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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Vladimir TerzijaORCiD
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND).
Vulnerability assessment forms the foundation for remediation activities that an organization develops as a part of risk assessment and mitigation. This paper presents a synchrophasor measurement device-specific cyber security vulnerability assessment at network level. A synchrophasor network is essential for wide-area measurement system (WAMS) that assembles time-synchronized data from multiple power network components and facilitates the processing and transferring of these data. Attackers can leverage their knowledge of firmware and protocols to disrupt or critically damage the functioning of the power system in a stealthy manner. Nevertheless, the exploitation can be curbed or controlled if the operator is aware of the vulnerabilities associated with the field devices. The authors detail their analysis on the following aspects: (a) classification of attacks in synchrophasor network, (b) Type of resources and reconnaissance sufficient to launch an attack on field devices, (c) identification, demonstration, and exploitation of synchrophasor device vulnerabilities. The work showcases exploitable vulnerabilities, to understand the breath and scope of a synchrophasor measurement device’s exposure to a possible cyber attack. The reverse-engineered attack focuses on capturing essential features of packets and consuming the bandwidth during the three-way handshake among legitimate entities. The latency in packet transmission is gradually increased, which results in retransmission; thus, the legitimate connection gets terminated. Thus, the paper provides situational awareness at the device level and credible information regarding loopholes and weak links in field devices.
Author(s): Swain KP, Sharma A, Karkare A, Chakrabarti S, Gryazina E, Terzija V
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: IEEE Access
Year: 2024
Volume: 12
Pages: 72491-72503
Online publication date: 20/05/2024
Acceptance date: 14/05/2024
Date deposited: 03/06/2024
ISSN (electronic): 2169-3536
Publisher: IEEE
URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3403456
DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3403456
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