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Regulating misleading political advertising on online platforms: an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Ben FarrandORCiD

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).


Abstract

Since its Joint Communication on Hybrid Threats, the EU has publicly recognised the risks to its security posed by non-traditional means aimed at undermining its legitimacy. The propagation of disinformation including misleading political advertising serves as a key example of how the Commission’s perception of the EU’s vulnerability to hybrid threats in times of geopolitical instability is shaping its regulatory policies. This article uses the framework of regulatory mercantilism, which argues that in conditions of perceived vulnerability, a state-like actor will reassert regulatory control based on a security logic in areas previously characterised by self-regulatory regimes. This article considers the Commission’s 2019-2024 priorities, and how the spheres of technology, security, and democracy policies are intersecting as a response to hybrid threats. As a result, online platform governance in the EU is being substantially restructured with a move from systems of self-regulation to co-regulation backed by sanction as a means of combating hybrid threats online. The Commission’s ‘taking back control’ from platforms in the context of a digital sovereignty agenda serves as an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy, which sees the Commission seek to promote regulatory strength in response to perceived vulnerability.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Farrand B

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Policy Studies

Year: 2024

Volume: 45

Issue: 5

Pages: 730-749

Online publication date: 18/09/2023

Acceptance date: 07/09/2023

Date deposited: 18/09/2023

ISSN (print): 0144-2872

ISSN (electronic): 1470-1006

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2258810

DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2023.2258810


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