Deliberative and Participatory Democracy

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Participatory democracy and deliberative democracy are often confused, equated, or at the very least treated as strongly related theories of democracy (Floridia 2014). It is easy to see why as both theories offer powerful normative critiques of liberal democracy, with protagonists from both arguing it suffers from an avoidable democratic malaise and legitimation crisis, advocating overarching democratic reform and rejuvenation to supplement and improve representative institutions, rather than replace them. In addition, both participatory and deliberative democracy developed in response to the dominance of empirical democratic theory (Schumpeter 1942; Berelson 1952; Downs 1957; Converse 1964), critiquing the negative conclusions drawn about the capacity of citizens (Vitale 2006; Böker and Elstub 2015). Despite these similarities the relationship between the two is highly contested.

There seems to be agreement that deliberative democracy developed from participatory democracy (Bohman 1996; Hauptmann 2001; Vitale 2006; Pateman 2012; della Porta 2013; Floridia 2014; Böker and Elstub 2015). On a methodological level it has been argued that they are indistinguishable (Coppedge et al. 2014) and on a practical one that they suffer from the same flaws (Hardin 2009), including the failure to achieve consequential input into central decision-making processes (Goodin 2012: 806). Some see deliberative democracy as a continuation of participatory democracy (Bohman 1996; Vitale 2006; della Porta 2013) and others a departure (Hauptmann 2001; Goodin 2012; Pateman 2012; Floridia 2014). Deliberative democracy is perceived to be the defence and saviour of the core of participatory democracy by some camps (Bohman 1996: 238; della Porta 2013: 7), and blamed for its subsumption by others (Hauptmann 2001; Pateman 2012). Some argue they are mutually
supportive (Vitale 2006; Cohen 2009; della Porta 2013; Davidson and Elstub 2014); incompatible (Warren 1996a; Mutz 2006; Pateman 2012); or that the relationship is agnostic (Fishkin 2009).

Given these debates, this chapter will explore the relationship between participatory and deliberative democracy; exploring their similarities and differences, compatibilities and tensions, to ascertain whether they should, and can, be pursued in tandem. The chapter starts with a definition and overview of participatory democracy. Section two explores its relationship to deliberative democracy through a typology of democracy based upon two dimensions; who makes decisions and how are decisions made. It is argued that they can be conceived as conceptually distinct, with an ‘aggregative participatory democracy’ that does not value deliberation, and a ‘liberal deliberative democracy’ that that does not require mass citizen participation in deliberation. The case is made that the normative and explanatory potential of each approach is diminished without the presence of the other in these conceptions so it is desirable and coherent to pursue a ‘participatory deliberative democracy’ in which citizens make collective decisions through deliberation. Participatory democracy can enhance and facilitate the inclusion of all relevant reasons and assent from all affected, that is required in a deliberative interpretation of legitimacy. In turn a specific focus on ‘deliberative’ participation makes participatory democracy less vague, can contribute towards delivering the educative effects that political participation is considered to cultivate in citizens, and help reduce inequalities by promoting public reasoning. Section three considers whether it is possible to combine them given the practical challenges presented by complexity in large scale modern societies. On reviewing the mixed empirical evidence, it is concluded that many citizens would welcome more opportunities to participate in,
meaningful and consequential, deliberation. The chapters therefore concludes, in agreement with Cohen (2009, 248), that ‘advancing both is coherent, attractive, and worth our attention.’

