

1           **Social Dimensions of Synthetic Biology in the Agrifood Sector: The**  
2                           **Perspective of Chinese and EU Scientists**

3  
4  
5    **Authors**

6    Shan Jin <sup>a\*</sup>, Beth Clark <sup>a</sup>, Wenjing Li <sup>ab</sup>, Sharron Kuznesof <sup>a</sup>, Lynn J. Frewer <sup>a</sup>

7    <sup>a</sup> School of Natural and Environmental Sciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon  
8    Tyne, NE1 7RU, United Kingdom

9    <sup>b</sup> School of Economics and Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, 430070, P.R.  
10   China

11  
12   **\*Corresponding Author**

13   Name: Shan Jin

14   Address: Agriculture Building, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU.

15   Email: [s.jin13@newcastle.ac.uk](mailto:s.jin13@newcastle.ac.uk); Tel: +44 (0) 784 923 4549.

25 **Abstract**

26 **Purpose**

27 Scientists' perceptions of societal needs and priorities will shape the innovation trajectories  
28 of synthetic biology (SB). In turn, these will be shaped by the funding and regulatory  
29 environments in which their research is conducted. This study intends to investigate  
30 scientists' perspectives on co-innovation with the public regarding the implementation of  
31 pathways associated with SB including its agrifood applications.

32 **Design/methodology/approach**

33 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Chinese and EU scientists ( $N=9$  and 13,  
34 respectively). Six prominent themes emerged from the interviews using the thematic analysis  
35 method.

36 **Findings**

37 Both Chinese and EU scientists regarded SB as being high-benefit, low-risk and ethically  
38 acceptable, and predicted its rejection by the general public and attributed this to the public's  
39 knowledge deficit and irrationality. They endorsed the deficit model of science  
40 communication, independent of greater emphasis on responsible research and innovation  
41 (RRI) in EU research projects. The findings raised concerns that public fears might intensify  
42 once they have learned about scientists' biased risk perceptions of SB; this calls for better  
43 involvement of broader stakeholders.

44 **Research limitations/implications**

45 As the sample size is relatively small, the generalisation of research findings needs to be  
46 cautious. However, we believe the findings have provided some insights that support  
47 increasingly RRI associated with SB.

48 **Originality/value**

49 This study has presented scientists' misunderstandings of societal responses to SB and  
50 science communication. It has also provided information to understand how SB-related issues  
51 and agenda can be better shaped in future.

52 **Keywords:** Synthetic biology; social dimension; risk uncertainty; deficit model; agrifood.

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

## 73        **1. Introduction**

74    It has long been observed that emerging technologies including those within the agrifood  
75    sector interact with social and economic factors, which may result in intended and unintended  
76    consequences (Grunwald, 2018). It is therefore necessary to integrate social dimensions at the  
77    early stages of agrifood technology development in order to allow the co-production of  
78    technological innovations in line with societal priorities and preferences (Li et al., 2020).  
79    Synthetic biology (SB), an emerging area of research, combines science and engineering  
80    principles to synthesise and assemble artificial and/or natural components to create novel  
81    living systems, which can be more predictable, efficient and off-the-shelf than traditional  
82    genetic modification due to improved standardisation and an open-source approach within the  
83    community (Canton, Labno, & Endy, 2008). These established systems are expected to  
84    generate applications across different sectors (e.g. healthcare, energy and agrifood) (Polizzi,  
85    Stanbrough, & Heap, 2018), and contribute to the bio-economy by transforming existing  
86    industries or creating new ones (OECD, 2011). However, societal concerns about heightened  
87    risk, ethical issues and regulatory issues may impede the development of SB, and these need  
88    to be addressed during the process of scientific innovation (Jin, Clark, Kuznesof, Lin, &  
89    Frewer, 2019).

### 90        *1.1 Anticipated risks and ethical issues*

91    In terms of SB as a whole, upgraded techniques and the open-source approach in recent years  
92    have facilitated the creation of knowledge and novel applications including those within the  
93    agrifood sector. This, however, has increased the complexity of regulation required to ensure  
94    safe implementation. For instance, DNA synthesis and genome assembly techniques may  
95    increase the generation of pathogens or toxins, whereas intentional or unintentional release  
96    (a.k.a. “bioterror” and “bio-error” respectively) could harm the environment and human

97 health (Garfinkel, Endy, Epstein, & Friedman, 2007; Polizzi et al., 2018; Wang & Zhang,  
98 2019). The difficulty of regulating experiments, in particular those conducted outside  
99 research institutes, further intensifies risks by increasing the likelihood of adverse events and  
100 the unpredictability of their effects (Jin et al., 2019). Some risks may directly relate to  
101 specific applications. Novel food or food additives produced by synthetic organisms may  
102 pose high-uncertainty risks, as no established scientific evidence exists regarding their long-  
103 term impacts on human health. Such concerns also apply to other agrifood technologies, for  
104 instance, food products using genetic modification (GM) technology and nanomaterials  
105 (Tyagi et al., 2016; van Putten et al., 2006). Synthetic organisms designed for non-food uses  
106 may threaten natural species, thereby endangering biodiversity and even human health by  
107 entering the food chain (Polizzi et al., 2018).

108 Socio-economic risks of SB are associated with the consequences of how specific  
109 applications are adopted. “Synthetic” crops for biofuel production, for instance, can be more  
110 environmentally friendly and economically attractive to farmers. However, biodiversity and  
111 water/food security can be threatened if the large-scale cultivation of energy crops results in  
112 competition with food crops (Harvey & Pilgrim, 2011). In addition, SB may benefit some  
113 stakeholders but harm others’ interests (OECD, 2011). For instance, using synthetic yeast to  
114 produce semi-synthetic artemisinin was initially expected to stabilize the drug supply and  
115 decrease the cost of malaria treatment; however, farmers cultivating *Artemisia annua* might  
116 be driven out of business (Polizzi et al., 2018).

117 Any emerging technology has the potential to raise ethical issues and to generate concern  
118 among its stakeholders, including the general public (Frewer et al., 2011). Most research into  
119 ethical issues associated with SB has considered the technology overall, rather than focusing  
120 on specific applications, due to some unifying features across SB and the limited information  
121 available about applications at the early stage (Heavey, 2014; Newson, 2015; Rogers, 2011).

122 Ethical issues were mainly associated with “life creation” and with the regulation in the light  
123 of biosafety and biosecurity, benefit sharing and research development (Anderson et al.,  
124 2012; Douglas & Savulescu, 2010; Weir & Selgelid, 2009). These identified ethical issues  
125 appeared to be “unexceptional” compared to other emerging technologies (Newson, 2015).

## 126 *1.2 Public responses to SB*

127 Limited studies into public perceptions of SB have been conducted, mainly in Europe and  
128 North America. Surveys have indicated that 39% of European participants approve the use of  
129 SB, either with strict regulation or without special laws (Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2012); and  
130 31.2% of respondents in the United States support the use of SB (Akin et al., 2017).

131 However, over 20% of the participants showed neutral attitudes (i.e. neither support nor  
132 rejection) towards, or did not know whether they support, the use of SB (Akin et al., 2017;  
133 Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2012). This highlighted low certainty of these participants’  
134 attitudes, partly due to a lack of information and media attention (Fischer, van Dijk, de Jonge,  
135 Rowe, & Frewer, 2013). In research into specific applications, it has been reported that  
136 applications for medical and environmental use tended to be more in line with public  
137 preference than agricultural and food products (Ineichen, Biller-Andorno, & Deplazes-Zemp,  
138 2017; Starkbaum, Braun, & Dabrock, 2015; Steurer, 2015).

