Browse by author
Lookup NU author(s): Professor Mich Tvede
Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.
In the present paper a general model of competition between clubs in sports leagues with flexible supply of inputs is studied. There are externalities between clubs because it takes more than one club to produce games and tournaments. It is assumed that the externalities take the form of complementarities. Firstly, it is shown that revenue sharing leads to lower overall quality of sports leagues. Secondly, it is shown that the optimal quality for the league is lower (higher) than the quality in a league without revenue sharing in case of negative (positive) externalities between clubs. Thirdly an example is used to illustrate the findings.
Author(s): Hansen BO, Tvede M
Editor(s): Alberto A. Pinto, Elvio Accinelli Gamba, Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos, and Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Publication type: Book Chapter
Publication status: Published
Book Title: Trends in Mathematical Economics
Year: 2016
Pages: 245-262
Online publication date: 31/07/2016
Acceptance date: 01/01/1900
Publisher: Springer
Place Published: Berlin
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_12
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_12
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 9783319325439