1. Participatory Democracy

The origins of participatory democracy lay in the Port Huron Statement produced by the ‘Students for a Democratic Society’ in 1962 (Mansbridge 1983; Floridia 2014). At this time the study of democracy was dominated by empirical democratic theory (Schumpeter 1942; Berelson 1952; Downs 1957; Converse 1964). This school of thought concluded that citizens did not have the inclination or ability to participate, and that democracy was all the better for this. For example, it was suggested that citizens were unlikely to feel the consequences of their political preferences directly (Schumpeter 1942) and would be highly unlikely to determine final decisions (Downs 1957) meaning there were few incentives for citizens to become informed participants. Participatory democracy ‘took up the cudgels’ (Pateman 2012, 7) against empirical democratic theory by asserting that citizens, in the right circumstances, should, could, and would participate effectively in democratic processes (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Barber 1984). Participatory democrats argued that it was neither the inability of citizens to participate, nor their rational choice not to, that led to political apathy, but rather socio-economic inequalities that determined participation levels and the extent of the opportunities available to citizens to participate. Moreover, they maintained that opportunities to directly participate in decisions that affect them will enable people to gain the skills to participate, ensure that citizens take an interest in politics, provide incentives and opportunities to become informed and thereby overcome the instrumental rational barriers to political participation noted above (Böker and Elstub 2015).
Specifically, participatory democrats are those desiring ‘direct participation of citizens in the regulation of key institutions of society, including the spheres of work and the community’ (Held 1996, 379; see also Pateman 2012, 10). They therefore elevate citizen participation as the principal political practice (Vitale 2006, 749): ‘The underlying participatory idea is that citizens in a democracy are to engage with the substance of law and policy, and not simply delegate responsibility for such substantive engagement to representatives’ (Cohen 2009, 248).

Therefore, participatory democrats want numerous opportunities and avenues for political participation in the workplace, community, media, and state (Arnstein 1969; Kaufmann 1969; Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Green 1985). Political participation in the traditional liberal democratic format of voting in elections is considered as simply insufficient by these standards in the sense of number and diversity of occasions to participate (della Porta 2013, 7). Voting is also considered too restrictive. The counting of votes, based on equal voting rights, prevents citizens being able to demonstrate the intensity of the preferences that they hold, whereas participatory democracy provides ‘more decisional capacity to those who are more committed, and therefore participate more’ (della Porta 2013, 39; see also Barber 1984, 205).¹

Moreover, participatory democrats want avenues for citizen participation to represent genuine opportunities to determine collective decisions (Arnstein 1969; Pateman 1970, 70; Barber 1984). A distinction is made here between ‘partial’ participation which only achieves

¹ Carson and Martin (1999, 57) refer to these politically active citizens as ‘the incensed and the articulate.’ It is still problematic for participatory democrats that those who participate more get more influence if participation is skewed by socio-economic factors, which it usually is. It is also a problem from a deliberative perspective that those who shout the loudest gain most influence, rather than those with the best reasons. Mini-publics have been designed to combat these problems and will be discussed further below in section 2.
influence on decisions and ‘full’ participation where there is equal decision-making power given to all (Pateman 1970, 70-71). Arnstein (1969) adds nuance to this distinction and offers a ‘ladder’ of participation to evaluate the extent processes and institutions enable citizens to determine decisions and outcomes. By this account simply increasing citizen participation in democratic processes can be insufficient, tokenistic, and ritualistic, enabling citizens to ‘hear and be heard’, but not ‘heeded’ (Arnstein 1969, 217), and resulting in manipulation if it does not provide genuine decision-making power to citizens. It is understood that these participatory opportunities will have to be seized by citizens rather than given to them: ‘since those who have power normally want to hang on to it, historically it has had to be wrested by the powerless rather than proffered by the powerful’ (Arnstein 1969, 222).

There are three broad justifications of participatory democracy. Firstly, it is suggested that it represents a more authentic and normatively strident interpretation of democracy than liberal representative democracy. If citizens make collective decisions that affect them themselves, wherever those decisions are made in the political, social and economic spheres, political equality and personal autonomy are enhanced. It delivers the true meaning of democracy of ‘rule by the people.’ In turn democracy is deepened and improved as more citizen participation can increase trust in political institutions enabling greater public support (della Porta 2013, 9).

Secondly, and relatedly, it is suggested that more participation can reduce socio-economic inequalities, thereby leading to political equality and consequently a more substantive democracy (Macpherson 1977, 94). Macpherson identifies a ‘vicious cycle’ as a spiral of

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2 For deliberative democrats hearing others and being heard by others are vital, but they would still want the resulting preferences to be consequential.
cause and effect that perpetuates socio-economic inequalities in political participation.\(^3\) The less certain socio-economic groups participate in politics the less they are able to organise, form demands, articulate demands and effectuate them. This in turn leads to the domination of decision-making from dominant or privileged socio-economic groups who do participate, but do not protect the interests and needs of the non-participants, and can even restrict the opportunities of these groups to participate. Macpherson concludes that the only solution is ‘a great deal more democratic participation than there is now’ (Macpherson 1977, 100). The idea being that an increase in equality would be reciprocated by an increase in participation and vice versa. Consequently, we can find breaks in the circle where there are either cumulative increases in equality or in democratic participation (Macpherson 1977, 101).

