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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Sebastian Popa
This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Taylor & Francis , 2021.
For re-use rights please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.
The EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the ‘unitary actor’ approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra-parliamentary dynamics on the delegation patterns in the Union. We maintain that party polarization as well as the level of policy salience shape delegation patterns in the EU. Reflecting the differences between political elites, increasing party polarization motivates the EP to curtail the prospect of bureaucratic drift when delegating power. Lacking effective control mechanisms over the supranational agency, the EP hinders the extent of delegated power if the Commission oversees the policy. In contrast to the extant literature, we do not find policy salience to be influential for the EP’s delegation decisions. We test these conjunctions using data from the Euromanifesto project and the dataset on delegation dynamic in the Union.
Author(s): Ershova S, Popa SA
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Journal of European Public Policy
Online publication date: 29/05/2020
Acceptance date: 19/05/2020
Date deposited: 15/07/2020
ISSN (print): 1350-1763
ISSN (electronic): 1466-4429
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
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