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Formal methods for security in the Xenon hypervisor

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Leo Freitas

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Abstract

This paper reports on the Xenon project’s use of formal methods. Xenon is a higher-assurance secure hypervi- sor based on re-engineering the Xen open-source hypervisor. The Xenon project used formal specifications both for assur- ance and as guides for security re-engineering. We formally modelled the fundamental definition of security, the hyper- call interface behaviour, and the internal modular design. We used three formalisms: CSP, Z, and Circus for this work. Circus is a combination of Standard Z, CSP, with its seman- tics given in Hoare and He’s unifying theories of program- ming. Circus is suited for both event-based and state-based modelling. Here, we report our experiences to date with using these formalisms for assurance.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Freitas L, McDermott J

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: International Journal on Software Tools Technology Transfer

Year: 2011

Volume: 13

Issue: 5

Pages: 463-489

Print publication date: 01/10/2011

ISSN (print): 1433-2779

ISSN (electronic): 1433-2787

Publisher: Springer

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10009-011-0195-9

DOI: 10.1007/s10009-011-0195-9


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