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Public Goods and the Commons: a Common Framework

Lookup NU author(s): Simon Vicary

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Abstract

This paper models the commons as a public good whose provision can only be lowered as a result of human action. We employ assumptions that make a commons public good analytically equivalent to the conventional ‘subscription’ model of private provision, and compare the properties of equilibrium as between the two cases. In general they might be described as ‘skew symmetric’ with respect to one another. In a large commons economy we expect widespread individual sacrifice of private consumption, with provision determined at the limit by those with the least, not the greatest, interest in the good. Furthermore, under certain conditions, equalising transfers raise public good provision and could even be Pareto improving. Also, making consumption more environmentally friendly will cause environmental quality to fall when the community is large.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Vicary S

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Newcastle Discussion Papers in Economics

Year: 2007

Volume: 03

Pages: 1-32

Print publication date: 01/07/2007

ISSN (print): 1361-1837

Publisher: Newcastle University Business School

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