Macpherson’s claims are supported by the third justification that participation in democracy has an educative effect on citizens. It is asserted that avenues for citizen participation can be schools of democracy, with increased participation leading to more informed and publicly conscious citizens. Through participating in collective decision-making ‘people are able to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills and values of co-operation and civic virtue’ (Evans and Boyte 1992, 17-18; see also Pateman 1970; della Porta 2013, 9). Therefore participation begets participation as citizens learn the skills needed to participate (Pateman 1970, 43). For participatory democrats this then also accounts for the seemingly low capacities of citizens in liberal democracies where participation has largely been limited to the ballot box as ‘the habit of delegating tends to make citizens not only more apathetic, but also more cynical and selfish’ (della Porta 2013, 7).

\(^3\) Macpherson focused on class, but this is just one determinant of political participation, it is necessary to extend his conclusions to other cleavages such as gender, race, ethnicity and age too.
Pateman (2012, 8) recently suggested that deliberative democracy has since ‘overtaken and subsumed its predecessor of participatory democracy’, indicating we lose some degree of these three added advantages of the participatory approach in the process. For Thompson (2008, 512), in contrast, ‘the turn toward deliberative theory has not displaced participatory theory.’ It is to the relationship between the two that we now turn.

2. Compatibilities and Synergies between Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

Della Porta (2013, 2) highlights two typological dimensions, with different qualities, useful for categorising different approaches to democracy, as illustrated in Table 1. below. The first dimension relates to who makes decisions and provides a categorisation of models of democracy on the extent that the participation of citizens is seen as an integral decision-making element, or whether this power lies with their representatives. The second dimension relates to how decisions should be made. The distinction here is between aggregative and majoritarian and deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Although most deliberative democrats consider consensus to be unlikely after deliberation and think that majorities should still win out when consensus is not reached, the emphasis is placed upon the debate that precedes the vote and ultimately how the majority reached their conclusion and the influence minorities had upon the final outcome (della Porta 2013: 6). The application of these two dimensions, to the theories of liberal, participatory, and deliberative democracy, results in a typology of democracy with four classifications.

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4 In practice there are of course more than four conceptions as it is distinctly possible to have various combinations of the four stylised models presented here. For example, Switzerland could be considered as a combination of aggregative liberal democracy and aggregative participatory democracy given its routinized use of referendums.
The first is ‘Aggregative Liberal Democracy’ which combines representation and majority voting. The second is ‘Aggregative Participatory Democracy’, without deliberation and with political views and identities formed externally to democratic processes rather than within them, and therefore combining participation with majority voting. Thirdly we have ‘Liberal Deliberative Democracy’ where representatives deliberate to make decisions. Therefore, according to della Porta’s (2013) analysis participatory and deliberative democracy can exist discretely and separately from each other, at least conceptually. However, there does remain the fourth conception of ‘Participatory Deliberative Democracy’ where citizens deliberate to make collective decisions. It is maintained here that this latter approach to democracy is more conceptually coherent, and therefore desirable, than aggregative participatory democracy and liberal deliberative democracy because participation and deliberation can be mutually supportive. Firstly, participation enables the assent of all and the inclusion of all reasons required by deliberative democrats. Secondly, deliberation makes participatory democracy less vague, enhances educative effects, and reduces inequalities by promoting public reasoning. Each of these points will now be considered in turn.

