ePrints

n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Mich Tvede

Downloads

Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.

Abstract

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Hougaard JL, Tvede M

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Operations Research Letters

Year: 2010

Volume: 38

Issue: 6

Pages: 536-538

Print publication date: 25/09/2010

ISSN (print): 0167-6377

ISSN (electronic): 1872-7468

Publisher: Elsevier BV

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.008

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.008

Altmetrics

Share