing to serve Turkish interests against our own country.”⁵⁸

Finally, migration is framed as an economic threat to Greece. There is a shared belief among Greek security professionals that migration creates parallel economies, leads to a drop in public revenues, burdens social welfare services, and increases unemployment. Drymouisis argues that unskilled illegal migrants strengthen the parallel economy, as they are excluded from the labour market regulations.⁵⁹ In turn, this reduces public revenues, as employers still hire illegal migrants but refrain from paying for their social security, which leads to the burdening of the government budget.⁶⁰ Moreover, migrants are threatening the social welfare system with collapse,⁶¹ as they benefit from it but they don’t contribute anything to it, which leads to the increase of public spending on healthcare, education and national security.⁶² Furthermore, Tsironis and colleagues argue that migration is linked to the rise of unemployment as the native workforce is substituted by the foreign one, which is preferred by the labour market because it is cheaper and more hard-working.⁶³ In contrast, however, a number of academic studies have highlighted the diachronic positive impact of migrants in Greek economy, who, for years, filled in labour shortfalls in vital economic sectors, such as agriculture, and helped keep the country’s inflation low.⁶⁴

⁵⁷ Barla, S., Kokkoros, E., Eteridis, N., and Velentzas, A. “Consequences of the demographic problem and illegal migration in national security: threat or opportunity?”, *MA Dissertation*, School of National Security, 2004, 66.

⁵⁸ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” 9.

⁵⁹ Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 36.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

⁶¹ *Ibid*.

⁶² Manos, “Muslim,” 35.

⁶³ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” 8.

⁶⁴ Antonopoulos, G. A., Tierney, J. and Webster, C. “Police Perception of Migration and Migrants in Greece.” *Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just.* 16 (2008): 353-378; Ioakeimoglou, E. “Migrants and Employment” in *Migrants in Greece*, eds. A. Marvakis, D. Parsanoglou, and M. Pavlou, (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001), 81-94; Lyberaki A., and Pelagidis, T. *The “fear of the*

Causal Interpretation of the Problem

The definition of migration as a problem in the Greek security professionals' frame is followed by the causal interpretation of the issue. The majority of security professionals' master's dissertations provide a detailed description of the push and pull factors that lead people to migrate to Greece: globalisation and multiculturalism, the nature of Islam, the rivalry and proximity with Turkey, and the EU and national migration policies, all feature as key push/pull factors of migration to Greece. In contrast, a large number of academic studies have put forward their own interpretation of the phenomenon. Push factors include the socio-political changes in former socialist countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the civil wars in the Balkans, the collapse of the Albanian regime, and the demographic push in many Third World countries.⁶⁵ Additionally, several pull factors have been suggested by the relevant literature, such as the growing underground economy, the relatively limited flexibility of the Greek labour market, the high seasonality of the Greek economy, and the financial and political stability of the country in the 1990s and 2000s.⁶⁶ Against these explanations, Greek security professionals put forward an altered presentation of the causes of migration to Greece.

Globalisation and Multiculturalism

A number of master's dissertations identify globalisation as the driving force of international migration. These studies present a radical understanding of the notion of globalisation, and, by extension, proceed to a distorted perception of multiculturalism. Elements of various conspiracy

foreigner" in the labour market: Tolerations and prejudices in development, (Athens: Polis, 2000).

⁶⁵ Alipranti-Maratou, L. "Migration to Greece: A New Type and Emerging Problems" in *Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2005*, eds. E., Close, M. Tsianikas, and G. Couvalis, (Adelaide: Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek, 2007), 187.

