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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Yousry AhmedORCiD
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).
This study examines whether managers employ the annual report textual disclosures as a conduit to communicate the probability of future corporate bankruptcy or to intentionally mislead stakeholders due to impression management incentives. We conduct various examinations around the information content of the tone conveyed by textual disclosures in the unstructured UK annual reports and the probability of corporate bankruptcy. We document that firms that communicate a more net positive tone are associated with lower bankruptcy risk. Importantly, this association is found to be stronger for firms whose managers have a lower incentive to mislead investors due to better board monitoring, stringent stock market regulation, and Big 4 audits. We also offer complementary evidence that firms conveying a more net positive tone exhibit higher future performance and earnings persistence, and lower future performance volatility. These firms are also less likely to exhibit extreme corporate policies and receive a qualified auditor’s opinion. Overall, this study sheds light on whether managers tend to inform or misinform (bury their heads in the sand) about corporate bankruptcy.
Author(s): Ahmed Y, Elsayed M, Xu B
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: British Journal of Management
Year: 2024
Volume: 35
Issue: 4
Pages: 2011-2031
Print publication date: 01/10/2024
Online publication date: 25/02/2024
Acceptance date: 30/01/2024
Date deposited: 04/02/2024
ISSN (print): 1045-3172
ISSN (electronic): 1467-8551
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12804
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12804
ePrints DOI: 10.57711/r6mv-2431
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