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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Michael Bell
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This paper proposes a method which identifies those links or nodes whose failure would impair network performance most. It is assumed that all links have two costs, a normal cost and a failed cost, both of which may be traffic-dependent. A 2-player, non-cooperative, zero sum game is envisaged between a router, seeking a least cost path, and a network tester, with the power to fail one link. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, link choice probabilities are optimal for the router and link failure probabilities are optimal for the network tester. Finding the equilibrium involves solving a maximim programming problem. When link costs are fixed (not traffic-dependent), the maximin problem may be solved as a linear programming problem. Two forms of the linear programming problem are presented, one requiring path enumeration and the other not. Where link costs are traffic-dependent, for example where queuing is a feature, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium may be found by the Method of Successive Averages. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the approach on a stochastic network with queuing. While the example relates to single commodity flows, it is noted that the Method of Successive Averages approach may also applied where flows are multi-commodity, for example where there are multiple origins and destinations.
Author(s): Bell MGH
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Proceedings, ITSC
Year of Conference: 2001
Pages: 1183-1188
Publisher: IEEE
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ITSC.2001.948831
DOI: 10.1109/ITSC.2001.948831
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 0780371941
