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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Peter Andras
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The emergence and evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals is a key question of theoretical biology. Uncertainty of outcomes of interactions between individuals is an important determinant of cooperative behavior. Here we describe a model that allows the analysis of the effects of such uncertainty on the level of cooperation. We show that in iterated cooperation games the level of cooperation increases with the level of outcome uncertainty. We show that this is the case if the individuals communicate about their cooperation intentions and also if they do not communicate their intentions. © 2008 IEEE.
Author(s): Andras P
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008
Year of Conference: 2008
Pages: 593-599
Publisher: IEEE
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630856
DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2008.4630856
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 9781424418237