Why Deliberative Democracy Benefits From Participation

Two of the key norms of deliberative democracy is inclusion of those affected by decisions and inclusion of all relevant reasons on the issue at hand: ‘According to the deliberative interpretation, democracy is a political arrangement that ties the exercise of collective power to reason-giving among those subject to collective decisions’ (Cohen 2009, 248). The ‘all

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5 It is not clear that this is an accurate portrayal of participatory democracy, as organisations in the 1960s and 70s that called themselves ‘participatory democracies’ tried to make face-to-face consensual decisions (Mansbridge 1983, 290) and their critiques of voting were noted above. But this does not make the classifications futile and irrelevant as it is still useful for analytical purposes. Indeed as will be explored below, it provides an indication of why participatory democracy is less coherent without deliberation.
affected’ norm and the requirement to include all relevant positions create a strong conceptual relationship to participatory democracy. The same link can be seen in Dryzek’s (2010, 23) seminal account of deliberative legitimacy, which requires ‘reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question.’ There is scope for the assent of all affected to be delivered through authorised representation (liberal deliberative democracy table 1), but deliberative democrats require reflective assent to be based upon the consideration of all relevant reasons too. If it is only our elected representatives that engage in deliberation the assent of citizens in the ballot box will not meet this requirement of reflection, which takes us to participatory deliberative democracy: ‘deliberative reason should not be divided so that representatives give reasons while citizens merely receive them’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 358-9). Consequently, for Steiner (2012, 32) ‘there is consensus among deliberative theorists that ordinary citizens should have the opportunity to take part in political deliberation’ (see also Vitale 2006, 749; Goodin 2008, 266).

Despite this commitment to citizen participation amongst deliberative democrats Pateman (2012) argues that firstly deliberative democrats have shown little interest in the expansion of participatory opportunities and secondly, when they do they take them as examples of deliberative democracy. These two points seem to be in tension. Either deliberative democrats are interested in a variety of participatory opportunities or they are not. Given the

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6 It should be acknowledged that this is just a starting point for Dryzek (2010, 23-35) and he continues to suggest that the problem of scale inevitably limits the number of people that can participate in deliberation. His solution is for deliberative democracy to be conceived as the interchange and contestation of discourses in the public sphere.

7 It is important to note that most participatory deliberative democrats see representation as essential. As previously mentioned it is a reformist position. They desire more citizen participation in deliberation in decision-making than currently present in liberal democracy to compliment the representative processes. However, a full discussion of representation is beyond the scope of this chapter.

8 She also claims that ‘some of the more enthusiastic advocates of deliberative democracy tend to present deliberation as if it were synonymous with democracy itself’ (Pateman 2012, 8). However, she cites no deliberative democrat to support this claim, and I do not know anyone who makes such a claim or holds this position.
discussion above, it seems to be the former although it is the case that they are indeed judged from a ‘deliberative perspective’ (Thompson 2008, 513).

More specifically, Pateman (2012, 10) thinks that deliberative democrats have been too obsessed with mini-publics as an avenue for participation. She is highly critical of mini-publics from a participatory democracy perspective, as they rely sortition rather than giving citizens rights to participate. This critique seems to neglect that, although mini-publics have been designed to ensure favourable conditions for good citizen deliberation, the use of random and stratified sampling is also used to overcome the socio-economic determinants of political participation that concerned Macpherson. Indeed Fishkin (2009), the architect of deliberative polling (a prominent type of mini-public), believes these socio-economic inequalities that are produced in political participation render mass participation in deliberation unobtainable, hence the need for sampling to ensure participants are descriptively representative of the broader public.

Moreover, although it is certainly the case that mini-publics are the institution that has received the most attention by deliberative democrats (Elstub 2014) they have been far from the only interest. For example deliberative democrats have focused on parliament (Steiner et al. 2004), constitutions (Elster 1998), referendums (Tierney 2012), political parties (Manin 1987), social movements (della Porta 2013), governance networks (Dryzek 2010), the internet (Dahlgren 2005), protests (Mendonca and Ercan 2015), workplaces (Felicetti 2016), the mass media (Wessler 2008), voluntary associations (Elstub 2008) and interest groups; (Hendriks 2012), to name just some.

