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Lookup NU author(s): Roberto Metere, Dr Changyu Dong
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© Springer International Publishing AG 2017. Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example, verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.
Author(s): Metere R, Dong C
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: 7th International Conference on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security
Year of Conference: 2017
Pages: 275-287
Online publication date: 06/08/2017
Acceptance date: 02/04/2016
Publisher: Springer Verlag
URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_22
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_22
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
Series Title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISBN: 9783319651262
