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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Gilbert Roberts
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Pairs of individuals frequently face situations in which they could do well if they cooperated, but each risks being exploited. The Prisoner's Dilemma is widely used for investigating such scenarios, but it is framed in terms of cooperating and defecting, whereas in reality cooperation is rarely 'all or nothing'. Recent models allowing for variable investment in cooperation indicated the success of a strategy of 'raising-the-stakes' (RTS), which invests minimally at first and then increases its investment if its partner matches it. We tested whether this strategy was adopted by subjects participating in an experiment in which they could choose how much money to give to a partner, reciprocity being encouraged by doubling donations. Subjects did increase their donations over successive rounds, both when playing against a stooge who reciprocated with the same investment, and when playing with a partner who was free to choose their investment. Subjects showed a strong tendency to match variations in their partner's investments. Cooperation was therefore achieved through a combination of initial escalation (RTS strategy) and quantitative responsiveness ('give-as-good-as-you-get' strategy). Although initial offers were higher than predicted, our results were broadly consistent with theoretical expectations.
Author(s): Roberts G, Renwick JS
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Year: 2003
Volume: 270
Issue: 1530
Pages: 2279-2283
ISSN (print): 0962-8436
ISSN (electronic): 1471-2970
Publisher: The Royal Society Publishing
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2491
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2003.2491
PubMed id: 14613615
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