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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Andrew Moxey,
Dr Benedict White
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This paper evaluates alternative designs for contracts between a regulator and an agricultural producer to increase the supply of environmental public goods. Contract design, based on the principal-agent model, fakes into account an asymmetry of information between the regulator and producer whereby the regulator is unable to observe precisely the producer's compliance costs. An example is included of contracts designed for nitrate abatement.
Author(s): Moxey A, White B, Ozanne A
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: Journal of Agricultural Economics
Year of Conference: 1999
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item