⁶⁶ Alipranti-Maratou, *Migration*; Antonopoulos, G. A. and Winterdyk, J. "The Smuggling of Migrants in Greece an Examination of Its Social Organization," *European Journal of Criminology* 3, no. 4 (2006): 439-461; Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Arango, J. *Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe*. Vol. 3: (Abingdon: Psychology Press, 1999); King, R., Lazaridis, G. and Tsardanidis, C. *G. Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

theories are predominant in this frame. Kokkinis suggests that international migration is caused by globalisation, which was planned and organised after the end of the Cold War by external forces, and more specifically, the USA.⁶⁷ Globalisation aims at the creation of an “ultra-neoliberal international economic system of trade and a unified global market” with loose national borders.⁶⁸ This process, by definition, leads large masses of people to migrate.⁶⁹ A similar opinion is echoed by Manos, who takes this idea a step further and argues that globalisation is an integral part of the “New World Order,” which involves the loosening and discredit of national borders, and the consistent internal subversion of a state’s national existence in order for peoples with national history, sovereignty, collective consciousness and memory to be substituted by multicultural populations.⁷⁰ In this manner, the nation-state is rendered an outmoded way of organisation, while the dedication to national identity and patriotism is demonised and presented as racist nationalism and xenophobia.⁷¹ With specific regard to Greece, Kokkinis claims that the “New World Order” aims at the “Balkanisation” of the country by dismantling its national identity through the strengthening of the Muslim element in its society in order to act as an antagonist to Russia,⁷² since Islam is de facto antagonistic towards the Russian Orthodox influence in the Balkans.⁷³

In turn, this framing of globalisation produces a very specific understanding of multiculturalism as a tool of restructuring countries for geopolitical and economic reasons. According to this line of thinking, since multiculturalism is a project enforced on Greece by external powers, it has to be resisted. Tsironis and colleagues suggest that it would be a tragedy for Greek people to be deceived and fall for the destruction of their national identity “with these nice words about humanitarianism, universalism, and multiculturalism,” which are presented as an ostensible progressive feat.⁷⁴ Multiculturalism poses “a direct threat to the ethnic and social coherence, national security, and political and state stability of the country”⁷⁵ and it is

⁶⁷ Kokkinis, “National,” 100.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 120.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Manos, “Muslim,” 33.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Kokkinis, “National,” 101.

⁷³ Ibid, 136.

⁷⁴ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” E4.

⁷⁵ Kokkinis, “National,” 119.

the duty of the Greek people to resist it, since “the political, social and spiritual elites of the country seem to have utterly and unquestionably accepted it.”⁷⁶

Islam and Turkey

Two other factors that cause the migration problem in Greece according to Greek security professionals are the nature of Islam and Greece’s proximity and rivalry with Turkey. Again there are elements of conspiracy theories evident in this frame, which are, however, expressed by a minority. Yet, they are indicative of the suspicion and bias, with which the Greek security professionals’ frame is instilled.

Kokkinis suggests that Islam is “impossible to be assimilated by Western civilisation”, as it is a “foreign body” and “incompatible with democracy.”⁷⁷ This deeply negative framing of Islam is combined with a profound sense of suspicion. Drymouisis argues that Muslims migrate to Europe in order to take advantage of the favourable legislation and discourse that allow them to reproduce their own cultural lifestyle.⁷⁸ Kokkinis maintains that Muslim migrants “despise the European lifestyle and conspire to take it over,”⁷⁹ while Barla and colleagues take this idea a step further by arguing that the migration of Muslims to Europe is organised and financed by economically powerful actors that aim to create a strong Muslim enclave in Europe.⁸⁰ In this respect, Drymouisis talks about “a crude and ruthless Islamic imperialism” that threatens the existence of the peoples of Europe.⁸¹

The way in which Islam and Muslim migrants are framed by Greek security professionals also informs their understanding of Turkey and its role in the mass migration of people to Greece. Turkey is generally viewed with suspicion by Greek security professionals, some of whom argue that the problem of irregular migration starts with the fact that “[w]e [i.e. Greeks] have a neighbouring country [i.e. Turkey], with which we have

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 150.

⁷⁸ Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 13-14.

⁷⁹ Kokkinis, “National,” 146.

⁸⁰ Barla *et al.*, “Consequences,” 11.

