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Lookup NU author(s): Emeritus Professor Alexander RomanovskyORCiD
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Design diversity is a popular defence against design faults in safety critical systems. Design diversity is at times pursued by simply isolating the development teams of the different versions, but it is presumably better to "force" diversity, by appropriate prescriptions to the teams. There are many ways of forcing diversity. Yet, managers who have to choose a cost-effective combination of these have little guidance except their own intuition. We argue the need for more scientifically based recommendations. and outline the problems with producing them. We focus on what we think is the standard basis for most recommendations: the belief that, in order to produce failure diversity among versions, project decisions should aim at causing "diversity" among the faults in the versions. We attempt to clarify what these beliefs mean, in which cases they may be justified and how they can be checked or disproved experimentally.
Author(s): Popov P, Strigini L, Romanovsky A
Editor(s): Felici, M., Kanoun, K., Pasquini, A.
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: 18th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP)
Year of Conference: 1999
Pages: 272-285
ISSN: 0302-9743 (print) 1611-3349 (online)
Publisher: Springer
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
Series Title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISBN: 9783540664888