139 Perceived benefits and risks were considered to be main determinants of people’s attitudes  
140 towards SB (Akin et al., 2017). The unknown long-term impacts of applications may be more  
141 relevant to the general public, including “bioterror” or “bio-error” incidents (Betten, Broerse,  
142 & Kupper, 2018; Kronberger, Holtz, & Wagner, 2012). Perceptions of naturalness and  
143 ethicalness; individual attributes (e.g. demographic characteristics; religiosity; trust in  
144 scientists, industry and government; deference to scientific authority); and characteristics of  
145 the product are also known to shape public attitudes (Akin et al., 2017; Braman, Mandel, &  
146 Kahan, 2008; Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2012, 2013; Ineichen et al., 2017). Jin et al. (2019)

147 argued that there is little evidence showing people inherently hold negative perceptions of  
148 SB, despite expressing concerns about certain risks and ethical issues.

### 149 *1.3 Scientists' role in the regulation of SB*

150 Scientists help frame regulatory and implementation policies and commercialisation  
151 trajectories of novel technologies as well as shaping public attitudes through engagement  
152 activities (Gupta, Fischer, George, & Frewer, 2013). Previous studies have indicated that  
153 scientists often exhibited higher benefit perceptions and lower risk perceptions towards  
154 technologies associated with their specialism compared with the lay public (Ho, Scheufele, &  
155 Corley, 2011; Kato-Nitta, Maeda, Inagaki, & Tachikawa, 2019). This expert-lay discrepancy  
156 was initially attributed to laypeople's deficit of knowledge by scientists, which popularized  
157 the "deficit model" among scientists for public communication of science and technology  
158 (Hilgartner, 1990). While this model for science communication has been widely discounted  
159 by subsequent studies (Sturgis & Allum, 2004), it is still the dominant model promulgated by  
160 experts across different domains (Seethaler, Evans, Gere, & Rajagopalan, 2019; Simis,  
161 Madden, Cacciatore, & Yeo, 2016). Scientists' perceptions of risks and ethical issues, as well  
162 as their predictions regarding public reactions to SB, may impact on their support for current  
163 science communication models and future development of this area.

164 The precautionary principle is applied to the regulation of biotechnologies in particular those  
165 within the agrifood sector in the EU and China, although the application of rules and  
166 measures in China tends to be less transparent (SEHN, 1998; Sun, 2019). In recent years, a  
167 growing number of EU projects (e.g. the Horizon 2020) have required scientists to integrate  
168 social dimensions into all stages of research projects, for instance, identifying and evaluating  
169 the potential influence of benefits, risks and ethical concerns, undertaking effective public  
170 engagement and science education, so as to achieve responsible research and innovation  
171 (RRI) (European Commission, 2015; Ribeiro, Smith, & Millar, 2017). In contrast, Chinese

172 scientists are required to undertake “social responsibility”, which is limited to the  
173 popularisation and communication of science only near the end of research projects (Dijkstra  
174 & Yin, 2019). The aforementioned regulatory discrepancies, together with the influence of  
175 cultural difference (Ho et al., 2011), may lead to differences between EU and Chinese  
176 scientists in terms of their perceptions of the social implications of SB.

177 In view of the significance of integrating social dimensions and the role of scientists in  
178 shaping technical development trajectories, this paper adopts a qualitative approach to  
179 understanding perspectives of EU and Chinese scientists regarding social implications  
180 associated with SB, and in so doing, addresses the following research questions:

- 181 1) What are scientists’ perceptions of social dimensions pertinent to SB in particular its  
182 applications in the agrifood sector? Is the precautionary or proactive principle more in  
183 alignment with scientists’ cognitive structures?
- 184 2) What are the similarities and differences between the EU and Chinese scientists with  
185 respect to their perceptions of social dimensions?
- 186 3) What are scientists’ understandings of the potential public response to SB?
- 187 4) Is the “deficit model” still dominating the scientific discourse, and does this differ  
188 between China and the EU, given the greater emphasis on RRI in research activities in  
189 the latter?
- 190 5) What are the implications for future research into SB?

## 191 **2. Methodology**

192 A semi-structured interview methodology was employed in this study based on two primary  
193 considerations. First, some issues in relation to SB are highly complex and ambiguous, and  
194 semi-structured interviews are a suitable tool for exploring respondents’ perceptions and  
195 views and probing for more information regarding complex issues (Barriball & While, 1994).



196 Second, scientists in SB come from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, and the adaptable  
197 nature of semi-structured interviews allows further clarification of responses after initial  
198 answers to interview questions (Sankar & Jones, 2007). This methodology has been widely  
199 used to investigate perceptions of other biotechnologies, and has demonstrated cross-cultural  
200 validity in this context (e.g. see Edmondston et al., 2010; Zalewska-Kurek, 2016).

### 201 **2.1 Procedure**

202 First, the literature on social issues surrounding SB and other technologies (e.g. GM  
203 technology, nanotechnology) was critically reviewed to elicit research questions. Based on  
204 this, a semi-structured interview guide was generated, covering the following topics: the  
205 potential applications for commercialisation including those within the agrifood sector;  
206 benefit and risk perceptions; understanding of public response; and attitudes towards  
207 regulation and public opinion (**Figure 1**). Meanwhile, technical articles about SB were  
208 reviewed to establish participant selection criteria (based on subfields of SB and domains of  
209 application). Then, interviews with the selected scientists were conducted, and data were  
210 transcribed and analysed. Ethical approval for the study was granted by the lead researcher's  
211 university in 2017 (Ref: 2581/2017).

212 .....

213 **Figure 1 near here**

214 .....

215

### 216 **2.2 Sample**

217 Twenty-two scientists from the EU (**N = 13**) and China (**N = 9**) were selected for semi-  
218 structured interviews during March 2018 and January 2019. All participants are leaders of  
219 research teams in different organisations and specialise in certain subfields of SB (see **Table**

220 1). Their work relates variously to applications linked to agriculture, food, energy, the  
221 environment, human health and medicine, and genome synthesis. The interviewer (SJ) has a  
222 background in both social and natural sciences: this reduced the potential for  
223 misunderstanding of technical terms and strengthened the interviewer’s ability to probe for  
224 in-depth information relevant to the respondents’ expertise.

225 .....

226 *Table 1 near here*

227 .....

### 229 **2.3 Data collection and analysis**

230 Interviews with the EU and Chinese scientists were undertaken using English and Mandarin  
231 respectively. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes and was digitally recorded and  
232 transcribed verbatim in English or Chinese. Here, the number of interviews was determined  
233 according to the requirement for data saturation in inductive thematic analysis (normally six  
234 interviews to reach 80% saturation), when no new themes could be identified from the last  
235 interview (Guest, Namey, & Chen, 2020). The thematic analysis method was then employed,  
236 following the phases: data familiarisation; code generation; constructing, reviewing, and  
237 defining themes; and report production (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The coding process of this  
238 study involved both inductive and deductive orientations and was undertaken using QSR  
239 International's NVivo 11 software. Quotes from Chinese scientists have been translated  
240 idiomatically into English for this paper.

## 241 **3. Results**

242 The interviews provide a wide range of insights into how scientists understand SB-related  
243 issues and the potential societal response. Six prominent themes emerged from the data,

244 supported by quotes from participants (labelled by participant’s location: ‘E = EU scientists,  
245 C = Chinese scientists’, accompanied by a unique identifying number).

### 246 ***3.1 SB: a vague concept in the scientific community***

247 A similarity between EU and Chinese scientists was the lack of a universal definition of the  
248 term “SB” as understood by the scientific community. Most scientists regarded SB as a novel  
249 area, but they differed in how they distinguished SB from other technologies, in particular  
250 GM technology. For instance, some scientists emphasised the tools employed in creating  
251 applications (e.g. using synthetic genes rather than those from other lifeforms), while others  
252 pointed to the importance of “*system design, combining the functional parts in a predictable*  
253 *manner*” (C6).

