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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Grega SmrkoljORCiD
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND).
Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooperation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.
Author(s): Smrkolj G, Wagener F
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Print publication date: 01/12/2016
Online publication date: 04/11/2016
Acceptance date: 30/10/2016
Date deposited: 30/10/2016
ISSN (print): 0165-1889
Publisher: Elsevier BV
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