A model for system-based analysis of voting systems

Ryan, P;, Peacock, T;, Tjøstheim, T

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17773-6_13

A model for system-based analysis of voting systems

Lookup NU author(s): Thomas Tjostheim, Thea Peacock, Professor Peter Ryan

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Abstract

There has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a "system-based" view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a scheme [1,2]. Threat analysis has so far been of three main forms: system-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We discuss these approaches before presenting a model for system-based analysis of voting systems that is more systematic than previous work. The model is described in detail, and demonstrated with an example from a case study of the Randell-Ryan "Scratch Card" voting system [3]. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.