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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Ying YangORCiD
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).
© 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.Managing a multi-agent supply chain within a hybrid carbon trading framework, which integrates Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Carbon Quota Trading (CQT), presents a significant challenge. This complexity is further amplified by the interplay of competition and cooperation among agents. Motivated by this, we develop a biform game-based cooperative mechanism for a two-stage supply chain that includes a high-emission manufacturer, a negative-emission manufacture and a downstream retailer. This mechanism is designed to encapsulate both the non-cooperative and cooperative game elements. The former features a product competition game among the manufacturers and retailer, setting the stage for the cooperative game without directly yielding equilibrium solutions. The latter involves a cost-sharing agreement for the CER project's initial investment, informed by various coalitional zero-sum games. Our analytical findings, corroborated by numerical simulations, reveal that the biform game coordination mechanism significantly enhances the volume of CERs traded and consumer surplus, compared to a non-cooperative scenario. It effectively aligns the collaborative efforts of all agents within the supply chain. This research contributes substantially to the literature on coordinating multi-stage, multi-agent supply chains, and the strategic deployment of emission reduction initiatives in supply chains. It also offers valuable managerial insights for the design of government regulations in carbon markets.
Author(s): Zheng X-X, Li R, Jia F, Liu Z-Y, Yang Y
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: International Journal of Production Research
Year: 2024
Pages: epub ahead of print
Online publication date: 18/09/2024
Acceptance date: 08/08/2024
Date deposited: 06/09/2024
ISSN (print): 0020-7543
ISSN (electronic): 1366-588X
Publisher: Taylor and Francis Ltd.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2024.2392635
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2024.2392635
ePrints DOI: 10.57711/eedz-mr20
Data Access Statement: Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no data were created or analysed in this study.
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