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Lookup NU author(s): Professor David RoseORCiD
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The dominant naturalistic tradition in moral philosophy assumes that the basic capacities and characteristics of the individual exist prior to his or her socialisation and that morality arises out of the necessity for cooperation. In order to exist peacefully in society, aggressive instincts are either redirected from external objects to the individual him or herself or the human being has a natural tendency to cooperation. There is a third alternative which avoids the problems with these accounts and also offers a way to comprehend the relationships between morality, social conventions and moral law. Giambattista Vico grounds his historical science in the faculty of imagination regulated by basic universal facts about human beings. The argument of the present paper will present the problems with reductive naturalism and outline the alternative Vichian moral sociology, projecting what the empirical consequences of this new methodology may be.
Author(s): Rose DE
Editor(s): Musschenga, B., van Harskamp, A.
Publication type: Book Chapter
Publication status: Published
Book Title: What Makes us Moral: On the capacities and conditions for being moral
Year: 2013
Volume: 31
Pages: 311-326
Series Title: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy
Publisher: Springer
Place Published: Amsterdam, Netherlands
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 9789400763432
