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Efficient contract design for agri-environment policy

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Andrew Moxey, Dr Benedict White


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This paper evaluates alternative designs for contracts between a regulator and an agricultural producer to increase the supply of environmental public goods. Contract design, based on the principal-agent model, fakes into account an asymmetry of information between the regulator and producer whereby the regulator is unable to observe precisely the producer's compliance costs. An example is included of contracts designed for nitrate abatement.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Moxey A, White B, Ozanne A

Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)

Publication status: Published

Conference Name: Journal of Agricultural Economics

Year of Conference: 1999

Pages: 187-202

ISSN: 0021-857X

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd


DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x

Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item