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9 For a more detailed discussion of mini-publics and their relationship to deliberative democracy see Setälä and Smith chapter XX in this Handbook.
A more pertinent critique of deliberative democrats from Pateman (2012, 10) is that they have not sufficiently engaged with the radical changes required to current political, social, and economic structures to ensure meaningful opportunities for citizens to participate in deliberation that determines collective decisions. Indeed Pateman (2012, 10) contends that deliberative democratic theory ‘still leaves intact the conventional institutional structures and political meaning of “democracy.”’ Deliberative democrats should then embrace more strongly some of the key ideas of participatory democracy, particularly the establishment of political, social, and economic rights to enhance the opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making, as ‘unless actual discursive contexts are supported by minimal social and economic contents…autonomy, free argumentation and communicative rationality will be impossible’ (Vitale 2006, 758), which are of course all central to the theory of deliberative democracy.

So one similarity between participatory and deliberative democracy, at least, is that both require the extension of political participation beyond the ballot box as they ‘seek the expansion of spaces in which will formation constitutes itself” (Vitale 2006, 759), however they disagree on what the nature of this participation should be (Böker and Elstub 2015). It is to this disagreement that we now turn.

*Why Participatory Democracy Benefits From Deliberation*

Deliberative democracy is distinct from participatory democracy as it requires public reasoning to be central to the decision-making process, while this is not necessarily required in participatory democracy (Cohen 2009, 250) which takes a more ecumenical view about the types of political participation that are desirable and is ultimately more concerned with the
variety, breadth, and depth of participation (Cohen 2009, 256): ‘participatory democracy is founded on the direct action of citizens who exercise some power and decide issues affecting their lives, while deliberative democracy is founded on argumentative exchanges, reciprocal reason giving, and on public debates which precede decisions (Floridia 2014, 305). For some this renders participatory democracy excessively vague (Sartori 1987). Indeed, it is claimed that it was in response to exactly this vagueness that deliberative democracy emerged (della Porta 2013, 187).

It should be noted that while participatory democrats are open to a variety of forms of political activity for citizens they too have praised dialogic approaches that induce preference reflection (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Barber 1984). For example, despite her criticisms of deliberative democracy, noted above, Pateman (2012) acknowledges that deliberation is crucial for all forms of democracy, including the participatory variant. Indeed, most participatory democrats reject Rousseau’s vision of citizens forming their wills in isolation in favour of a dialogic and communicative approach (Vitale 2006, 749). In providing a genealogy of participatory and deliberative democracy, Floridia (2014) emphasises the importance of a ‘transitional phase’ that stemmed the two, which was ‘still within the discussion on participatory democracy’, but went beyond this model, and directed the discussion towards the subsequent deliberative turn through a focus on discursive participation (Floridia 2014, 300). In particular, he highlights the work of Mansbridge (1983) and Barber (1984). Barber (1984) stressed the importance of ‘public talk’ aimed at consensus in participatory decision-making: ‘Talk enables us to examine rank orders, commensurable scales, and the effect of time and place; it allows us to get at what we really want as individuals and as a community …choices are generally more coherent and less paradoxical than the logical dilemmas extrapolated from them, especially if the choices are informed by a process of strong democratic talk’ (Barber 1984, 205). Through her empirical work on town-
hall meetings and cooperative workplace democracy, Mansbridge (1983, 3) praised processes that involved decision-makers reasoning ‘together until they agree on the best answer.’

The point is that a focus on deliberation as a specific form of participation would enhance both the normative and explanatory potential of participatory democracy. Without it we are left with ‘aggregative participatory democracy’ (table 1) with citizens’ preferences seen as exogenous. This position would render participatory democrats unable to fully account for why participatory opportunities can be ‘schools of democracy’ that enhance civic virtue (Grönlund et al. 2010) and broaden the views of the participants and incapable of distinguishing between authentic views and manipulated ones.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast deliberative democrats have repeatedly focused on how deliberation can improve people’s opinions and make them more authentic: ‘the justifications of political consciousness and the learning processes attendant on participation make sense only in a context of public discussion wherein each individual can think, ponder and have the opportunity to change, either totally or in part, his or her original position as a result of the exchanges’ (Vitale 2006, 753-4). It is then participating in deliberation specifically that will encourage and enable citizens to gain the greater focus on public goods attributed to participation by participatory democrats. Once again the conception of democracy is stronger in ‘participatory deliberative democracy’ (table 1) with participatory and deliberative democracy combined.

