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Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Daniel ZizzoORCiD

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0).

Abstract

We experimentally test preferences for employment in a collective wagebargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introducea treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Ourresults show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productiveworkers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether only unionmembers determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small inthe voting game, but it increases if the game becomes an individual allocation task. Weinterpret this as an accountability effect.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Kocher MG, Poulsen O, Zizzo DJ

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Social Choice and Welfare

Year: 2017

Volume: 48

Issue: 3

Pages: 659–678

Print publication date: 01/03/2017

Online publication date: 07/02/2017

Acceptance date: 10/01/2017

Date deposited: 17/01/2017

ISSN (print): 0176-1714

ISSN (electronic): 1432-217X

Publisher: Springer

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1028-x

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1028-x

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