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Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game

Lookup NU author(s): Simon Vicary

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Abstract

This paper extends the leader-follower analysis of a weakest-link public good by permitting an agent to provide the good on one's own territory or on another's territory through an in-kind transfer. An equilibrium with cash transfers, followed by in-kind transfers from the income recipient, may be Pareto superior. Any cash transfers must be from the follower to the leader for welfare to improve.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Vicary S; Sandler T

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2001

Volume: 74

Issue: 1

Pages: 71-75

ISSN (print): 0165-1765

ISSN (electronic): 1873-7374

Publisher: Elsevier BV

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00515-8

DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00515-8

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