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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Diemo DietrichORCiD
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allow banks to influence the scale of assistance and externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives, but may have higher fiscal costs.
Author(s): Dietrich D, Hauck A
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 59
Issue: 2
Pages: 133-161
Print publication date: 01/05/2012
Online publication date: 02/03/2012
Date deposited: 26/09/2014
ISSN (print): 0036-9292
ISSN (electronic): 1467-9485
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2011.00573.x
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2011.00573.x
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