254 “*In reality, another basis is DNA synthesis technology, because having this technique means*  
255 *that we no longer need to rely on the original organism; we can design DNA and then*  
256 *develop various applications.*” (C5)

257 “SB” (described as “*too broad*” a term by one participant, E10) was interpreted with  
258 reference to distinct technological terms (e.g. gene editing and GM). Very few scientists  
259 referred to SB as the combination and/or upgrade of other biotechnologies.

260 “*I guess it depends how you have interpreted the terminology ‘SB’ ... we re-engineered part*  
261 *of the pathway that makes serotonin in rice by gene editing*” (E13)

262 “*I think CAR–T therapy, for instance, is actually an application of SB and essentially of*  
263 *genetic engineering as well.*” (C4)

264 “*Actually, it's not a novel field. I think SB is just an inevitable stage in the evolution*  
265 *of biotechnology.*” (C9)

266 **3.2 Benefits and risks perceived by scientists**

267 Participants anticipated that various SB-based applications will be technically ready for  
268 commercialisation in the next 10 to 15 years, including in the agrifood, environment, energy,  
269 and healthcare sectors and as advanced experimentation tools (see **Table 2**). These  
270 applications were expected by both Chinese and EU scientists to provide new production  
271 methods across sectors, bringing potential financial gains to different stakeholders, and health  
272 and environmental benefits to the broader public. Very few scientists mentioned the risks  
273 associated with SB-based applications. Most participants stressed the importance of scientific  
274 evidence in evaluating an application's risk and assessed the risks of SB-based applications  
275 as very low or even nil. For instance, the use of microbes as hosts either for chemical  
276 production or pollutant detection was regarded to have “*approximately zero risk*” (E9, C3).

277 *“I'd say the risk is essentially zero for both of them because they're very sick*  
278 *microorganisms, they can't compete in the environment. It's really just a matter of regulation*  
279 *and concern about public opinion, but I would say the actual risk is zero for cell-free systems*  
280 *and approximately zero for cell-based systems”.* (E9)

281 *“The risk of manufacturing energy and food depending on microbe is approximately zero. I*  
282 *think it's completely controllable and shows no difference in nature compared with common*  
283 *industrial manufacturing.”* (C3)

284 There seemed to be a consensus among both Chinese and EU scientists that the technology  
285 per se is “*neutral*” (C9), but the question of who uses it was thought to be relevant. Future  
286 risks were therefore mainly considered to originate from the motivations of the users, for  
287 instance, the illicit use or misuse of technology by individuals or extremely profit-driven  
288 companies. Uncertainties around SB-related risks, and long-term effects in particular, were

289 rarely discussed by the scientists. Only two scientists (C3, C9) pointed out the uncertain  
290 health risks of some food and medical applications.

291 *“There is a lack of assessment of the long-term health effects because it's very complex and*  
292 *related to the brain, immune system, metabolism and other aspects. You may cure one*  
293 *disease but produce other diseases at the same time, right? We must admit that there are*  
294 *many unknown risks.” (C3)*

295 *“But if you modify the microbial strain and use them for fermentation and let them indirectly*  
296 *enter the food chain or use them to adapt human gut microbes, what effects will they have on*  
297 *humans, livestock, and the environment? We don't know, which means there are many*  
298 *uncontrollable and unknown things in science, and we know nothing about the risk.” (C9)*

299 One difference in perceived risks between the EU and Chinese scientists was the awareness  
300 of ecological risks. For instance, the potential ecological risk caused by the release of  
301 synthetic lifeforms was discussed much more by the EU scientists than by the Chinese  
302 scientists. However, the EU scientists labelled the risk level as essentially low, as the released  
303 lifeform typically could not outcompete or replace the natural population.

304 *“From my perspective, there are no definite risks. I know that people are somehow scared of*  
305 *releasing engineered organisms into the environment, but chances for these organisms to do*  
306 *something that we don't want them to do is very very low, very very low..... So, I don't think*  
307 *there are risks at the top of the list.” (E5)*

308 *“But I don't think it's a big deal because normally the modified microbe remains worse*  
309 *performing than the natural ones. So, normally in the wild, they are probably going to die*  
310 *first.” (E10)*

311 .....

312

*Table 2 near here*

313

.....

314

315 ***3.3 Ethical considerations***

316 Both the Chinese and the EU scientists thought SB to be essentially ethical. One difference  
 317 between the European and Chinese scientists was their ethical boundary in the choice of  
 318 experimental materials. European scientists thought the use of animals or even plants in  
 319 experiments could be off-limits, which therefore required careful ethical consideration, while  
 320 Chinese scientists' ethical boundary located at the use of human cells, in particular human  
 321 embryonic stem cells. The other difference relates to the fair distribution of benefits, which  
 322 was mainly discussed by the European scientists; for instance, the benefits of applications to  
 323 people in underdeveloped regions or from poorer communities. The concern over growing  
 324 technology injustice, such as *"the technology gap between rich and poor countries"*, was  
 325 raised by a European researcher (E3).

326 *"If I were to confine my answer to agricultural uses on plants and crops, there are no ethical*  
 327 *issues in my opinion. Ethical issues are only pertinent in human and animal research."* (E1)

328 *"I think we'll probably see more of a technology gap between rich and poor countries. I think*  
 329 *most of these things are going to be very available in rich countries and I think the more*  
 330 *technologies we have, the bigger the gap becomes then."* (E3)

331 ***3.4 Scientists' prediction of societal responses***

332 Both the EU and Chinese scientists in this study expressed pessimism about the overall  
 333 societal acceptance of SB, in particular its applications within the agrifood sector. The  
 334 factors/issues they proposed as potentially affecting public responses were relatively similar

335 and can be assigned to three major categories, namely: perceived benefits, perceived risks  
336 and negative impacts caused by various stakeholders (e.g. NGOs and politicians). The  
337 scientists considered the general public's perception of benefits to be shaped largely by  
338 attributes of applications per se (e.g. function and applied sector of products) and personal  
339 needs and preferences. Medicine-related applications, for example, were see evaluated as  
340 more acceptable to consumers than applications in the agrifood sector. Also, applications  
341 with tangible and immediate benefits were expected to be more acceptable to laypeople than  
342 those with delayed benefits, representing a perceived lack of long-term and global views  
343 among the general public.

344 *“They need new drugs for old and new diseases because this is the urgent need. Of course, I*  
345 *mean there could be some people willing to taste new food applications, and they are not*  
346 *reluctant to do that, but we are talking about the majority. It’s very, very conservative and*  
347 *very, very careful attitude.” (E4)*

348 *“You should tell people what is probably beneficial to them and give them the thing in a good*  
349 *way. Then they may accept it.” (C1)*

350 *“I think they want tangible benefits for them rather than profit margins or these kinds of*  
351 *things for companies and I think people are concerned about what's the point of creating risk*  
352 *when we don't need it.” (E3)*

353 *“I think possibly people are very, you know, inward looking and maybe selfish. They look at*  
354 *things that will benefit them and their families immediately rather than looking at long-term*  
355 *or more global views.” (E2)*

356 Personal needs might be associated with socio-economic status. For instance, people in  
357 underdeveloped countries were assumed to prioritise applications that address hunger and  
358 food security issues, which may be rejected by those from developed economies. However,

359 as some participants identified (C3, E12), beneficial applications as perceived by scientists  
360 might not bring actual benefits to the public or might not align with laypeople's preferences  
361 and needs; this was regarded as a disconnect between scientists and the public that could  
362 impede future development of SB-based applications.

363 *"You could say, well, people shouldn't need it because they should be eating mixed diets... ..*  
364 *But the reality is in poor communities, they don't have the option necessarily of mixed diets.*  
365 *That is an ethical consideration, absolutely." (E13)*

366 Regarding the public's risk perceptions, the most frequently mentioned factors by  
367 participants in this study was laypeople's irrationality and their lack of knowledge about SB  
368 per se and relevant applications, suggesting that scientists still perceived the "deficit model"  
369 to be relevant to the introduction of SB.

