ePrints

Is Three a Crowd? Small Group Provision of a Public Good [Appendix]

Lookup NU author(s): Simon Vicary

Downloads

• Accepted version [.pdf]

Abstract

Suppose a group of individuals within a large community trust one another sufficiently to be able to co-ordinate their contributions to a public good. The alternative is to accept a Nash equilibrium. We show that under a wide range of reasonably plausible circumstances a relatively small group size (in many cases just three) suffices for this to be beneficial to group members.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Vicary SJR

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Metroeconomica

Year: 2018

Volume: 69

Issue: 1

Pages: 70-85

Print publication date: 01/02/2018

Online publication date: 06/04/2017

Acceptance date: 18/02/2017

Date deposited: 31/01/2017

ISSN (print): 0026-1386

ISSN (electronic): 1467-999X

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

URL: http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/pub_details2.aspx?pub_id=231695

DOI: 10.1111/meca.12169

Notes: Full article available at https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12169

Altmetrics

Share