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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Melanie Parravano Baro
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND).
We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford et al. (2008). These findings suggest that players' mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be explained by team reasoning or a level-k model, crucially depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of the coordination payoffs.
Author(s): Parravano M, Poulsen O
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Print publication date: 01/11/2015
Online publication date: 08/05/2015
Acceptance date: 05/05/2015
Date deposited: 08/02/2016
ISSN (electronic): 0899-8256
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