ePrints

Vendettas

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Daniel ZizzoORCiD

Downloads

Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.

Abstract

Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Bolle F, Tan JHW, Zizzo DJ

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Year: 2014

Volume: 6

Issue: 2

Pages: 93-130

Print publication date: 01/05/2014

Online publication date: 01/05/2014

ISSN (print): 1945-7669

ISSN (electronic): 1945-7685

Publisher: American Economic Association

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.2.93

DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.2.93

Altmetrics

Share