⁸¹ Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 30.

national sovereignty problems and which also is a Muslim country.”⁸² In this respect, some security professionals argue that Turkey has important national interests in using migration to Europe and Greece for its own benefit. Tsironis and colleagues argue that Turkey is using migrant smuggling as a means to promote its unsubstantiated claims in the Aegean Sea through the conduct of search and rescue operations in Greek territorial waters.⁸³ Manos suggests that migrant smuggling brings great economic benefits to Turkey and argues that the Turkish state fomented illegal smuggling networks in its territory.⁸⁴ Finally, Greek security professionals also believe that Turkey is using migration “as a weapon to destabilise Greece,”⁸⁵ as migrants “create terrible social problems, problems in the healthcare system etc.”⁸⁶

EU and National Migration Policies

EU and Greek immigration policies are also considered as constitutive factors of the migration problem in Greece, according to the security professionals’ frame. Some security professionals reveal their concerns and disappointment with specific EU policies, such as the family reunification directive⁸⁷ and the (then) Dublin II regulation.⁸⁸ Tsironis and colleagues argue that the application of the family reunification directive means that an additional 3-4 million migrants will come to Greece,⁸⁹ and for this reason “the Greek government must abolish the family reunification

⁸² Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 18 January 2012.

⁸³ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” 1.

⁸⁴ Manos, “Muslim,” 40.

⁸⁵ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*.

⁸⁷ Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003 L251/12.

⁸⁸ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ 2003 L50/1, now replaced by Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 2013 L180/31.

⁸⁹ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” E4.

measure.”⁹⁰ Furthermore, Manos argues that the Dublin II regulation constitutes “a huge problem for Greece” as it obliges the country to keep all undocumented migrants that cross its borders.⁹¹

National migration policies have also played their role in the creation of the migration problem in Greece, according to this frame. There is a shared understanding of the relevant legislation as “largely pro-migrant,”⁹² which is seen, however, as a negative characteristic and it is even treated with suspicion: “our country’s migration policy is characterised by a weird tolerance towards migration, which constitutes a pull-factor for waves of illegal migrants.”⁹³ Security professionals are also critical of the regularisation programmes that were implemented in the country in the past as they “rewarded the migrants who entered the country illegally” and they “gave incentive to other migrants to enter the country illegally, hoping that someday they will be regularised too.”⁹⁴ Finally, security professionals are critical of the (then) suggested change in the nationality law, which would incorporate elements of *jus soli*⁹⁵ into the legislation. Manos claims that this would constitute a potential national security threat, adding that such a change would be “the pinnacle of the malaise, weakness, and suspicious indifference of our political system.”⁹⁶

Moral Evaluation of the Problem

Greek security professionals’ frame of migration-related issues also includes the moral evaluation of the roles and qualities of key actors involved in the migration problem. More specifically, security professionals assess the attitudes of Greek people towards migrants *vis-à-vis* the quality of migrants themselves, and they evaluate the role and contribution of NGOs and Frontex in the management and control of irregular migration. In this respect, Greek security professionals’ moral evaluations together with the problem definition and causal interpretation

⁹⁰ Drymouisis, “The Muslim,” 47.

⁹¹ Manos, “Muslim,” 37.

⁹² Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

⁹³ Manos, “Muslim,” 33.

⁹⁴ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” E8.

⁹⁵ *Jus soli*, or else the “right of the soil”, defines citizenship as a territorial birth right. See Brubaker, R. *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁹⁶ Manos, “Muslim,” 39-40.

described above, serve as experience organisers and action guides that inspire and legitimate the treatment recommendation that will be presented in the last section of the chapter.

“Us” v the “Others”

The analysis of Greek security professionals’ interviews and master’s dissertations reveals the moral evaluation of the attitudes of Greek people towards migrants *vis-à-vis* the migrants themselves. There seems to be a shared understanding of “us,” as “friendly,” “hospitable,” “humanitarian” and characterised by a “keen sense of honour” (*philotimo* in Greek). Koukouras maintains that Greeks always had a highly developed sense of hospitality towards the “foreigner.”⁹⁷ In the same manner, Tsironis and colleagues argue that “Greece was always ecumenical and open towards all other people,”⁹⁸ while one of the interviewees argued that “Greece has humanitarianism and hospitality as its flag.”⁹⁹ Additionally, another interviewee stated that “Greeks were never racist.”¹⁰⁰ Indeed, these findings are in line with Antonopoulos.¹⁰¹ Yet, it is common for the police in Greece to adopt racist attitudes towards migrants and to employ various offensive practices.¹⁰²

As far as the framing of the migrant “Other” is concerned, all interviewees referred to migrants as “illegal migrants” (“*lathrometanastes*” in Greek), a term that fails to capture the important distinction between regular/irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The specific choice of this term derives from a certain logic, according to which “in Greece, we don’t have migrants; we only have illegal migrants.”¹⁰³ Moreover, in its heart this frame sees migrants in Greece as inferior people of lower quality and culture. Kokkinis considers immigrants as “pathetic individuals”¹⁰⁴ and “the contemporary version of the barbaric tribes.”¹⁰⁵

⁹⁷ Koukouras, “The Criminality,” 50.

