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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Michael Bell, Professor Philip Lowe
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We argue that a 'free' market - that is, a market in which the state does not intervene - is a theoretical impossibility in a state society. In place of the natural economy view of a market apart from the state, we offer a social economy view of the inescapable social structuring of markets through state regulation. Even when states institute policies which prevent 'interference' in a market, the enforcement power of the state is no less required. We thus distinguish between two forms of regulation: negative regulation - regulation which prevents interference - and positive regulation - regulation which enables interference. These two forms of regulation make possible two different conceptions of freedom, what Isaiah Berlin once termed 'negative freedom' from agency and 'positive freedom' to have agency. We argue that positive and negative freedom and positive and negative regulation are inseparable; freedom is always contextual. Through a discussion of the debate between industrial agriculture and environmentalists, we show that both supporters and critics of the 'free' market are alike in their advocacy, often unacknowledged, of both negative and positive forms of regulation. Rather then a lessening of regulation, this debate represents the institution of a new regulatory regime out of the contest of interests. We conclude by considering the implications for democracy of the contextual character of freedom. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Author(s): Bell MM, Lowe P
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Journal of Rural Studies
Year: 2000
Volume: 16
Issue: 3
Pages: 285-294
Print publication date: 01/07/2000
ISSN (print): 0743-0167
ISSN (electronic): 1873-1392
Publisher: Pergamon
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0743-0167(99)00062-5
DOI: 10.1016/S0743-0167(99)00062-5
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