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Lookup NU author(s): Simon Vicary
This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Wiley-Blackwell, 2018.
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Suppose a group of individuals within a large community trust one another sufficiently to be able to co-ordinate their contributions to a public good. The alternative is to accept a Nash equilibrium. We show that under a wide range of reasonably plausible circumstances a relatively small group size (in many cases just three) suffices for this to be beneficial to group members.
Author(s): Vicary SJC
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Metroeconomica
Year: 2018
Volume: 69
Issue: 1
Pages: 70-85
Print publication date: 01/02/2018
Online publication date: 06/04/2017
Acceptance date: 18/02/2017
Date deposited: 22/02/2017
ISSN (print): 0026-1386
ISSN (electronic): 1467-999X
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12169
DOI: 10.1111/meca.12169
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