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Lookup NU author(s): Emeritus Professor Noel Burton-Roberts
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Truth gap theories of presupposition are generally thought of as theories in which, by definition, the intuition that presuppositions are 'preserved under negation' is modeled by arranging for certain entailments of A (its presuppositions) to be logically necessitated by the-negation-of-A. The inevitability of this view of truth gap theories is questioned and arguments against making that arrangement are presented. An alternative is outlined: a truth gap theory, formulated without reference to negation, in which the intuition of preservation under negation is modelled and explained non-truth-conditionally and as the cognitive epiphenomenon of an underlying logic of presupposition.
Author(s): Burton-Roberts N
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Lingua
Year: 1997
Volume: 101
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 65-88
Print publication date: 09/06/1998
ISSN (print): 0024-3841
ISSN (electronic): 1872-6135
Publisher: Elsevier BV
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3841(96)00033-2
DOI: 10.1016/S0024-3841(96)00033-2
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