By failing to highlight ‘deliberation’ as a particularly important type of participation, participatory democrats also miss the contribution it can make to another of their justifications, the reduction of socio-economic inequalities. The argument is that by generating public reasoning, deliberation encourages all, including powerful elites, to justify

\textsuperscript{10} Admittedly more empirical studies that compare different types of participation to deliberative participation and their relationship to civic virtue are required.
their demands to all, which will reduce their ability to promote their own self-interest. It also provides the opportunity for subordinate groups to provide reasons explaining why the status quo and existing inequalities are unjust or inefficient.

This section has then acknowledged that participatory democracy and deliberative democracy have important differences between them, but that it is coherent and desirable to combine them for a participatory deliberative democracy. We now turn to consider whether this is possible.

3. Combining Participation and Deliberation

As well as making participation in deliberation immensely challenging, the issue of complexity also divides participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Firstly, we examine the debates on complexity in theory, before turning to practice and a consideration of the empirical evidence to ascertain whether citizens do want to participate in deliberation.

Theoretical Debates on Complexity, Participation and Deliberation

Vitale (2006, 754) argues that participatory democracy has been less cognisant of the complexity of modern societies than its deliberative counterpart. This seems clear in the work of notable deliberative democrats such as Warren and Cohen. Warren (1996a, 242) questions the extent that people want more opportunities for participation, dismissing it as ‘roman dogma’, which would ultimately result in instability: ‘Individuals are likely to find decision-

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11 Participants can of course cloak their self-interest in insincere claims to common goods. Through this they do though become exposed to these reasons, which could provoke dissonance reduction and the consequent adoption of the public reasons offered. Furthermore, participants may be concerned about their reputation if their insincerity is exposed publicly. Insincere claims can be challenged and therefore potentially exposed y reasons and information provided by other participants (Elstub 2008, 85-86).
making so burdensome and inefficient that most will withdraw into cynical apathy. This will leave most decisions to an activist few who will, ironically, make decisions based on the authority they derive from a participatory process’ (Warren 1996a, 243).  

Warren also contends that participatory democrats fail to acknowledge the importance of expertise in complex societies (Warren 1996b). Cohen (2009, 257) suggests ‘social complexity and scale limit the extent to which modern polities can be both deliberative and participatory’ and therefore that improving deliberative quality requires reducing political participation to ensure that those who are deliberating are insulated from public pressures and demands. In turn if we expand participation, deliberative quality will be reduced (see also Thompson 2008, 513). Deliberation requires participants to be, or become, informed about the issue, but on any given issue most will not be informed as they will lack the interest and incentive to be, so the quality of deliberation declines as the number of participants increases, even if deliberation can increase knowledge on the issue. This is why deliberative democrats have not been able to agree on how many citizens should participate in deliberation (Steiner 2012, 32).

For some deliberative democrats this critique does not ‘gut’ participatory democracy, but rather ‘shores it up’ (Hauptmann 2001: 399). For example, according to Bohman (1996, 29) the specific focus on deliberative participation is more achievable on the large scale than the broader view of participation taken by participatory democrats. While according to Dryzek (1987, 436) participatory democracy without deliberation ‘will add to the burdens of complexity’, while deliberation without inclusive participation can lead to self-interested elite dominance. Hauptmann (2001) is sceptical of the coherency of this position though, arguing that the deliberative critique stabs at the heart and fundamentals of the participatory model

