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Dynamic R&D with spillovers: A comment

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Grega SmrkoljORCiD

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Abstract

Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooperation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Smrkolj G, Wagener F

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Year: 2016

Volume: 73

Pages: 453-457

Print publication date: 01/12/2016

Online publication date: 04/11/2016

Acceptance date: 30/10/2016

Date deposited: 30/10/2016

ISSN (print): 0165-1889

Publisher: Elsevier BV

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2016.10.011

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.10.011

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