⁹⁸ Tsironis *et al*, “Guarding,” E4.

⁹⁹ Hellenic Police Officer, Hellenic Police Directorate, Orestiada, 6 April 2012.

¹⁰⁰ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 24 January 2012.

¹⁰¹ Antonopoulos, G. A. “Greece: Policing Racist Violence in the ‘Fenceless Vineyard’.” *Race & Class* 48, no. 2 (2006), 92-100.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 95.

¹⁰³ Kokkinis, “National,” 127.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 115.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 96.

Barla and colleagues refer to them as “uncivilised Third Worlders,”¹⁰⁶ while a few security professionals used in our informal discussions extremely demeaning terms to describe them, such as “niggers,” “monkeys,” “apes,” “animals” and “stinkers.” Yet, one of the interviewed police officers was explicit during the formal interview too and used degrading terms, such as “stinkers” and “animals” to portray them.¹⁰⁷ Finally, some of the master’s dissertations employ heavily loaded terms to describe the phenomenon of migration. Manos, for instance, talks about the “whirlwind of illegal migration,”¹⁰⁸ while others, use war-like metaphors, such as “migrant invasion,” “[Greece became] the target of migrants,”¹⁰⁹ and “the armies of miserable migrants.”¹¹⁰

The NGOs

Greek security professionals’ frame also includes the moral evaluation of NGOs. A number of master’s dissertations and interviewees put forward their negative opinions, suspicions and distorted picture in general of NGOs. Moreover, this frame manifests Greek security professionals’ attitude towards human rights. For instance, a Coast Guard officer in Lesbos argued that NGOs “are dealing with human rights, while we [i.e. the Coast Guard] are dealing with border guarding. We respect human rights, but we are not interested in them.”¹¹¹ Another interviewee suggested that members of NGOs are bringing their political ideas with them at work,¹¹² while a third interviewee, moving in the same direction, stated that only people who support SYRIZA¹¹³ are involved in NGOs and human rights protection, adding that “SYRIZA do not like the police.”¹¹⁴ As these quotes manifest, there is a deep misunderstanding regarding what NGOs really are and do. Moreover, they reveal that security professionals see NGOs as politicised actors and bearers of a political agenda.

¹⁰⁶ Barla *et al*, “Consequences,” 65.

¹⁰⁷ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 18 January 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Manos, “Muslim,” 39.

¹⁰⁹ Kokkinis, “National,” 98.

¹¹⁰ Barla *et al*, “Consequences,” 64.

¹¹¹ Hellenic Coast Guard Officer, Lesbos Port Authority, Mtilene, 8 March 2012.

¹¹² Hellenic Police Officer, Hellenic Police Directorate, Orestiada, 6 April 2012.

¹¹³ SYRIZA, or else the Coalition of the Radical Left.

¹¹⁴ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 18 January 2012.

Additionally, they uncover a very specific attitude towards human rights, which are considered of secondary importance.

Indeed, this misunderstanding of the role and mission of NGOs goes deeper. Drymoussis suggests that NGOs “are pushing for the admission of mass illegal migration, adopting a discourse of universal human rights, usually ignoring the fact that the source of power at the international level is always the nation-state.”¹¹⁵ One interviewee also argued that the NGOs’ jobs are not hard compared to what the police officers are doing.¹¹⁶ Finally, other security professionals stated that they couldn’t understand why NGOs even exist as “they are just in it for the money” and “they simply make our [i.e. the police’s] job harder.”¹¹⁷

