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Threat Analysis of Cryptographic Election Schemes

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Peter Ryan, Thea Peacock

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Abstract

We discuss some vulnerabilities, threats and counter-measures for voter-verifiable, cryptographic election schemes: Chaum [1], Neff [7] and Pret a Voter schemes [2]. Our analysis shows that such schemes are potentially prey to a wide variety of threats, both technical and socio-technical. On the other hand, counter-measures can be deployed to all the threats identified. This paper strives to take initial steps towards a more systematic threat analysis for such schemes. We briefly address the issue of how to ensure such threat analyses are as systematic and complete as possible.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Ryan PYA, Peacock T

Publication type: Report

Publication status: Published

Series Title: School of Computing Science Technical Report Series

Year: 2006

Pages: 12

Print publication date: 01/06/2006

Source Publication Date: June 2006

Report Number: 971

Institution: School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

Place Published: Newcastle upon Tyne

URL: http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/publications/trs/papers/971.pdf

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