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Prêt á Voter: a System Perspective

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Peter Ryan, Thea Peacock



Numerous cryptographic voting schemes have been proposed in recent years. Many of these have highly desirable formal security properties. However, as with all security systems, even a well-designed technical system can be undermined by implementation details or environmental factors, typically including human users, that violate (often implicit) assumptions of the design and evaluation. In `Cryptographic Voting Protocols: a System Perspective[11] Karlof et al perform a systems-based analysis of the Chaum [5] and Neff [17],[18],[19] schemes. They identify a number of vulnerabilities and discuss possible mitigations and counter-measures. In this paper, we examine the extent to which these vulnerabilities carry over to the Prêt á Voter scheme [6]. In addition, we describe some further systems-based vulnerabilities not identified in [11]. We also discuss some further threats, such as chain voting attacks, which do not apply to the Chaum or Neff schemes but to which Prêt á Voter is vulnerable, unless appropriate countermeasures are deployed. It turns out that Prêt á Voter is remarkably robust to most of the vulnerabilities described in [11] and here.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Ryan P Y A, Peacock T

Publication type: Report

Publication status: Published

Series Title: School of Computing Science Technical Report Series

Year: 2005

Pages: 21

Print publication date: 01/09/2005

Source Publication Date: September 2005

Report Number: 929

Institution: School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

Place Published: Newcastle upon Tyne