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Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Martin Sefton

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Abstract

We report experiments where subjects generally fail to attain the efficient equilibrium of a one-shot game, but attain the efficient equilibrium of the repeated version. The results suggest that in the repeated game actions are used to signal future intentions. © Elsevier Science B.V.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Clark K, Sefton M

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2001

Volume: 70

Issue: 3

Pages: 357-362

ISSN (print): 0165-1765

ISSN (electronic): 1873-7374

Publisher: Elsevier B.V.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00381-5

DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00381-5

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