Frontex

Some security professionals, particularly those involved in asylum procedures, the detention, internal control and management of migrants,¹¹⁸ share a negative evaluation of the role of Frontex in Greece. More specifically, there is a common belief that Frontex has a minimal contribution to the reduction of irregular migration flows. In this respect, one of the interviewees suggested that Frontex can do “nothing at all” about irregular migrants, as “[...] from the moment somebody enters your country illegally [...] you can’t send him back where he came from, since refoulement is not permitted.”¹¹⁹ The same interviewee argued that “what Frontex does is to record these people and let them go. This is the two-faced Europe.”¹²⁰ Echoing these views, another interviewee stated that Frontex officers have been deployed in Greece in order to record all foreigners that enter the country, so that when irregular migrants registered in Greece get arrested in Germany, for instance, then Greece is obliged to accept them back according to the Dublin II regulation.¹²¹ In this regard,

¹¹⁵ Drymoussis, “The Muslim,” 34.

¹¹⁶ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 18 January 2012.

¹¹⁷ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹¹⁸ In other words, in processes where Frontex has no involvement at all.

¹¹⁹ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

“[i]t’s in their [i.e. Frontex’s] interests to record foreigners, because they are incapable of deterring them.”¹²²

Thus, Frontex is framed by Greek security professionals as a force that has been deployed in Greece in order to serve the interests of Central and Western European states. All in all, the stance of the EU is largely perceived as hypocritical. More specifically, security professionals express their disappointment with the lack of solidarity and the unequal responsibility-sharing among EU member states regarding the management of undocumented migrants: “if the EU really wanted to support Greece, then the burden of illegal migrants would be shared among all member states. There is hypocrisy on behalf of the EU.”¹²³

Treatment Recommendation

The chapter has presented so far the definition of migration as a problem, the causal interpretation of the issue and the moral evaluation of the role of various actors involved therein, according to the Greek security professionals’ frame. Nevertheless, frames often include a treatment recommendation of the problem, as was stated above, which informs their action-oriented nature by organising the experience and guiding the practices of those who construct and adhere to them. The treatment recommendation in the Greek security professionals’ frame is partly shaped by their reflections on their very own migration control and management practices presented below.

Greek Security Professionals’ Practices

Security professionals’ reflections revolve around the idea that “the control and deterrence of illegal migration is futile,”¹²⁴ as “migrants will attempt sooner or later to cross the borders illegally using a different route.”¹²⁵ In this respect, one of the interviewees argued that “there is no way to stop somebody from entering Greece; deterrence is impossible.”¹²⁶ In the same manner another interviewee claimed that patrols are pointless, since they do not contribute anything to the control of illegal migration

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Tsironis *et al.*, “Guarding,” H2.

¹²⁶ Hellenic Police Officer, Hellenic Police Directorate, Lesvos, 9 March 2012.

due to the complex methods employed by the smugglers.¹²⁷ However, another factor that renders patrolling and deterrence methods ineffective is the willingness of illegal migrants to be arrested.¹²⁸ Indeed, “illegal migrants want to be arrested [...] because they are aware that being detained is part of their journey,”¹²⁹ but also because “the conditions in detention centres are better compared to the outside world.”¹³⁰ Yet, Greek security professionals express deep resentment regarding their internal migration control mechanisms too. According to one of them “‘sweep operations’ are a smokescreen,”¹³¹ as “illegal migrants just move to a different area; we [i.e. the police] are just transferring the problem.”¹³² Indeed, one of the interviewees stated that “sweep operations” are just “part of the political parties’ political calculations.”¹³³

In this respect, the Hellenic Police seem to have adopted a rather controversial migration control practice: “we detain them [i.e. the irregular migrants] for a few hours, then we release them, and then we arrest and detain them again. In this way we are breaking their nerves and we push them to go to Europe or back to their home countries.”¹³⁴ Indeed, this practice seems to be openly admitted by a member of parliament of the New Democracy party, the main actor of the Greek coalition government: “we must make their [i.e. the irregular migrants’] lives hard in order for them to understand that they are unwanted in the country and leave.”¹³⁵ In the same manner, one of the interviewed police officers in Athens stated that “we must make Greece inhospitable to migrants. I mean that all Greeks must stop our financial relations with them in order to make them

¹²⁷ Hellenic Police Officer, Hellenic Police Directorate, Orestiada, 6 April 2012.