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12 Barber (1984, 267) is perhaps less guilty than other participatory democrats here as he proposed a more measured demand of ‘some participation some of the time on selected issues.’
and therefore should not be considered a continuation of this project, but rather a departure. Although she accepts the validity of the deliberative critique of participatory democracy, she suggests that democratic theory loses a critical edge with the deliberative turn: ‘dulling and even losing one’s critical perspective on the world as it is and, consequently, one’s sense of how it might be made better. Deliberative democrats have made the latter error; while their theories cannot be criticised for the weaknesses characteristic of utopian political visions, their critical perspective on the world is too blurred to be useful’ (Hauptmann 2001, 413). A problem which Elstub (2010) and Elstub et al. (2016) argue has been on the increase in deliberative democracy. Ultimately for Hauptmann, deliberative democrats take complexity too seriously, while she still accepts the critique that participatory democrats do not take complexity seriously enough.\(^\text{13}\) Although not explicitly stated, the impetus here seems to be a democratic approach that stems this divide. It is not clear though that participatory deliberative democracy is such an approach. Can the available empirical evidence shed any further light on the extent that mass participation and deliberation are compatible in complex societies?

\textit{Empirical Evidence on Mass Deliberation}

There is certainly a considerable amount of evidence that has been invoked to suggest participation and quality deliberation are not compatible. Reservations remain though on whether this evidence is actually measuring deliberation or just talk. New evidence is also emerging which indicates a more positive relationship between participation and deliberation.

\(^{13}\) Although Femia (1996) argues deliberative democrats do not take complexity seriously enough themselves.
In her qualitative studies on town-hall meetings and a cooperative workplace democracy, highlighted above, Mansbridge (1983) found that people do not always find it easy to engage in deliberation. More damningly for participatory deliberative democracy, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) draw from survey and focus group evidence, which they believe indicates that citizens do not want to participate in deliberation. They offer a ‘stealth democracy’ thesis, arguing that people reluctantly participate when corruption in representative democracy becomes excessive, and feel their input is required to address this imbalance, but ultimately would much prefer a functional representative system that required minimum involvement from citizens.14

Jacobs et als.’ (2009) quantitative study provides an important counter, indicating that when citizens engage in debating political issues they are more likely to engage in other forms of political participation. Moreover, that ‘public talking is a vibrant and surprisingly widespread process by which citizens form opinions about civic life’ (Jacobs et al. 2009, 25).

Steiner (2012, 39) is sceptical suggesting that ‘the data only indicates what Americans say about political talking, not about how much they actually talk about politics.’ In general, Steiner (2012, 45) finds that surveys give a much more positive picture of the level of deliberation than when actual behaviour is observed.’ Moreover, he is concerned that the data measures talk and not necessarily deliberation (Steiner 2012, 40; see also Dryzek 2010, 24).

The most powerful evidence against the stealth democracy thesis from Neblo et al. (2010, 566) who suggest that the limitations of these studies is that they ‘extrapolate from current,

14 Dryzek (2005, 207-8) is highly critical of what he considers dubious interpretations of both the survey and focus group data in this study which consequently renders the case for stealth democracy tenuous, while Neblo labels this evidence as both ‘circumstantial’ (2015: 127-28) and yet also ‘strong’ (2015: 129).
naturally occurring patterns of political participation, to conclusions about latent demand for deliberative opportunities.’ Their counter argument is that if people were offered more meaningful opportunities to participate in deliberation, than are currently available, they would be more likely to seize these. They report results from another American survey based study that looks at hypothetical willingness to deliberate. It found that there is a greater willingness to deliberate than many theorists have assumed and moreover, ‘that those most willing to deliberate are precisely those turned off by standard partisan and interest group politics’ (Neblo et al. 2010, 582). It is important to stress that their evidence does suggest some citizens agree with the stealth democracy thesis, but importantly ‘found vastly more evidence in favour of the deliberative thesis- that is, that people would participate more if they thought that the system were less corrupt’ as opposed to more. Indeed 8 to 11 times more respondents in their survey fitted the deliberative thesis than the stealth alternative. Stealth preferences are then conditional it seems. This study also found ‘more enthusiasm for specifically deliberative opportunities than for more general political participation’ (Neblo et al. 2010, 570). Overall 83% expressed some willingness to participate in a deliberative event (Neblo et al. 2015, 573). Moreover, the usual determinants and patterns of political participation such as education, age, gender, income, and race were not statistically significant indicators to attitudes towards deliberative participation. Indeed ‘younger people, racial minorities, and lower income people expressed significantly more willingness to deliberate’ (Neblo et al 2010, 574). Neither did the issue at hand that citizens might deliberate effect willingness to participate (Neblo 2015, 137).

