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How do 'busy' and 'overlap' directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Shams PathanORCiD

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Abstract

© 2017 AFAANZ. We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity-linked pay and exhibit higher pay-performance (delta) and pay-risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity-linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Pathan S, Wong PH, Benson K

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Accounting and Finance

Year: 2019

Volume: 59

Issue: 2

Pages: 1341-1382

Print publication date: 01/06/2019

Online publication date: 24/04/2017

Acceptance date: 02/04/2016

ISSN (print): 0810-5391

ISSN (electronic): 1467-629X

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12272

DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12272

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