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This paper extends the analysis of weakest-link public goods by permitting an agent either to increase one's own provision or else augment both one's own provision and that of other agent(s). Nash equilibria may be either symmetric with agents matching one another's provision or else asymmetric with an in-kind transfer by one agent to another. An equilibrium with cash transfers, but no in-kind transfers, may be Pareto superior to one with only in-kind transfers. If agents differ in their efficiency, then in-kind transfers by the low-cost agent may dominate a cash transfer. The possibility of Pareto-improving transfers is enhanced as the number of agents increases.
Author(s): Vicary S; Sandler T
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2002
Volume: 46
Issue: 8
Pages: 1501-1520
ISSN (print): 0014-2921
ISSN (electronic): 1873-572X
Publisher: Elsevier BV
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00103-9
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00103-9
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