They complement this study with a test of whether people were actually willing to deliberate with a range of members of Congress. They found no real determinants to differentiate between those who expressed an interest in participating, but failed to attend, and those who
actually participated. In sum, actual deliberative participation was less biased and skewed than voting: ‘these findings suggest that it is deeply misleading to think of deliberative participation as the provenance of activists and political junkies or any other proper subset of participants in “real” politics’ (Neblo et al. 2010, 578). So it seems citizens may well be amenable to participating in deliberation after all. However, there is some evidence which suggests that this is only possible in homogeneous groups.

Following another American based quantitative study Mutz (2006, 2) concludes that ‘there are fundamental incompatibilities between theories of participatory democracy and theories of deliberative democracy.’ Deliberation and participation undermine each other as citizen participation is possible, but not deliberative participation, and deliberation is possible but not through citizen participation: ‘The problem with much of what deliberative democracy asks of participatory democrats is that both of these tasks- activism and deliberation- have been embedded in a single model as simultaneous responsibilities of the individual’ (Mutz 2006, 131). For Mutz (2006) deliberation between those with differing viewpoints can increase toleration, but reduces participation as people seek to avoid conflict. Participation is motivated by political passion that is reduced through deliberation. Much of this is due to the fact that many people are so desperate to maintain social harmony they refrain from engaging in argument or making a contribution that will destroy solidarity (Mutz 2006, 84 Although Mutz’s own study suggests it is not a problem for deliberative democracy per se, but democratic participation full stop, as cross cutting influence reduces private acts of political participation like voting too (Mutz 2006, 9), Sunstein’s (2007) evidence too suggests that people avoid discussing politics with those who they disagree.
There are limitations with this study too though. In Mutz’s study the primary sources of the research data are three representative surveys of Americans and their political networks. However, two were actually designed to establish levels of social influence during election campaigns, only one was created with the explicit aim of quantifying levels of exposure to different political preferences (Mutz 2006, 22). The evidence from this survey is therefore by far the most important to the research but the results from each are not easily identifiable, but rather combined. Moreover, we must question whether she was actually measuring deliberation as Mutz focused on ‘everyday talk.’ The absence of key deliberative elements of publicity and decision-making cannot be dismissed. If they were present in ‘everyday talk’ the talk would change and so would people’s experiences of it and approaches to it. People, who might not discuss politics with those they disagree on a day to day basis, may well welcome the opportunity to persuade those with differing viewpoints if their opinion was going to influence a collectively binding decision. Returning to Neblo’s evidence, he acknowledges that there are still substantial numbers who do not want to deliberate, but finds that although conflict aversion was a key reason, it was not decisive, with the main reason being that these people did not feel like they knew enough about the issue (Neblo 2015, 149). Something which of course participation in deliberation is meant to overcome.

The evidence on the relationship between participation and deliberation is then far from decisive, but there is certainly not enough here to simply rule out the possibility of a participatory deliberative democracy.

4. Conclusion

The relationship between participatory democracy and deliberative democracy has been repeatedly scrutinised. The argument here is that they are certainly distinct and different
approaches to democracy, but ultimately it is beneficial, but not essential, to combine them. Fishkin (2009) is therefore right to suggest the relationship is agnostic. Participation is beneficial, but not essential, to the realisation of deliberative norms, helping secure assent from all and the inclusion of all reasons. Similarly, deliberation is beneficial, but not essential, to the realisation of participatory norms, helping to educate citizens and combat inequality, while giving participatory democracy a more coherent focus. Participatory democracy tells us that citizens should govern and deliberative democracy that decisions should be made through deliberation. When combined we have participatory deliberative democracy, and a view that citizens should govern through deliberation. There are certainly challenges in combining them, but the inconclusive evidence on their compatibility provides insufficient reason not to try given the legitimacy benefits that could be accrued if successful. As when combined they ‘provide a richer alternative for the improvement of democracy in search for political legitimacy’ (Vitale 2006, 753), and may well be our best hope to save democracy (della Porta 2013).

References


