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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Mich Tvede
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For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.
Author(s): Hougaard JL, Tvede M
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Operations Research Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 38
Issue: 6
Pages: 536-538
Print publication date: 25/09/2010
ISSN (print): 0167-6377
ISSN (electronic): 1872-7468
Publisher: Elsevier BV
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.008
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.008
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