370 *"Consumers are not rational and so we don't know, and this is why the companies changed*  
371 *their names from the SB companies to fermentation companies." (E8)*

372 *"I think the controversy must be over food and agriculture. I think there might be some*  
373 *irrational panic among the public and this is very difficult to change in a short period of*  
374 *time." (C3)*

375 *"... Somehow, the discussion is not scientific as they are not willing to eat genes. But all the*  
376 *organisms you eat have genes, so you eat genes all the time." (E6)*

377 The negative impacts of stakeholders on public responses were mentioned by both the EU  
378 and Chinese scientists. A consensus among them all seemed to be the low public trust in  
379 biotechnology companies due to previous GM products delivering little public benefit.  
380 However, a striking difference emerged concerning whom the scientists perceived as the  
381 most influential stakeholders in European and Chinese societies. Among the EU scientists,  
382 politicians, NGOs and the media were assumed to exaggerate the risks of SB, leading to



383 resistance to SB-based applications among the public. In contrast, the Chinese scientists  
384 emphasised the importance of government attitudes towards the development of certain  
385 technologies or applications. Only Chinese participants were concerned about the decline of  
386 public trust in scientists due to their joint interest in associated businesses, which could  
387 adversely affect people's acceptance of SB-based applications.

388 *"To be realistic, no biotechnology or other company will invest in research and development*  
389 *in Europe. The issue is not social opinions per se, they more have to do with political*  
390 *expedience at the highest level and the vested interests of anti-GM NGOs who also do not*  
391 *like GM."* (E1)

392 *"There is a lack of transparency in academia. Actually, I can now understand why GM is*  
393 *questioned by the public. There is some joint interest in science communication as some*  
394 *scientists have their own companies, making people feel the connection to interests. But in*  
395 *fact, it is also strongly associated with the public's lack of knowledge."* (C6)

### 396 ***3.5 Demands to upgrade the regulatory framework***

397 The EU scientists showed low satisfaction with the current regulation of SB, seeing it as  
398 overregulated and not based on scientific evidence. Most of them argued that regulation  
399 should be implemented based on the end products, rather than on the process or the  
400 technology per se. In other words, if a product is evaluated to be safe through rigorous safety  
401 assessment, it should be approved for further development. Such controversy is particularly  
402 heated with regard to gene-editing technology, since it can produce the same crops as  
403 traditional breeding, yet its products are regulated as GM crops.

404 *"Products should be regulated according to the risk, not according to how they were made.*  
405 *So, this is something that we've seen with this recent decision of the European Court of*  
406 *Justice for genome-edited plants is that they want to regulate them according to how they*

407 were made. But you could make exactly the same product **using technology** in mutagenesis  
408 technology that's not regulated. So, you can have two things that were **made in** different  
409 ways, but the products are exactly the same. Why will one be regulated and the other not?  
410 *That's completely stupid.*” (E3)

411 In contrast, the Chinese scientists showed limited knowledge of the national regulation of SB.  
412 They suggested establishing a more rigorous and trustworthy safety assessment system for  
413 broader biotechnology-based research and products, since this might increase public  
414 acceptance. In addition, the field of biotechnology in China has been damaged by the “gene-  
415 edited babies” scandal<sup>1</sup>, leading to a decline in public trust. Some participants therefore  
416 expressed demands to develop reasonable standards and mechanisms for ethical evaluation  
417 within this field.

418 *“I think we can establish a national ethics committee or safety committee, make it*  
419 *authoritative, and then inform people that any technology will be evaluated by the*  
420 *committee.”* (C1)

### 421 **3.6 Scientists’ views on public communication**

422 Some participants were aware of a lack of communication between scientists and laypeople  
423 in the field of SB and assumed that this could impede public acceptance in future. However,  
424 most participants advocated educating the public, ideally from an early age, about the  
425 technology, its applications, and scientific evidence-based thinking. Decisions in relation to  
426 technical issues were still required to remain in the hands of experts or scientists. Only one  
427 participant (C9) pointed out the need to communicate with other stakeholders (e.g. the  
428 government and media) and inform the public of potential risks and relevant mitigation  
429 strategies associated with certain applications. This again suggests that the deficit model is

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-46382662> (accessed 1 March 2020).

430 perceived by most scientists in both China and the EU as a potential route to the  
431 implementation of SB.

432 *“I’ve said earlier, we should increase certain argument and education, start the education at*  
433 *an early age so that the kids in school don’t get the first message about gene technology*  
434 *there, maybe from somewhere else.” (E6)*

435 *“Absolutely, I always think you should listen to people. I don't think you have to agree with*  
436 *them, we'll do what they say, because you are allowed to disagree, you're allowed to say*  
437 *that's all very well, but you're wrong.” (E7)*

438 *“Actually, the development of SB requires good communication with the government, the*  
439 *media and the public, rather than ignoring the public’s reasonable requests.” (C9)*

#### 440 **4. Discussion**

441 This study showed that there is currently no consensus on the definition of SB among  
442 scientists, which can be partially attributed to its being a combination of multiple disciplines.  
443 This has raised the question of how SB should be described in public communication.  
444 Framing SB primarily based on GM characteristics could bias people against SB and  
445 associated applications, due to prior attitudes towards GM products, particularly for people  
446 who regard SB-based applications as the equivalent of GM products (Fischer & Frewer,  
447 2009). Thus, there is a need for a more reasonable introduction to SB which is both  
448 scientifically accurate and understandable by laypeople. Such an introduction would strongly  
449 benefit social scientists particularly when they investigate public responses and make targeted  
450 science communication strategies.

451 Despite disparities in definition, scientists in our study anticipated a large number of  
452 applications across different sectors (see **Table 2**), and expected these to deliver economic,  
453 health and environmental benefits to society in future. Both the EU and Chinese scientists

454 judged SB to be essentially high-benefit, low-risk and ethically acceptable; this aligns with  
455 findings among US synthetic biologists (Rose et al., 2018). Benefits of different applications  
456 were expected to target distinct groups of stakeholders. For instance, biofortified crops may  
457 help address food security issues, in particular in underdeveloped regions; crops with reduced  
458 input requirements may directly benefit farmers, through reduced costs, and indirectly benefit  
459 the broader public, through the mitigation of environmental impacts. In the healthcare sector,  
460 **chimeric antigen receptors T-cell therapy**, for example, provides a new cancer treatment  
461 method and improves patients' quality of life (**Table 2**).

462 Compared with the numerous benefits, only a limited number of risks were mentioned, which  
463 were in reference to specific applications (see **Table 2**). Scientists perceived that ecological  
464 risks may arise from the unconstrained use of applications (e.g. the release of synthetic  
465 microbe), and these risks have been evaluated as very low or even nil; few participants  
466 acknowledged the unknown long-term effects of food-related applications on human health.  
467 In contrast, our review of the relevant literature showed various health, environmental and  
468 socio-economic risks. Specifically, these risks may have a non-quantifiable presence of  
469 events or consequences; and can be divergently evaluated due to multiple societal actors and  
470 the diversity of value judgements; they have been described as “risk uncertainty” and “risk  
471 ambiguity” respectively (Klinke & Renn, 2012). Previous studies often found **a** limited  
472 influence of information provision on laypeople's attitudes towards GM food, implying the  
473 potential confirmatory bias (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). In this study, confirmatory bias  
474 seemed to exist among scientists as well, given their dependence on scientific results showing  
475 no negative impacts of SB or GM applications. In addition, natural scientists need to account  
476 for the identification and evaluation of technical risks in their own research projects, and  
477 uncertainties can often emerge as part of the risks. Surprisingly, while most participants  
478 assumed that people may worry about **the** long-term health effects of food applications, few

479 of them acknowledged the uncertainties associated with the risks. As more risk governance  
480 frameworks (e.g. IRGC Framework) have demanded the inclusion of risk uncertainty and  
481 ambiguity (Renn, Klinke, & Van Asselt, 2011), it should be extended to future risk  
482 assessment and communication in SB projects.

