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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Jean Hillier
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I explore the core Habermasian concept of rational consensus-formation and its counterfactuality before introducing the possibility of permanence of conflict, non-reciprocity and domination (i.e. of agonism) which may productively explain some of the powergames enacted in planning decision-making. In so doing I draw on the concept of agonism and introduce the political into Habermas' moral theorization. Where the personal and the political intersect there is a role for psychology. I illustrate how Habermas' communicative theorizing was itself partly developed from a psychoanalytical tradition before introducing some of the concepts popularized by Jacques Lacan. I conclude that development of communicative planning theory could usefully retain some of Habermas' psychological foundations while turning to the work of Lacan as a basis for an enhanced understanding of the realities of planning practice.
Author(s): Hillier J
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Planning Theory
Year: 2003
Volume: 2
Issue: 1
Pages: 37-59
ISSN (print): 1473-0952
ISSN (electronic): 1741-3052
Publisher: Sage Publications Ltd.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1473095203002001005
DOI: 10.1177/1473095203002001005
Notes: As a planning theorist interested in the potential of consensus-building I am concerned that, in the reality of practice, many planning strategies and/or disputes about development applications do not end in harmonious consensus. In this paper I explore a different way of attempting to explain and help an understanding of non-consensus. In examining the concept of agonism I do not mean to infer that conflict is good or that every planning decision will be beset by conflict. Rather, I offer the paper as a beginning attempt to understand why some consensus-formation strategies may have a tendency to break down. Writing about agonistic politics and decision making in a liberal democratic context may well invite a certain amount of scepticism. Nevertheless, in this paper I suggest an agonist alternative to the core Habermasian concept of rational consensus. I attempt to reveal the agonism constitutive of social reality as counter to the Habermasian fantasies of unity and authority. I introduce the possibility of permanence of conflict, inequality, difference, non-reciprocity and domination (ie of agonism) which, I believe, may engage more productively in explanation of power-games enacted in planning decision making. In so doing I draw on Chantal Mouffe’s ideas about agonism and overtly introduce the political into what Habermas would regard as a moral basis for theorisation. In seeking a robust philosophical grounding for my theoretical developments I trace Mouffe’s thinking back to its Lacanian roots.
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