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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Shams PathanORCiD
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© 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context.
Author(s): Fernandez Mendez C, Arrondo Garcia R, Pathan S
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad
Year: 2017
Volume: 46
Issue: 1
Pages: 28-62
Print publication date: 01/01/2017
Online publication date: 30/11/2016
Acceptance date: 13/10/2016
ISSN (print): 0210-2412
ISSN (electronic): 2332-0753
Publisher: Routledge
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345
DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345
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