483 Public concerns about SB and its applications may increase if scientists' biased risk  
484 perceptions of SB are learned by the general public. Therefore, a consensus regarding how to  
485 estimate, evaluate and manage these risks must be reached, in the light of scientific  
486 uncertainty and ideally on a case-by-case basis; this also calls for better involvement of  
487 synthetic biologists, the public, and broader stakeholders, such as risk researchers and  
488 government representatives, **as the involvement activities associated with SB are limited**  
489 **(Inglesby, Cicero, Rivers, & Zhang, 2019)**. With respect to risk communication, researchers  
490 have investigated whether and how risk uncertainty should be communicated with the public.  
491 Some studies showed that experts perceive biotechnologies as less risky compared with the  
492 public (Ho et al., 2011; Savadori et al., 2004). Experts also believed that laypeople were  
493 incapable of conceptualising scientific uncertainty, and that information about uncertainty  
494 could result in the decline of public trust in science and scientific institutions (Frewer et al.,  
495 2003). However, there is evidence that the general public is familiar with scientific  
496 uncertainty and wants information about it, and that in cases where scientific uncertainty has  
497 been identified, the failure to provide uncertainty-related information can reduce people's  
498 trust in scientific and regulatory institutions (Frewer, 2003; Frewer et al., 2002). In order to  
499 ensure effective communication about SB-based food applications, the public's preferences  
500 and expectations about risk information need to be investigated and integrated into risk  
501 communication; this should include the interpretation of risk uncertainty and "what is being  
502 done to reduce uncertainty".

503 Two major different ethical issues were perceived by the Chinese and EU scientists,  
504 including the moral use of organisms as experiment material and consideration of  
505 technological justice. The EU scientists are more cautious when selecting organisms  
506 experiment material, as they believed using animals or sometimes even plants needs moral  
507 considerations. The Chinese scientists thought only the use of human cells, in particular  
508 human embryonic stem cells, might be off-limits. In addition, the need to consider **the**  
509 technology gap between developed and underdeveloped economies was only proposed by EU  
510 scientists. Schroeder and Kaplan (2019) argued the need and potential of using RRI,  
511 including moral responsibilities outside Europe to tackle grand challenges globally. In future  
512 SB-related research collaboration between the EU and China, researchers must also address  
513 the possible nuance of ethical standards when selecting ethical principles or standards for  
514 particular projects.

515 In our study, both Chinese and EU scientists expressed overall pessimism about public  
516 acceptance of SB applied to agriculture and food production. The issues/factors which they  
517 considered influential included laypeople's benefit perceptions, laypeople's risk perceptions,  
518 and the impacts of other stakeholders. A striking difference between the Chinese and EU  
519 scientists lay in the types of stakeholders they mentioned as potentially influencing public  
520 attitudes. The EU scientists argued that politicians, NGOs and the media might exaggerate  
521 risks in relation to SB, thereby reducing social acceptance. The Chinese scientists, however,  
522 stressed the lack of support from the government for commercialising certain applications,  
523 which could diminish public confidence in SB. The main reason for this difference could be  
524 the discrepancy between Chinese and EU society with regard to the relative power of various  
525 stakeholders in policy-making surrounding the adoption of novel technologies. However, the  
526 impact of the government support on public acceptance of SB might have been overestimated  
527 by Chinese scientists. For example, **despite** a positive attitude of the Chinese government

528 towards GM technology at the early stage, GM food still failed to be widely accepted by  
529 Chinese citizens (Cao, 2019; Huang & Peng, 2015). The “associationist” view even showed  
530 people’s trust in authorities might **be not** the cause of people’s attitudes towards a food  
531 technology (e.g. GM). Instead, it might be the consequence of people’s prior attitudes  
532 towards the technology, again showing the limitation of depending on government trust to  
533 promote risky technologies (Eiser, Miles, & Frewer, 2002; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005).

534 Some participants argued that there exists a mismatch between application attributes and  
535 public needs and preferences, which may diminish the benefits people perceive in specific  
536 applications. This mismatch may need to be addressed in future via effective communication  
537 with the public which provides information to guide scientists’ “fine-tuning” of applications,  
538 in particular those at critical development points. Another important finding in this study  
539 related to the frequent claims by both the EU and Chinese scientists about laypeople’s  
540 irrationality and knowledge deficit, which were assumed to increase public perceptions of  
541 risk in relation to SB. Little evidence was presented to support the opinion that laypeople’s  
542 perception of risk is based on irrationality. Conversely, previous studies have consistently  
543 shown that the public has its own way of evaluating risks, and technical risk information  
544 alone plays a limited role in the public response (e.g. see Slovic, 2000; Frewer, 2004).

545 Public involvement has been an integral part of developing new technologies in line with  
546 democratic ideals, which may also play a great role in the development of SB. Moreover,  
547 different modes of public engagement may lead to distinct trajectories for specific  
548 applications. Most participants in this study believed that the public should be educated about  
549 the technology and about scientific evidence-based thinking, claiming that laypeople are  
550 irrational and ill-informed. This confirmed that the “deficit model” for the public  
551 communication of science and technology is still operational in the scientific community. An  
552 important issue is that both Chinese and EU scientists appeared to endorse the “deficit

553 model” of public acceptance as the dominant route to societal introduction of SB, despite a  
554 considerable emphasis on the adoption of co-production and RRI approaches, in particular in  
555 the EU. Inclusion of fundamental training in RRI approaches may be required as part of  
556 graduate curriculums and should be a compulsory part of funding programmes, if a more  
557 pragmatic approach to addressing societal acceptance is to emerge (Seethaler et al., 2019).

558 Some participants recognised consumers’ diverse needs and scientists’ possible  
559 misunderstanding of these needs; they therefore stressed the importance of accurately  
560 understanding people’s actual needs and preferences in order to better resolve associated  
561 problems. This points to another model of engaging with the public, with one-way  
562 information flow from the public to experts, i.e. public consultation (Rowe & Frewer, 2005),  
563 which is similar to the “dialogue model” for science communication (Trench, 2008). While  
564 some participants expressed a belief in the importance of public needs and preferences, they  
565 still persisted in the view that decisions should be in the hands of experts. This stance could  
566 be counterproductive, as it has been shown to lead to public rejection of novel technologies  
567 (e.g. GM technology) (Frewer et al., 2013). As such, to improve the public acceptance of SB-  
568 based applications, it is necessary to expand the inclusion of stakeholders and jointly shape  
569 relevant issues and agenda, such as the development and commercialisation of applications.

## 570 **5. Limitations of the study**

571 Some limitations in this study may need to be considered. This research focused only on  
572 scientists in two regulatory regions and used a relatively small sample size. Meanwhile, in  
573 this study, there were more scientists from the area of microbial SB involved as it is a  
574 dominant subfield of SB. Future research should identify and engage more scientists from  
575 other subfields as well as more diverse stakeholder groups across a broader geographical  
576 range. Also, existing studies into public responses to SB, in particular its specific  
577 applications, are still insufficient, which has limited further identification of scientists’



578 misunderstandings of public attitudes. However, we believe that the results provide some  
579 insights which can support increasingly responsible innovations within the area of SB.

