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Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Lookup NU author(s): Anthony Burton, Professor Susan Chilton


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Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Burton AC, Carson KS, Chilton SM, Hutchinson WG

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Applied Economics

Year: 2009

Volume: 41

Issue: 27

Pages: 3561-3569

ISSN (print): 0003-6846

ISSN (electronic): 1466-4283

Publisher: Taylor & Francis


DOI: 10.1080/00036840701537802


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