¹²⁸ Manos, “Muslim,” 37.

¹²⁹ Hellenic Coast Guard Officer, Sea Borders Protection Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹³⁰ Border Guard Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 24 January 2012.

¹³¹ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹³² Border Guard Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 24 January 2012.

¹³³ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹³⁴ Border Guard Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 24 January 2012.

¹³⁵ “Adonis: We must make migrants’ lives hard”, *Proto Thema*, 10 June 2013, available at <http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/?aid=285345> (last visited 28 January 2014).

understand that there is nothing here. No charity, no philanthropy, no job offers.”¹³⁶

This treatment recommendation, as radical as it sounds, guides the repeated illicit migration control practices employed by Greek security professionals. Indeed, this logic has been identified by Mauro Palma, President of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, who has argued that Greek authorities intentionally create inhuman detention conditions in order to send a message to would-be migrants that “they will have a hard time in Greece.”¹³⁷

Conclusions

This chapter attempted to shed some light on the frame that guides the recurrent unlawful migration control practices of Greek security professionals. More specifically, it put forward the dominant realist understanding among Greek security professionals of migration as a public health, political, social and societal, asymmetric, and economic threat to Greece. Moreover, it presented their interpretation of the causes of the migration problem that focuses on globalisation and multiculturalism, the nature of Islam, the rivalry and proximity with Turkey, and the ineffective EU and national migration policies. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrated their moral evaluations of the attitudes of Greeks towards migration, migrants themselves, and the role and contribution of NGOs and Frontex in the management and control of migration. Finally, it introduced the treatment of the problem recommended by Greek security professionals that is shaped by their reflections on their very own security practices. These four elements make up the Greek security professionals’ frame of migration and inform, guide and legitimate the recurrent illicit migration control practices of the Greek authorities.

This frame, which is a radical and extreme variation of the “realist policy frame,” and the resulting unlawful security practices pose some serious challenges to the EU Internal Security Strategy. For example, the data processing by law enforcement officers examined by O’Neill, Grant and Blasi Casagran in their chapters to this book would be seriously affected

¹³⁶ Hellenic Police Officer, Attica Aliens’ Police Directorate, Athens, 19 January 2012.

¹³⁷ See “Greece says to illegal immigrants ‘You will have a hard time’”, *To Vima*, 13 January 2012, available at <http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=438602> (last visited 28 January 2014).

by these frames, particularly in the context of the “epistemic community” as examined by Egan. First, they are placing obstacles to the development of a coherent long-term immigration policy in Greece, and they are undermining the full implementation of integrated border management. Second, they increase the death toll of immigrants at the external borders of the EU and damage the Union’s reputation as a defender of human rights, despite the fact that individual member states are held responsible for human rights violations. Third, they compromise the application of the principles of solidarity and cooperation among EU member states and agencies by instilling biases and suspicions in inter-state and inter-agency relations. All in all, they end up jeopardising national and EU security, the very essences of which they aimed to protect in the first place.

One needs to ask if there is a way to alleviate the consequences of this frame and the resulting unlawful security practices on national security and the EU Internal Security Strategy. By building upon the works of sociological institutionalists, Horii explores the impact that Frontex border guard training has brought to the EU external border regime and argues that it has had an integrative effect on it, as it has promoted the socialisation and professionalisation of border guards.¹³⁸ Indeed, the interviewed security professionals that expressed the most negative opinions across the board were those that had not received any kind of Frontex training and were not involved in procedures where socialisation with Frontex officers was mandatory. In contrast, officers who had attended Frontex training seminars and/or were cooperating regularly with foreign officers expressed more moderate opinions. The answer to the above question then could be the expansion of Frontex training programmes across all Greek security professionals, and the introduction of similar “anti-radicalisation” training programmes in the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard Academies, the School of National Security and the Hellenic National Defence College. However, any solution implemented in this regard, should go hand-in-hand with further research on the real and perceived impact of EU migration policies on the member states’ national security and the field of security professionals.

¹³⁸ Horii, S. “It Is About More Than Just Training: The Effect of Frontex Border Guard Training,” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2012): 158-177.

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