## 580 **6. Conclusion**

581 SB has seen much progress in creating novel tools and agrifood applications, but the limited  
582 attention paid to its social implications may hinder its long-term development. In this study,  
583 both Chinese and EU scientists believed that SB is essentially high-benefit, low-risk and  
584 ethically acceptable. These scientists therefore tended to support the proactive principle  
585 rather than the precautionary principle for the regulatory process. However, most of the  
586 participants were pessimistic about the public response to SB, in particular its agrifood  
587 applications, which they considered to be driven by laypeople's perceptions of risks and  
588 benefits, and by other stakeholders. The results revealed far more similarities than differences  
589 between the two participant groups' views on social implications, despite the greater  
590 emphasis on RRI approaches in EU research activities as compared to China; one relatively  
591 clear difference lay in their perceptions of the relative impacts of various stakeholder groups  
592 on public attitudes. In addition, this study underlined some issues that should be investigated  
593 in future research, including the definition of SB, the assessment and communication of risk  
594 uncertainties, and the selection of suitable communication models. All the findings raise the  
595 need to involve the public, scientists and broader stakeholder groups so as to jointly shape  
596 SB-related issues and agenda on a case-by-case basis.

## 597 **Acknowledgement**

598 We would like to thank R D M Cullen for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  
599 We also thank Gaogui Shi and Zhihui Liang for helping conduct and transcribe some  
600 interviews in this study.

## 601 **Declarations of Interest Statement**

602 The authors declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,  
603 and/or publication of this article.

604

605

606

## 607 **References**

- 608 Akin, H., Rose, K. M., Scheufele, D. A., Simis-Wilkinson, M., Brossard, D., Xenos, M. A.,  
609 & Corley, E. A. (2017). Mapping the landscape of public attitudes on synthetic biology.  
610 *BioScience*, 67(3), 290–300. <https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biw171>
- 611 Anderson, J., Strelkova, N., Stan, G.-B., Douglas, T., Savulescu, J., Barahona, M., &  
612 Papachristodoulou, A. (2012). Engineering and ethical perspectives in synthetic biology.  
613 *EMBO Reports*, 13(7), 584–590. <https://doi.org/10.1038/embor.2012.81>
- 614 Barriball, K. L., & While, A. (1994). Collecting data using a semi-structured interview: a  
615 discussion paper. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 19(2), 328–335.  
616 <https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2648.ep8535505>
- 617 Betten, A. W., Broerse, J. E. W., & Kupper, F. (2018). Dynamics of problem setting and  
618 framing in citizen discussions on synthetic biology. *Public Understanding of Science*,  
619 27(3), 294–309. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662517712207>
- 620 Braman, D., Mandel, G. N., & Kahan, D. M. (2008). Cultural Cognition and Synthetic  
621 Biology Risk Perceptions: A Preliminary Analysis. In *GW Law Faculty Publication and*  
622 *Other Works* (p. 282). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264804>
- 623 Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research*  
624 *in Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101. <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>
- 625 Canton, B., Labno, A., & Endy, D. (2008). Refinement and standardization of synthetic  
626 biological parts and devices. *Nature Biotechnology*, 26, 787–793.  
627 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nbt1413>
- 628 Cao, C. (2019). The Chinese Media and Changing Policy. In *GMO China: How Global*  
629 *Debates Transformed China's Agricultural Biotechnology Politics* (pp. 129–154).  
630 Columbia University Pres.
- 631 Dijkstra, A. M., & Yin, L. (2019). Insights from China for a Global Perspective on a  
632 Responsible Science–society Relationship. *Cultures of Science*, 2(1), 65–76.  
633 <https://doi.org/10.1177/209660831900200106>
- 634 Douglas, T., & Savulescu, J. (2010). Synthetic biology and the ethics of knowledge. *Journal*  
635 *of Medical Ethics*, 36(11), 687–693. <https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2010.038232>
- 636 Dragojlovic, N., & Einsiedel, E. (2012). Playing God or just unnatural? Religious beliefs and  
637 approval of synthetic biology. *Public Understanding of Science*, 22(7), 869–885.  
638 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662512445011>
- 639 Dragojlovic, N., & Einsiedel, E. (2013). Framing Synthetic Biology: Evolutionary Distance,  
640 Conceptions of Nature, and the Unnaturalness Objection. *Science Communication*,  
641 35(5), 547–571. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547012470707>
- 642 Edmondston, J. E., Dawson, V., & Schibeci, R. (2010). Undergraduate biotechnology  
643 students' views of science communication. *International Journal of Science Education*,  
644 32(18), 2451–2474. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500690903514598>
- 645 Eiser, J. R., Miles, S., & Frewer, L. J. (2002). Trust, Perceived Risk, and Attitudes Toward  
646 Food Technologies. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 32(11), 2423–2433.  
647 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2002.tb01871.x>
- 648 European Commission. (2015). *Indicators for promoting and monitoring responsible*

649 *research and innovation: report from the expert group on policy indicators for*  
650 *responsible research and innovation*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European  
651 Union. Retrieved from  
652 [http://ec.europa.eu/research/swafs/pdf/pub\\_rri/rri\\_indicators\\_final\\_version.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/swafs/pdf/pub_rri/rri_indicators_final_version.pdf)  
653 Fischer, A. R. H., & Frewer, L. J. (2009). Consumer familiarity with foods and the perception  
654 of risks and benefits. *Food Quality and Preference*, 20(8), 576–585.  
655 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodqual.2009.06.008>  
656 Fischer, A. R. H., van Dijk, H., de Jonge, J., Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2013). Attitudes and  
657 attitudinal ambivalence change towards nanotechnology applied to food production.  
658 *Public Understanding of Science*, 22(7), 817–831.  
659 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662512440220>  
660 Frewer, L. J. (2003). Societal issues and public attitudes towards genetically modified foods.  
661 *Trends in Food Science & Technology*, 14(5–8), 319–332.  
662 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0924-2244\(03\)00064-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0924-2244(03)00064-5)  
663 Frewer, L. J. (2004). The public and effective risk communication. *Toxicology Letters*,  
664 149(1–3), 391–397. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.toxlet.2003.12.049>  
665 Frewer, L. J., Bergmann, K., Brennan, M., Lion, R., Meertens, R., Rowe, G., ... Vereijken,  
666 C. (2011). Consumer response to novel agri-food technologies: Implications for  
667 predicting consumer acceptance of emerging food technologies. *Trends in Food Science*  
668 *and Technology*, 22(8), 442–456. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2011.05.005>  
669 Frewer, L. J., Hunt, S., Brennan, M., Kuznesof, S., Ness, M., & Ritson, C. (2003). The views  
670 of scientific experts on how the public conceptualize uncertainty. *Journal of Risk*  
671 *Research*, 6(1), 75–85. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1366987032000047815>  
672 Frewer, L. J., Miles, S., Brennan, M., Kuznesof, S., Ness, M., & Ritson, C. (2002). Public  
673 preferences for informed choice under conditions of risk uncertainty. *Public*  
674 *Understanding of Science*, 11(4), 363–372. <https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-6625/11/4/304>  
675 Frewer, L. J., van der Lans, I. A., Fischer, A. R. H., Reinders, M. J., Menozzi, D., Zhang, X.  
676 Y., ... Zimmermann, K. L. (2013). Public perceptions of agri-food applications of  
677 genetic modification - A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Trends in Food Science*  
678 *and Technology*, 30(2), 142–152. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2013.01.003>  
679 Garfinkel, M. S., Endy, D., Epstein, G. L., & Friedman, R. M. (2007). Synthetic genomics:  
680 Options for governance. *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice,*  
681 *and Science*, 5(4), 359–362. <https://doi.org/10.1089/ind.2007.3.333>  
682 Gillon, R. (1994). Medical Ethics: Four principles plus attention to scope. *British Medical*  
683 *Journal*, 309(6948), 184–188. Retrieved from  
684 [https://search.proquest.com/docview/1777514508/fulltextPDF/72E6BD468A674508PQ/  
685 1?accountid=14620%0Ahttp://www.jstor.org/login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/stable/pdf/  
686 f/29724194.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa520b0d86c2f17d1825f7eaf62b05c30](https://search.proquest.com/docview/1777514508/fulltextPDF/72E6BD468A674508PQ/1?accountid=14620%0Ahttp://www.jstor.org/login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/stable/pdf/29724194.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa520b0d86c2f17d1825f7eaf62b05c30)  
687 Grunwald, A. (2018). *Technology assessment in practice and theory*. Oxford: Routledge.  
688 Guest, G., Namey, E., & Chen, M. (2020). A simple method to assess and report thematic  
689 saturation in qualitative research. *PLoS ONE*, 15(5), e0232076.  
690 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232076>  
691 Gupta, N., Fischer, A. R. H., George, S., & Frewer, L. J. (2013). Expert views on societal  
692 responses to different applications of nanotechnology: A comparative analysis of experts  
693 in countries with different economic and regulatory environments. *Journal of*  
694 *Nanoparticle Research*, 15, 1838. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11051-013-1838-4>  
695 Harvey, M., & Pilgrim, S. (2011). The new competition for land: Food, energy, and climate  
696 change. *Food Policy*, 36(Supplement 1), 40–51.  
697 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2010.11.009>  
698 Heavey, P. (2014). Integrating ethical analysis “Into the DNA” of synthetic biology.

