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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Ian O'FlynnORCiD
This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Routledge, 2022.
For re-use rights please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.
Deliberative democracy entails a commitment to deciding political questions on their merits. To that end, people engage in an exchange of reasons in a shared endeavour to arrive at the right answer or the best judgement they can make in the circumstances. Of course, in practice a shared judgement may be impossible to reach. Yet while compromise may seem a natural way of dealing with the disagreement that deliberation leaves unresolved—for example, some deliberative theorists argue that a willingness to compromise manifests respect for the considered views of others, even as we continue to disagree with them—the relationship between deliberation and compromise is not as straightforward as one might think. To explain why, this paper contrasts conflicts of judgement with conflicts of preference, interest and value to show why greater attention needs to be paid to the character of the decision to be made.
Author(s): O'Flynn I, Setälä M
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Online publication date: 05/03/2020
Acceptance date: 28/02/2020
Date deposited: 28/02/2020
ISSN (print): 1369-8230
ISSN (electronic): 1743-8772
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