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Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Till Weber

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Abstract

Experimental research has shown that ordinary people often perform remarkably well in solving coordination games that involve no conflicts of interest. While most experiments in the past studied such coordination games among socially distant anonymous players, here we study behaviour in a set of two player coordination games and compare the outcomes depending on whether the players are socially close or socially distant. We find that social closeness influences prospects for coordination, but whether it helps, harms, or has no impact on coordination probabilities, depends on the structure of the game.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Gächter S, Starmer C, Thöni C, Tufano F, Weber TO

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2022

Volume: 216

Print publication date: 01/07/2022

Online publication date: 04/05/2022

Acceptance date: 21/04/2022

Date deposited: 30/05/2022

ISSN (electronic): 0165-1765

Publisher: Elsevier

URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110552

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110552

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