699 *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, 18(1), 121–127. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-014-9588-3)  
700 014-9588-3

701 Hilgartner, S. (1990). The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual Problems, Political  
702 Uses. *Social Studies of Science*, 20(3), 519–539.  
703 <https://doi.org/10.1177/030631290020003006>

704 Ho, S. S., Scheufele, D. A., & Corley, E. A. (2011). Value Predispositions, Mass Media, and  
705 Attitudes Toward Nanotechnology: The Interplay of Public and Experts. *Science*  
706 *Communication*, 33(2), 167–200. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547010380386>

707 Huang, J., & Peng, B. (2015). Consumers' perceptions on GM food safety in urban China.  
708 *Journal of Integrative Agriculture*, 14(11), 2391–2400. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2095-](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2095-3119(15)61125-X)  
709 3119(15)61125-X

710 Ineichen, C., Biller-Andorno, N., & Deplazes-Zemp, A. (2017). Image of synthetic biology  
711 and nanotechnology: A survey among university students. *Frontiers in Genetics*,  
712 8(SEP), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fgene.2017.00122>

713 Inglesby, T., Cicero, A., Rivers, C., & Zhang, W. (2019). Biosafety and biosecurity in the era  
714 of synthetic biology: Meeting the challenges in China and the U.S. *Journal of Biosafety*  
715 *and Biosecurity*, 1(2), 73–74. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobb.2019.09.003>

716 Jin, S., Clark, B., Kuznesof, S., Lin, X., & Frewer, L. J. (2019). Synthetic biology applied in  
717 the agrifood sector: Public perceptions, attitudes and implications for future studies.  
718 *Trends in Food Science & Technology*, 91, 454–466.  
719 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2019.07.025>

720 Kato-Nitta, N., Maeda, T., Inagaki, Y., & Tachikawa, M. (2019). Expert and public  
721 perceptions of gene-edited crops: attitude changes in relation to scientific knowledge.  
722 *Palgrave Communications*, 5(1), 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0328-4>

723 Klinke, A., & Renn, O. (2012). Adaptive and integrative governance on risk and uncertainty.  
724 *Journal of Risk Research*, 15(3), 273–292.  
725 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2011.636838>

726 Kronberger, N., Holtz, P., & Wagner, W. (2012). Consequences of media information uptake  
727 and deliberation: Focus groups' symbolic coping with synthetic biology. *Public*  
728 *Understanding of Science*, 21(2), 174–187. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662511400331>

729 Li, W., Clark, B., Taylor, J. A., Kendall, H., Jones, G., Li, Z., ... Frewer, L. J. (2020). A  
730 hybrid modelling approach to understanding adoption of precision agriculture  
731 technologies in Chinese cropping systems. *Computers and Electronics in Agriculture*,  
732 172, 1–12.

733 Newson, A. (2015). Synthetic Biology: Ethics, Exeptionalism and Expectations. *Macquarie*  
734 *Law Journal*, 15, 45–58. Retrieved from  
735 <http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=108715935&S=R&D=ofs&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLe80SeprM4zdnyOLCmr0%2BeqK9Sr664Sa%2BwxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGpt02xr65LuePfgeyx43zx>

738 OECD. (2011). *Future prospects for industrial biotechnology*. *Future Prospects for*  
739 *Industrial Biotechnology*. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264126633-en>

740 Polizzi, K., Stanbrough, L., & Heap, J. (2018). *A new lease of life, Understanding the risks of*  
741 *synthetic biology*. London, UK. Retrieved from [https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-](https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/risk-reports/library/understanding-risk/a-new-lease-of-life)  
742 *insight/risk-reports/library/understanding-risk/a-new-lease-of-life*


743 Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2004). Trust, the asymmetry principle, and the role of prior  
744 beliefs. *Risk Analysis*, 24(6), 1475–1486. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00543.x)  
745 4332.2004.00543.x

746 Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2005). Trust in risk regulation: Cause or consequence of the  
747 acceptability of GM food? *Risk Analysis*, 25(1), 199–209.  
748 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2005.00579.x>

- 749 Renn, O., Klinke, A., & Van Asselt, M. (2011). Coping with complexity, uncertainty and  
750 ambiguity in risk governance: A synthesis. *Ambio*, *40*, 231–246.  
751 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-010-0134-0>
- 752 Ribeiro, B., Smith, R., & Millar, K. (2017). A Mobilising Concept? Unpacking Academic  
753 Representations of Responsible Research and Innovation. *Science and Engineering*  
754 *Ethics*, *23*(1), 81–103. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-016-9761-6>
- 755 Rogers, W. (2011). Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: a Commentary. *MacQuire Law*  
756 *Journal*, 2011–2016. Retrieved from  
757 [https://www.mq.edu.au/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0020/213761/mlj\\_2015\\_rogers.pdf](https://www.mq.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/213761/mlj_2015_rogers.pdf)
- 758 Rose, K. M., Howell, E. L., Scheufele, D. A., Brossard, D., Xenos, M. A., Shapira, P., ...  
759 Kwon, S. (2018). The values of synthetic biology: Researcher views of their field and  
760 participation in public engagement. *BioScience*, *68*(10), 782–791.  
761 <https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biy077>
- 762 Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2005). A typology of public engagement mechanisms. *Science*  
763 *Technology and Human Values*, *30*(2), 251–290.  
764 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243904271724>
- 765 Sankar, P., & Jones, N. L. (2007). Semi-Structured Interviews in Bioethics Research.  
766 *Advances in Bioethics*, *11*, 117–136. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1479-3709\(07\)11006-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1479-3709(07)11006-2)
- 767 Savadori, L., Savio, S., Nicotra, E., Rumiati, R., Finucane, M., & Slovic, P. (2004). Expert  
768 and public perception of risk from biotechnology. *Risk Analysis*, *24*(5), 1289–1299.  
769 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00526.x>
- 770 Schroeder, D., & Kaplan, D. (2019). Responsible inclusive innovation: tackling grand  
771 challenges globally. In R. Von Schomberg & J. Hankins (Eds.), *International Handbook*  
772 *on Responsible Innovation* (pp. 308–324). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- 773 Seethaler, S., Evans, J. H., Gere, C., & Rajagopalan, R. M. (2019). Science, Values, and  
774 Science Communication: Competencies for Pushing Beyond the Deficit Model. *Science*  
775 *Communication*, *41*(3), 378–388. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547019847484>
- 776 SEHN. (1998). Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle. Retrieved 24  
777 November 2019, from [https://www.healthandenvironment.org/environmental-](https://www.healthandenvironment.org/environmental-health/social-context/history/precautionary-principle-the-wingspread-statement)  
778 [health/social-context/history/precautionary-principle-the-wingspread-statement](https://www.healthandenvironment.org/environmental-health/social-context/history/precautionary-principle-the-wingspread-statement)
- 779 Simis, M. J., Madden, H., Cacciatore, M. A., & Yeo, S. K. (2016). The lure of rationality:  
780 Why does the deficit model persist in science communication? *Public Understanding of*  
781 *Science*, *25*(4), 400–414. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516629749>
- 782 Slovic, P. (2000). *The perception of risk*. London: Routledge.
- 783 Starkbaum, J., Braun, M., & Dabrock, P. (2015). The synthetic biology puzzle: a qualitative  
784 study on public reflections towards a governance framework. *Systems and Synthetic*  
785 *Biology*, *9*(4), 147–157. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11693-015-9182-x>
- 786 Steurer, W. (2015). “Some kind of genetic engineering... only one step further”-public  
787 perceptions of synthetic biology in Austria. In *Ambivalences of Creating Life: Societal*  
788 *and Philosophical Dimensions of Synthetic Biology* (pp. 115–140).  
789 [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21088-9\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21088-9_6)
- 790 Sturgis, P., & Allum, N. (2004). Science in society: Re-evaluating the deficit model of public  
791 attitudes. *Public Understanding of Science*, *13*(1), 55–74.  
792 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662504042690>
- 793 Sun, J. (2019). Genetically Modified Foods in China: Regulation, Deregulation, or  
794 Governance? In K.-C. Liu & U. S. Racherla (Eds.), *Innovation, Economic Development,*  
795 *and Intellectual Property in India and China*. (pp. 347–366). Springer, Singapore.
- 796 Trench, B. (2008). Towards an analytical framework of science communication models. In D.  
797 Cheng, M. Claessens, T. Gascoigne, J. Metcalfe, S. Bernard, & S. Shi (Eds.),  
798 *Communicating Science in Social Contexts*. Springer, Dordrecht.

