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Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Ian Dobbs

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Abstract

This paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power. Under uncertainty, the unconstrained firm 'waits longer' before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary, enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry. In the certainty case, the imposition of an inter-temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution; by contrast, under uncertainty, it cannot. Even if the price cap is optimally chosen, under uncertainty, the monopoly firm will generally (a) under-invest and (b) impose quantity rationing on its customers. © Royal Economic Society 2004.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Dobbs IM

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Economic Journal

Year: 2004

Volume: 114

Issue: 495

Pages: 421-440

ISSN (print): 0013-0133

ISSN (electronic): 1468-0297

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00215.x

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00215.x


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