Toggle Main Menu Toggle Search

Open Access padlockePrints

On preservation under negation

Lookup NU author(s): Emeritus Professor Noel Burton-Roberts

Downloads

Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.


Abstract

Truth gap theories of presupposition are generally thought of as theories in which, by definition, the intuition that presuppositions are 'preserved under negation' is modeled by arranging for certain entailments of A (its presuppositions) to be logically necessitated by the-negation-of-A. The inevitability of this view of truth gap theories is questioned and arguments against making that arrangement are presented. An alternative is outlined: a truth gap theory, formulated without reference to negation, in which the intuition of preservation under negation is modelled and explained non-truth-conditionally and as the cognitive epiphenomenon of an underlying logic of presupposition.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Burton-Roberts N

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Lingua

Year: 1997

Volume: 101

Issue: 1-2

Pages: 65-88

Print publication date: 09/06/1998

ISSN (print): 0024-3841

ISSN (electronic): 1872-6135

Publisher: Elsevier BV

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3841(96)00033-2

DOI: 10.1016/S0024-3841(96)00033-2


Altmetrics

Altmetrics provided by Altmetric


Share