799 [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8598-7\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8598-7_7)  
800 Tyagi, A., Kumar, A., Aparna, S. V., Mallappa, R. H., Grover, S., & Batish, V. K. (2016).  
801 Synthetic Biology: Applications in the Food Sector. *Critical Reviews in Food Science*  
802 *and Nutrition*, 56(11), 1777–1789. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10408398.2013.782534>  
803 van Putten, M. C., Frewer, L. J., Gilissen, L. J. W. J., Gremmen, B., Peijnenburg, A. A. C.  
804 M., & Wichers, H. J. (2006). Novel foods and food allergies: A review of the issues.  
805 *Trends in Food Science and Technology*, 17(6), 289–299.  
806 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2005.11.010>  
807 Wang, F., & Zhang, W. (2019). Synthetic biology: Recent progress, biosafety and biosecurity  
808 concerns, and possible solutions. *Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity*, 1(1), 22–30.  
809 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobb.2018.12.003>  
810 Weir, L., & Selgelid, M. J. (2009). Professionalization as a governance strategy for synthetic  
811 biology. *Systems and Synthetic Biology*, 3, 91–97. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s11693-009-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11693-009-9037-4)  
812 [9037-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11693-009-9037-4)  
813 Zalewska-Kurek, K. (2016). Understanding researchers’ strategic behaviour in knowledge  
814 production: a case of social science and nanotechnology researchers. *Journal of*  
815 *Knowledge Management*, 20(5), 1148–1167. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JKM-11-2015-0444>  
816

817 **Figure 1.** Schematic overview of the research methodology



818

819 **Table 1.** Interview sample characteristics

<b>Location</b>	<b>Participant no.</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Subfield of research</b>
<b>Europe</b>	E1	Male	University	Plant SB
	E2	Female	University	Plant SB
	E3	Female	Research institute	Plant SB
	E4	Female	Industry	Plant SB
	E5	Male	University	Computational SB
	E6	Male	Industry	Microbial SB
	E7	Male	University	Microbial SB
	E8	Male	University	Microbial SB
	E9	Male	University	Microbial SB
	E10	Male	University	Microbial SB
	E11	Male	University	Microbial & Computational SB
	E12	Male	University	Microbial & Mammalian SB
	E13	Female	University	Plant & Microbial SB
<b>China</b>	C1	Male	Research institute	Microbial SB
	C2	Male	University	Microbial & Computational SB
	C3	Male	Research institute	Computational SB
	C4	Male	University	Microbial & Mammalian SB
	C5	Male	Research institute	Computational SB
	C6	Male	Research institute	Microbial SB
	C7	Male	Industry	Microbial SB
	C8	Male	University	Plant SB
	C9	Male	Research institute	Plant & Microbial SB

820 Note: Despite strenuous efforts to achieve a gender balance among participants, we failed to recruit female  
821 Chinese scientists for this study.

822



823 **Table 2.** Scientists' anticipated applications and benefit/risk perceptions

Application Sectors	Origin of material	Product traits	Confined use	Perceived benefits	Perceived risks
<b>Agriculture</b>	Plant	Crops with increased resistance to biotic and abiotic stress, reducing their needs for inputs (e.g. fertilizer, pesticide and water)	No	The improved crops and new ways of pest/crop disease control may provide higher-quality foods and possibly cheaper products with reduced environmental impacts. The reduced needs for inputs and increased productivity may bring economic benefits to farmers.	The use of gene-drive system in insects for population control may pose ecological risks.
	Plant	Crops with increased productivity (e.g. improved photosynthesis)	No		
	Plant	Crops with improved quality (e.g. nutrition level)	No		
	Plant	New ways of self-incompatible crop breeding (e.g. diploid potato breeding)	No		
	Microbe	Provide biofertilizer to facilitate crop growth through plant-microbe interaction	No		
	Microbe	Biopesticide	Yes		
	Microbe/cell free system	Biosensors for pathogen detection in plants and soil	No		
	Insect	Change the insect population with synthetic gene-drive system	No		
<b>Food</b>	Animal cell/microbe	Novel food (e.g. artificial meat and yeast-based milk)	Yes	New ways of food additive and enzyme production can be obtained. Novel foods may reduce the animal killing and land sue.	The long-term effect of food applications is uncertain.
	Microbe	Food additives (e.g. flavourings and aroma)	Yes		
	Microbe	Enzymes for food processing	Yes		
<b>Environment &amp; energy</b>	Microbe/plant	Carbon dioxide fixation	No	Applications may help address pollution issues and produce energy with reduced environmental impacts.	The released microbe may pose ecological risks.
	Microbe/plant	Bioremediation for polluted lands/water	No		
	Microbe/plant	Biofuel production	'Yes' for microbe-based; 'No' for plant-based		

	Microbe	Waste processing and recycling (e.g. transformed into energy)	Yes		
<b>Healthcare</b>	Microbe/plant/insect/animal	Medicine production (e.g. artemisinin and vaccines)	Yes		
	Human cell/microbe	Disease treatment (e.g. CAR-T for cancer treatment and synthetic microbe for chronic disease treatment)	No (used in human body)	Novel ways of medicine or natural products production may reduce the price and stabilise the supply of products. These new options for disease treatment can benefit patients.	Engineered human cell and microbe for disease treatment might have side effects on human health.
	Microbe/plant	Nutraceutical products	'Yes' for microbe-based; 'No' for plant-based		
<b>Fundamental research</b>	Not Applicable	Advanced tools for DNA/genome synthesis and sequencing	Yes	Advanced tools can boost development of applications in different sectors.	Not mentioned

824